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EXIT MONOLOGUES IN ROMAN COMEDY

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IN A previous discussion of the content and function of link monologues¹ we found that they served primarily to promote continuous action. In itself the exit monologue usually provides a potential vacant stage before the beginning of the next chapter of action and an opportunity for the dramatist to interrupt the action with a substantial pause. To this extent link monologue and exit monologue are antithetical in function. But the potential vacant stage is not necessarily realized. The characters who appear in the next scene may emerge immediately, without any considerable pause. Since the texts of comedy transmitted to us contain no stage directions,² modern editors are dependent upon the context in each case in order to determine whether a potential vacant stage is actual. The problem of vacant stages, substantial pauses, and consequent act divisions is a subject of controversy.³ In this connection it should be observed that,

¹ *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV (1939), 1-23, 116-26, where a general introduction on the monologue and a bibliography are provided. In the present article references to Leo, unless otherwise defined, are to "Der Monolog im Drama," *Abhandl. d. könig. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (Phil.-hist. Kl.), Vol. X, No. 5 (Berlin, 1908). Exit monologues should not be studied apart from the general technique of exit, but no such study of exit technique has as yet appeared. Mary Johnston (*Entrances and Exits in Roman Comedy* [Geneva, 1933]) is interested mainly in the use of the side entrances; Katherine S. Bennett (*The Motivations of Exits in Greek and Latin Comedy* [Ann Arbor Press, 1932]) is concerned with one phase of exit technique.

² A solitary exception at *Aul.* 60; cf. Lindsay, "Ancient Editions of Plautus," *University of St. Andrews Publications*, No. III [Oxford, 1904], 81-82 and 83; and Leo, *GGA* (1904), 362, n. 1. The equivalent of stage directions is often provided by the text itself.

³ For a recent general treatment of the problem cf. R. T. Weissinger, "A Study of Act Divisions in Classical Drama," *Iowa Studies in Classical Philology*, No. IX (1940), where earlier bibliography is cited (pp. 133 ff.).

whereas the link monologue emphasizes its function in continuing the stream of action by very regularly announcing the entrance of characters in the next scene, the exit monologue includes such an announcement in only about a dozen examples. In this minority of cases a subsequent vacant stage is impossible. The relative infrequency in announcing the entrance of new characters underlines the conspicuous difference between the exit and the link monologue.

Critics of modern drama raise the question of why there are exit monologues in European drama of the seventeenth and later centuries. These critics are apologists for the use of monologues in the technique of the modern theater. They answer the question by suggesting the advantage of varying the monotony of group exits, of relieving the awkwardness incidental to such group exits, and in general of facilitating the departure of the last speaker in a dialogue scene. They further emphasize the lack of a drop curtain in the earlier periods of European drama as promoting the use of exit monologues and preventing the tableau effects at the end of scenes. This lack of a curtain was probably a feature of the ancient theater in the earlier periods.⁴ Such an apologetic attitude, however, is out of place in a consideration of ancient drama. The soliloquy was a racial characteristic of the Greeks and Italians and emerged naturally in the drama as soon as the organic chorus disappeared.⁵

We shall distinguish three varieties of exit monologue: the true exit monologue and, in distinction from it, the quasi-monologue spoken in the presence of others but not intended for their ears and, finally, the entrance-exit monologue delivered by an entering character who makes his exit at the conclusion of his solo speech;⁶ in this last type we shall not include the prologues of comedy, which, if uttered by a prologus or by a divinity, are both entrance and exit

⁴ Cf. Düsel, *Die dramatische Monologe in d. Poetik d. 17. u. 18. Jahrhunderte* . . . (Hamburg, 1897), *passim*; Arnold, *The Soliloquies of Shakespeare* (1911), 87-88; Roessler, *The Soliloquy in German Drama* (1915), 18; Flickinger, *The Greek Theater and Its Drama*⁴ (University of Chicago Press, 1936), 243 ff., 247, 250, 311.

⁵ Quantitatively, exit monologues are just about as numerous as link monologues, approximately one hundred in each case, but both are outnumbered by entrance monologues, which, including the "Zutrittsmonolog," amount to about two hundred and seventy.

⁶ Leo seldom includes the quasi-monologue and, as far as he observes at all the entrance-exit monologues, enumerates them only under entrance monologues.

speeches but in this respect are of no interest in a study of dramatic technique. We are concerned with the content and the function of these exit monologues and with certain characteristic features of style.

I

The content of these monologues is marked by two recurrent themes: a reaction to the preceding action or existing situation and a statement of more or less immediate future action. Link monologues and exit monologues are alike in beginning usually in a reflective or deliberative mood suggested by the context. But they part company and assert their respective individualities in what follows the reflective reaction: the link monologue concludes with an announcement of the oncoming character in the following scene; the exit monologue in only about a dozen of approximately one hundred cases announces an entrance but regularly concludes with a statement of the speaker's intended movements and action. In this respect the link monologue advertises its purpose of continuing the stream of action, while, at least apparently, the exit monologue interrupts the current by clearing the stage for new developments. Both the reflection and the program of future action in exit monologues are natural; both are monotonously recurrent. The program of action, in the particularity with which it states just where the speaker is going and just what he is about to do, often betrays the dramatist as somewhat mechanically providing information through which the audience may follow the precise movements of the characters and the evolution of the plot. Here the exit monologue shares with other features of comedy the function of making the development of the action intelligible to the spectators.⁷

Deviations from this normal content are rare and appear usually in the shorter forms of the monologue. Reaction to the existing situation is sometimes neglected.⁸ So, too, there are occasional failures to

⁷ For some general remarks on various methods by which the dramatists assure themselves that the audience is intelligently following the development of the action cf. Legrand, *Daos* (Lyons and Paris, 1910), 533 ff.

⁸ So, in the quasi-monologue in *Truc.* 697-98, spoken in the presence of Astaphium and perhaps in this case intended for her ears, Truculentus, without any specific reaction to the previous scene, remarks simply that he is being carried off to a tavern where he will be poorly entertained at his own expense. Shortest of all exit monologues is *And.* 819: "sequar hos: me nolo in tempore hoc videat senex," where only immediate action is indicated; Leo omits it in his list (57, n. 4), but *hos* clearly reveals a monologue. *Stich.* 671-72 (omitted by Leo, 56, n. 2), *Capt.* 192-94 (omitted in Leo, 59), *Cas.* 589-90

provide a statement of future action.⁹ Though some of these clipped forms appear in short monologues, mere brevity is not synonymous with deviations from the norm. Within the compass of half-a-dozen or fewer verses the dramatists often cover both reaction to the preceding dialogue and a program of future action.¹⁰

When, as is often the case, the monologue expands beyond these narrow limits, the enlargement appears in the reaction to the immediate situation. The program of future action, on the other hand, usually remains intact within the compass of a few verses. There are, however, relatively few cases of extravagant length such as we found on occasion in the link monologue (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV [1939], 8 ff., 120-21), at least not among the true or quasi-monologues. The special type which I have called "entrance-exit" monologues in several cases is unduly extended, but in accord with the style of entrance solo speeches rather than in conformity to any distinguishing characteristic of exit technique.

Any slight excess of emotion or intensity of reflection may lead to a slight extension of the reaction to the immediate situation.¹¹ These

(not included in Leo, 54); *Men.* 216-17 (quasi-monologue in presence of Erotium), *Merc.* 466-68 (a quasi-monologue in the presence of Charinus and Eutychus and overheard by the latter; not included in Leo, 49), *Most.* 931-32, *Persa* 165-66 (not certainly a monologue), *Eun.* 918-22 (announcing oncoming character with curious abruptness); *Phorm.* 311-14 (again not regarded as a monologue by Leo, 58, n. 4, but cf. Dziatzko-Hauser, *ad loc.*) are all examples of short monologues in which reaction to the immediate situation is neglected.

⁹ So in *Trin.* 199-222, *Truc.* 633-44 (though Stratophanes does indicate an intention to abandon Phronesium) and *Hec.* 274-80 (but slight suggestion of future action in 280), 566-76, 794-98. *Merc.* 817-29 is a topical monologue, and the peculiar subject matter perhaps explains the absence of a statement of future action. Most of these are of excessive length and unusual content and will be discussed later from other points of view.

¹⁰ So in *Cist.* 626-30, 650-52 (a quasi-monologue in the presence of Halisca; cf. 637); *Capt.* 766-67 (cf. Fraenkel, *Plaut. im Pl.*, 181, n. 1); *Amph.* 858-60; *Aul.* 274-79, 403-6 (an entrance-exit monologue, omitted in Leo, 56, n. 6), 624-27 (an entrance-exit monologue), 677-81; *Men.* 665-67 (quasi-monologue in presence of Menaechmus, omitted in Leo, 59, n. 5), 441-45 (a quasi-monologue in presence of the sailors), 698-700; *Poen.* 445-48; *Stich.* 398-401; *Heaut.* 167-70; *Hec.* 510-15; *Adelph.* 507-10, 587-91, 707-12, 782-86.

¹¹ As in *Amph.* 455 ff. (quasi-monologue in presence of Mercury); *Cas.* 549 ff. (quasi-monologue in presence of Cleustrata and overheard by her); *Men.* 1039 ff.; *Miles* 576 ff. (quasi), 586 ff.; *Poen.* 787 ff. (quasi); *Rud.* 1184 ff.; *Stich.* 497 ff., 632 ff.; *Trin.* 591 ff., 718 ff.; *Truc.* 434 ff., 633 ff. (quasi, in presence of a puer); *And.* 425 ff. (quasi, in presence of Davos and Simo).

cases are kept within reasonable limits, and in general the monologues, inclusive of reflection and program of future action, seldom exceed a dozen verses. Much less natural are the expansions of material when an expository element enters into the composition. In such cases the exposition is often a manifest effort, like the program of future action, to clarify the plot of the play by narrating off-stage action or by contributing to the presuppositions or by various other approximations to what we may call the "prologue style." The spectator is unduly conscious that he is being informed of necessary facts. Such material is, of course, not peculiar to exit monologues but characteristic both of other types of monologue and, in general, of the somewhat naïve technique of Hellenistic and Roman comedy.

The narrative of off-stage action is characteristic of entrance monologues,¹² and when it appears in exit monologues these are almost always of the peculiar type which I have called entrance-exit monologues. So in *Aul.* 373-81, 624-27 (cf. 669), 705-11; elaborately, with some Roman coloring, in the intermezzo of Ergasilus at *Capt.* 461-97, and, following immediately, at 498-515 in Hegio's monody, finally in the same play at 909-22 (if we assume that the *puer* made his exit before the others appeared at 923). Not only are these entrance-exit monologues, but they are limited to two plays—the *Aulularia* and the *Captivi*. We have observed peculiarities in the link monologues of the *Aulularia*, resulting probably from the nature of the plot (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV [1939], 117-18), and the three cases in the *Captivi* illustrate the interlude technique which is somewhat obvious in that play. Again, at *Rud.* 892, Daemones devotes his solo speech entirely to the jealousy of his wife and the fishing trip of his slave. Prologue style is more apparent when the audience is directly addressed, as at *Stich.* 673-82. The speech of Lydus at *Bacch.* 368-84 reveals his impressions of the atmosphere of the sisters' establishment but does not report action off stage; again it is an entrance-exit monologue. A rare example among true exit monologues occurs at *Pseud.* 896-902. The entrance-exit monologues in this category, apart from the content, are notably time-filling in function, as we shall later observe (pp. 13 ff., 16 ff.).

¹² Leo (71-72) classifies according to their content the monologues of the Latin plays derived from originals by Philemon, Diphilus, and Menander; cf. also Law, *Studies in the Songs of Plautine Comedy* (Menasha, Wis., 1922), 49-51, 54, n. 3.

More often the expository tendencies are manifested in solo speeches in which the reaction to the existing situation is expanded to include statements of past action and of plans for the future in a style which we associate with the prologues of comedy. Many of these are simply the somewhat conventionalized monologues of archintriguers who summarize their past achievements and, in moods varying from despair to triumphant self-confidence, engage in prophetic outlook toward the future. Chrysalus in *Bacch.* 349-65 is conscious of success but dubious about the future; Chalinus in *Cas.* 504-10 more briefly summarizes past success, optimistically views the future; Pseudolus (*Pseud.* 562-70) directly addresses the audience, assures them of his efficiency and inventive capacity, and in 759-63 more confidently expresses his certainty of success; Epidicus in *Epid.* 158-63 announces the beginning of his intrigue and tries to stiffen his own backbone, and in 306-18 more elaborately expounds his plans for the future. Geta, at least a first assistant in intrigue, reports his past accomplishments and dubiously regards the future in *Phorm.* 778-81. Similar speeches from other characters appear rarely. Mnesilochus, in a quasi-monologue of considerable length at *Bacch.* 500 ff., enlarges on his plans for the future (here, unusually, after announcement of his own immediate future action in *domum ibo* of 507); very briefly Simo in *Pseud.* 1238 ff. plans the discomfiture of Pseudolus, unconscious of the humorous effect of his unwarranted self-confidence.

In these cases reflection passes into narrative and prospectus, but specific qualities of prologue style are more apparent when the narrative contains facts that antedate the beginning of dramatic action and presuppositions for which a prologue is a natural vehicle of expression. Sometimes such facts are brief insertions in the midst of reflection, as in *Curc.* 528-29 and *Capt.* 759-62 (a quasi-monologue). It is noteworthy that three conspicuous cases occur in Terence and might slightly confirm a view that Terence eliminated the prologues in his Greek originals and was forced to supply expository material elsewhere. Of these, two are brief, *Eun.* 202-5 and *Hec.* 572-74. The third—in *And.* 206 ff.—is of greater length, covering 215-224; it is primarily part of the archintriguer's deliberation on initiating his plan of action, but the material bearing on the plot of the play is of great

importance for the understanding of later developments.¹³ This prologizing style reaches its maximum in the unique speech of the *lena* in *Cist.* 120–48, a true exit monologue; but in its length (motivated by the heavy ballast of wine which she carries), in its full statement of presuppositions, and in its general style it would be regarded as an intercalated prologue if it were not immediately followed by a more nearly genuine prologue delivered by Auxilium, who peevishly remarks that the *lena* has left little more to be said (149 ff.)¹⁴

This expository tendency takes a different turn in an isolated case. In this instance we find the entire exit speech devoted to the discussion of a set topic, and the speech lacks the final announcement of immediate future action which regularly concludes the exit monologue. The speaker proposes a moral reform—the abolition of the double standard; this moralizing speech of Syra in *Merc.* 817–29 is suggested by the action of the preceding scenes, but it is a unique case of subject matter more often found in entrance monologues.¹⁵

There is a close parallel to the moralizing topical monologue of Syra in the moralizing of Megaronides as he makes his exit at *Trin.* 199 ff., and Leo (*Plaut. Forsch.*², 122) has already noted that Philemon is the author of the Greek originals of the *Mercator* and of the *Trinummus*. In both passages there is no announcement of future action at the end of the speech, so that the topical character of both speeches is thrown into sharp relief. But in the *Trinummus* the generalizations on scandalmongers (199–211) are specifically illustrated in Megaronides' own case (212 ff.), while in the *Mercator* the spectator is left to infer the application of the doctrine.¹⁶

¹³ Cf. Fields, *The Technique of Exposition in Roman Comedy* (University of Chicago Libraries, 1938), 65; Harsh, *Studies in "Preparation" in Roman Comedy* (University of Chicago Press, 1935), 37. On the view that Terence eliminated the Greek prologues cf. Frank, *Amer. Jour. Phil.*, XLIX (1928), 309 ff.

¹⁴ Leo (56, n. 1) strangely lists the monologue of the *lena* as an entrance speech. Auxilium, in the opening words of the prologue, indicates that he has overheard the *lena*'s speech, but I assume that this is supernatural overhearing. On the speech of Auxilium, Fields (*op. cit.*, 55) remarks that it "serves primarily to correct the impression given throughout the previous scene . . . that Melaenis is actually Selenium's mother."

¹⁵ For the full significance of the speech and for Euripidean parallels cf. Leo, *Plaut. Forsch.*², 120–22.

¹⁶ Similar moralizing comments on social groups appear in abbreviated form as incidental to the exit monologue: *Stich.* 641 ff. in an entrance-exit monologue; *Poen.* 811–13 in a quasi-monologue; *Hec.* 274–75. And critical remarks on classes in society,

In contrast with all these various ways in which the reaction to the immediate situation may be expanded so that the reflection is enlarged and the monologue as a whole sometimes carried to excessive length, the second part, the program of future action, with few exceptions is left intact.¹⁷ We noted above, in connection with *Bacch.* 500 ff., that the statement of future action in *domum ibo* of 507 is followed by material that usually precedes such an announcement. In *Aul.* 105-17 an elaborate plan of future action follows "diserucior . . . quia ab domo abeundum est mihi" of 105, but this statement is blended with some reflection (111-17) and the conventional formula concludes the monologue (118-19). A rambling repetitiousness marks the program in a few cases. At *Poen.* 920 *ibo intro* is followed by various reflections that bear upon future, rather than past, action, and at 929 *intro ibo* is repeated; in *Pseud.* 1241 "at ego iam intus provisam" is followed by a brief character-sketch of Pseudolus, and at 1245 "nunc ibo intro," etc., repeats the previous statement; at *Rud.* 586 "quin abeo huc in Veneris fanum" is followed by a comical digression on the hospitality of Neptune in 588-91, and then in 592 "nunc lenonem quid agit intus visam" essentially repeats 586. Modern critics eliminate the repetitiousness of the *Poenulus* by bracketing 923-29, but the other two passages may protect the traditional text. However, it is in general true that the program of future action is remarkably brief and concise. In about a dozen cases¹⁸ the announcement of

trades, professions, and the like are characteristic of comedy; cf. Leo, *Plaut. Forsch.* 2, 131, and *Class. Phil.*, XIII (1918), 135.

¹⁷ *Amph.* 974 ff. is only an apparent exception; here Jupiter breaks the mold of true monologue by addressing *divinus Sosia*, who is present in only a supernatural sense, in terms that may be described as a substitute for the normal program of future action. The entrance-exit monologue in *Aul.* 363-70, dubiously ascribed to Pythodiceus, is eccentric; it starts with a statement of future action in the briefest form and then elaborates the theme of the thievish cooks, which is suggested by the program in "inter-visam quid faciant coqui." Future action is humorously expanded in *Capt.* 901-8 in terms that point to Plautine handiwork, and to a less degree in *Merc.* 663-66; for special reasons the program is somewhat expansive in *Men.* 552-58. *Stichus* 436 ff. (probably a quasi-monologue in the presence of Epignomus and others; cf. Leo, 56, n. 2; and Conrad, *The Technique of Continuous Action in Roman Comedy* [Menasha, Wis., 1915], 43, n. 12), is a striking departure from the norm: here a long speech starts with the program, advertises the plan for the celebration, then revises it, digresses to explain the dissipation of the slaves as a Greek custom (probably a Roman insertion), and finally announces repetitiously the program in 448-53.

¹⁸ *Aul.* 697 (where note "Strobilum miror ubi sit" as an unusual formula, recurring in *Rud.* 897-98, where cf. Marx on 897; as a variation of it note, in the link monologue

the oncoming character slightly increases the compass of the exit speech and serves to continue, rather than to break, the continuity of action. Although the program of future action usually contains information of value regarding the destination of the speaker and his intended action, there are a few cases in which the information is trivial, humorous, or in other ways immaterial.¹⁹

In the larger features of style the exit speech is in accord with the other types of monologue. The monologue form is sustained usually by the use of the first person, but this "ego-style" is often reinforced by the use of the third person, referring to the speaker himself.²⁰ Supernatural beings and natural phenomena are rarely invoked.²¹ The mold of the monologue is broken sometimes by direct address to the spectators²² or to persons off stage.²³ In phraseological details there is considerable stereotyping, which arises from the situation. The beginning of the reflective portion is often marked by a reference to the departure of the character who has just made his exit. This results in constant recurrence of compounds of *ire* in various formulas which we may generalize as the "ille-abiiit" cliché. Similarly, when the program of future action begins, *ire* or its equivalent appears in various forms, "ibo intro," "domum ibo," and whatnot, or "quid ego cesso

of *Aul.* 804, "nunc seruum esse ubi dicam meum Strobilum non reperi"; *Miles* 1393 (prepares for the entrance but does not directly announce it); *Most.* 82-83; *Pseud.* 573 a (announces the musical interlude); *Rud.* 442 ff. (practically announces the ultimate entrance of Labrax and Charmides, though this does not occur until 485); *Stich.* 682 (seems to imply entrance of the two fellow-slaves); *And.* 226; *Heaut.* 1000; *Eun.* 918 ff. (strangely abrupt, without any reflection on previous action); *Phorm.* 314 (seems to imply Phormio's entrance, but it is more explicitly indicated before the monologue, in 308); *Hec.* 280 (but only by implication?).

¹⁹ So, e.g., *Merc.* 662-66 (in 805 he seems to have done the searching himself); *Poen.* 789-95; *Rud.* 1189-90; *Stich.* 400-401, 503-4, 638-40; *Trin.* 718-26 (but followed by a serious program).

²⁰ *Epid.* 161 ff.; *Men.* 554; *Stich.* 398, 632 ff.; *Trin.* 718; *And.* 206; *Phorm.* 781.

²¹ *Amph.* 548 ff.; *Aul.* 584, 608, 611, 613—all of which are occasioned by the nature of the plot. Frequent invocations of the *di immortales* are usually only exclamatory in effect (*Amph.* 455, *Aul.* 616, *Men.* 873, *Most.* 77, *Poen.* 923, *Trin.* 591, *Truc.* 434). Address to the *aula* in *Aul.* 580, 583 arises from the situation.

²² *Bacch.* 1072, *Men.* 879-81, *Poen.* 921-22, *Pseud.* 562, *Stich.* 446-48, 673.

²³ *Aul.* 363, 398; *Bacch.* 376; *Capt.* 456, 919; *Epid.* 661; *Merc.* 793, 800; *Rud.* 481. In *Poen.* 814 the *advocatus* addresses the other *advocati* as a chorus-leader might address the chorus. In *Rud.* 458 ff. Scepharnio deceives himself in imagining the presence of Ampelisca. Quasi-monologues, spoken in the presence of others, are sometimes interrupted by direct address to the others on stage (e.g., *Bacch.* 525).

abire" and the like. These tedious reiterations of forms of *ire* are natural and inevitable under the conditions of the exit monologue, but they tend to harden and crystallize the diction.²⁴

II

In approaching the function of the exit monologue—its serviceableness in the economic structure of the play—we must note at the outset that a given monologue seldom performs exclusively one single function but that a given function is often more prominent in one solo speech than in another. In our analysis of the content we have already

²⁴ The metrical form of the exit monologue is remarkably uniform and corresponds in this respect to the link monologue (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV [1939], 9, n. 10). Standing as it usually does at the conclusion of dialogue scenes, it normally continues the meter of the previous dialogue, with the result that iambic senarii and trochaic septenarii constitute the regular metrical mold. In a few cases this continuation of the preceding metrical forms results in other meters, as in *Curc.* 527–32 and *Hec.* 794–98 (iambic septenarii). In *Heaut.* 996–1002 the meter of the previous dialogue is continued in 996–99 but abruptly changes in 1000–1002 to iambic septenarii and then, after the monologue, shifts to iambic octonarii; here it is interesting to note that the shift from 999 to 1000 corresponds to a change in content from reflection to the announcement of the oncoming character and the program of future action. Somewhat similarly in *Rud.* 440–57 the first two verses continue the trochaic septenarii of the previous action, but the sudden discovery of the *leno* in the distance leads to a shift to iambic senarii in 442–57, and again the break corresponds to a change from reflection to the shock of discovery and a program of future action (cf. Marx on 447). Quite different are a few cases in which the exit monologue abandons the previous meter and starts a new and independent form. The two monodies of *Capt.* 498–515 and *And.* 481–88 are perfectly regular; they are entrance-exit songs, and their lyrical form corresponds to the normal entrance song. On the other hand, *Stich.* 673–82, in addition to its peculiar content (cf. above, p. 5) and its mechanical function as a time-filling entrance-exit monologue, introduces an independent metrical system of iambic septenarii between the iambic senarii and the trochaic septenarii of the enviroing scenes; this solo speech is again an entrance-exit monologue, and its peculiar meter may accord with its function as primarily an entrance speech. But no such defense can be offered for *Hec.* 566–76; although part of its content is expository and although, like the passage of the *Stichus*, it is a pure exit monologue, instead of continuing the preceding trochaic septenarii it starts a new system of iambic octonarii, which are continued in the following dialogue scene. This deviation is paralleled by another Terentian passage in *Adelph.* 707–12, where, after a dialogue scene in trochaic septenarii, the exit monologue begins an independent system of iambic septenarii, but, in this case, the new system is not continued in 713 ff.; the meter of 712 is disputed (cf. Dziatzko-Kauer, *Anhang, ad loc.*). Perhaps the most interesting departure is at *And.* 206–27; here, in a true exit monologue of unusual content (cf. above, pp. 6–7), we have within the monologue itself shifts of meter that obviously correspond with changes in mood and subject matter; 206–14 in a reflective mood continue the meter of the preceding iambic octonarii, but the shift to purely expository material in 215–24 is accompanied by a change to iambic senarii, after which the iambic octonarii are resumed in 225 and 227 (but interrupted by an iambic senarius in 226) in a brief announcement of the oncoming character and program of action. In general, as in the link monologue, metrical peculiarities are more conspicuous in Terence than in Plautus.

covered one important function. The program of immediate future action clarifies the action and the movements of the active roles and enables the audience to follow the play with a higher degree of intelligence.²⁵

Of greater significance is the structural value of the exit monologue. As in the link monologue (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV [1939], 116-26), so in the solo exit speech, the speaker not only reacts naturally to the immediate situation in what he says but often serves as an economic convenience in the time which he takes to say it. The problem of time-filling may arise from the necessities of the plot in combination with features of the stage setting or from purely external conditions. (1) A fixed scenic background without provision for change of scenes forces a dramatist to cover the time for off-stage action (which cannot be dramatically presented) by dramatic action on stage. In such a case he is easily tempted into trivial or inorganic action to fill the interval and into mechanical devices. (2) If the cast is limited in number so that a dozen roles must be played by half-a-dozen actors, the time needed for changing roles must be covered by action on stage. If a dramatist has a chorus at his disposal, he easily solves either or both of these difficulties by bringing on his chorus whenever he needs to fill time intervals. In non-choral drama he may devise, for the same purposes, intermezzo dancing, musical interlude, pantomime, or what-not; or he may interrupt the dramatic action by substantial pauses, corresponding to the curtain fall in modern drama, which will plausibly suggest lapses of time. Any objective consideration of the Roman comedies reveals another device for filling time. Entrance, link, and exit monologues are often patent conveniences in settling the two problems of the dramatist: during a solo speech by one character off-

²⁵ An incidental and infrequent function is characterization. I do not refer to artistic self-revelation, such as we find in Euclio's speeches in the *Aulularia* or in the parasite's utterances in *Capt.* 461 ff., 901 ff., but to somewhat obvious cases of characterizing other participants in the action than the speaker. Demaenetus in *Asin.* 118-22 sketches the effective cleverness of the slave; in *Most.* 82-83 Grumio introduces Philolaches as essentially virtuous; Simo in *Pseud.* 1243-44 pictures Pseudolus as a second Odysseus; Charmides in *Rud.* 584-85 berates Labrax as a pitiless slave-dealer; Daemones, in the same play in 1259-62, presents Gripus as a typical rascally slave; Micio in *Adelph.* 143-47 characterizes his brother, and in 707-9 Aeschinus affectionately describes Micio. Leo (*Plaut. Forsch.*², 121) subtly observes that Syra in *Merc.* 817, by lingering to deliver her topical monologue after Eutychus has dashed into the house, realizes the characterization of herself provided at 670 ff. as a sluggish old woman, eighty-four years of age.

stage action may be accomplished by other characters, or actors who play one role before the solo speech may reappear after it in new roles.

It is seldom possible to determine just how the roles in Roman comedy were distributed among a limited cast, and in the following analysis I shall limit myself to a few cases in which, I believe, the distribution is fairly clear. In the main we shall be observing the use of exit monologues to cover the intervals between the exit and the return of the same characters or to fill time for off-stage action, that is, we shall be able to demonstrate the function of the monologue in meeting the first of the two problems listed above; but we can only imperfectly suggest in a few clear cases the use of the monologue to provide for change of roles.

In our discussion we must confront another problem. In the time probably of Varro, a generation or two after the death of Terence, ancient critics divided the plays of Terence into acts; such a division is described in the commentary of Donatus on Terence's plays, survives in some manuscripts, and is perpetuated in modern texts. In the edition of Plautus made by Pius in 1500 a similar division into acts was constituted and is perpetuated with some modifications in our modern texts of Plautus. As far as such a traditional act division posits regularly recurring pauses in the dramatic action as presented on the Roman stage, we shall be interested in observing how frequently such act divisions occur immediately before or after exit monologues which in themselves primarily fill intervals of time. If such a juxtaposition of two time-filling devices frequently occurs, it would seem that one of them is superfluous. In my own view the evidence tends to discredit the validity of such act division in the cases in which it immediately precedes or follows time-filling monologues.²⁶

²⁶ In the subsequent analysis I shall use the term "traditional act division" to indicate act division in the Oxford texts of Plautus and of Terence. The division in our modern texts, illustrated by the practice of the Oxford texts, has been subjected to criticism from various points of view by Burekhardt, Conrad, Freté, Keym, Legrand, Leo, and Weissinger; cf. the bibliography in Weissinger (*op. cit.*, 133-37) for the titles of their books. As I do not intend to discuss the matter except as it is affected by exit monologues, I indicate the recent reaction only by references to the conclusions of Weissinger (*op. cit.*, 62-99), especially his list of vacant stages accompanied by pauses in the action which point to act divisions; these are marked by an asterisk in his collection on p. 86.

Our analysis will include, primarily, monologues that in themselves fill intervals of time, without any additional elements and, secondarily, monologues that in combination with relatively brief passages, whether other monologues or dialogue, assist in filling time.

In the case of link monologues we noted that two plays—the *Aulularia* and the earlier scenes of the *Miles*—differed from the others in a conspicuously liberal use of the monologue to fill time. In respect to exit monologues the same observation applies to the *Aulularia* but not to the *Miles*. In the former at least nine exit monologues, by themselves or in combinations, fill time. Most of these, however, are in combination with short environing passages: so at 274 ff., where 265–79 fill the interval needed for Megadorus to go to the market place and hire the cooks who appear at 280;²⁷ at 363 ff. (the monologue dubiously ascribed to Pythodiceus as an entrance-exit speech) the monologue combines with 373 ff. (an entrance-exit monologue of excessive length because of its notable report of off-stage action in prologue style) to fill the interval between the exit and return of Congrio; 391–97, which is a continuation of 371–89, and the entrance-exit monologue of Anthrax combine to fill the space between Congrio's speech at 390–91 and his enforced entrance at 406; and the time between Euclio's exit at 676 and his return at 713 is filled by a combination of the exit monologue at 677–81, the brief dialogue of 682–95, a second exit monologue at 696–700, and an entrance-exit monologue in 701–12—almost a perfect chain of solo speeches.²⁸ On the other hand, the exit monologue per se fills intervals only a few times: 398–405, an entrance-exit monologue, provides time for Euclio to enter the house and drive out Congrio at 406; 616–23 covers Euclio's absence; and 624–27, again an entrance-exit monologue, covers the interval between the slave's exit at 623 and his forced entrance at 628. Thus, in general, the *Aulularia* again illustrates peculiarities of structure incident to the constant movement from place to place occasioned by the special nature of the situation and the plot. The *Miles*, on the other hand, in the hole-in-the-wall theme, furnishes no examples of time-filling exit monologues corresponding to the link monologues previously discussed in *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV (1939), 117–18.

²⁷ Yet Weissinger (*op. cit.*, 86) posits an act division after 279.

²⁸ But Weissinger inserts an act division after 700.

Except in the *Aulularia* the exit solo speech rarely appears in a given play more than once or twice as a time-filler, at least by itself. Combinatory sequences increase the number of cases appreciably. *Bacch.* 1067-75 combines with the solo song of Philoxenus in 1076-86 to fill the interval between the exit and the return of Nicobulus. *Men.* 441-45—a quasi-monologue in the presence of the sailors—unites with the entrance monologue of Peniculus in 446-65 to cover the absence of Menaechmus Sosicles from the stage, during which he has dined with Erotium.²⁹ Somewhat differently the monologue in *Men.* 550-58 forms the conclusion of a dialogue scene which, as a whole, covers the absence of Peniculus within the house, in this case with rather trivial action.³⁰ The topical monologue of Syra at *Merc.* 817-29 combines with the entrance monologue at 830-41 to bridge the interval between the exit and return of Eutyclus, again making a pause unlikely before 830, where modern texts posit the beginning of an act.³¹ *Rud.* 1258-64 concludes a dialogue scene, mostly patter talk, which as a whole covers the absence of Trachalio; in the interval Trachalio has gone to the city and fetched his master, requiring considerable time for that purpose. The brief monologue at *Trin.* 1110-14 in combination with 1115-24, an entrance monologue, covers the interval between the exit and return of Charmides and Callicles; here it has been observed that *modo* in 1120 presupposes a greater lapse of time than is plausibly suggested by 1115-19, unless there was a pause in the action before 1115; in this case the traditional act division between 1114 and 1115 might provide an additional lapse of time, but much depends on how rigorously these dramatists represented actual lapses of time.³² In most of the examples one notes the striking recurrence of the sequence, exit monologue plus entrance monologue, as the means of filling time. This sequence appears again in Terence. *Hec.* 510-15 is followed by Myrrhina's brief entrance song to cover

²⁹ In the traditional act division, approved by Weissinger, a new act begins after 445.

³⁰ The act division after 558 in the Oxford text is not approved by Weissinger; cf. Leo, 59, n. 4, and Conrad, *op. cit.*, 56.

³¹ The traditional act division before 830 is not accepted by Weissinger. For the variant views regarding act division in the *Mercator* cf. Weissinger, *op. cit.*, 71-73.

³² Cf. *Epid.* 611 with 607-9; Conrad, *op. cit.*, 25 ff. and 81; Johnston, *op. cit.*, 133.

the absence of Phidippus; here, again, traditional act division intervenes between the two monologues.³³ Without any such act division³⁴ *Hec.* 794-98 is followed by an entrance monologue at 799-807 to fill the time between the exit and the return of Bacchis. Finally, Micio's absence in *Adelph.* between 707 and 719 is filled by the exit speech in 707-12 and the entrance monologue in 713-18.³⁵ Slightly different is the use of an exit speech at *Adelph.* 782-86, which covers the absence of Demea in combination with two verses (787-88) spoken by Micio to Sostrata as he leaves her house. The constant repetition of exit monologue followed by entrance monologue as a time-filling sequence should be carefully considered by advocates of act division in the Roman productions; for, if the traditional division falls between the two elements in the sequence and involves any substantial pause in the action, we seem to have a superfluity of time-filling devices. Two different types of time, corresponding to the two different problems of the dramatist as outlined above (cf. p. 11), are filled by this same sequence in *Capt.* 901-20; this passage as a whole, composed of Ergasilus' exit monologue and the entrance monologue of the *puer*,³⁶ fills the time between the exit of Hegio and his return; but, as I have elsewhere (*Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, XXI [1910], 37-39) tried to prove, at the same time the monologue of the *puer*, taken by itself, provides time for the actor who plays Ergasilus to return in a new role at 921; Hegio, in the interval, travels to the harbor and back; the traditional act division appears at the end of the sequence in this case, not between the monologues,³⁷ but again, if attended by a substantial pause, it seems to provide superfluous time, quite apart from the loss of dramatic effect in having any pause intervene between the end of the *puer's* monologue and the arrival of Hegio and the others from the harbor.

³³ Accepted by Weissinger, *op. cit.*, 86; cf. Conrad, *op. cit.*, 51, 65.

³⁴ But Weissinger puts an act division after 798; cf. Conrad, *op. cit.*, 67.

³⁵ On the various theories of act division in the *Adelphoe* cf. Weissinger, *op. cit.*, 75. On p. 86 he posits an act division after 712.

³⁶ This may be an entrance-exit monologue; it is not clear whether the *puer's* exit is interrupted by Hegio's arrival or not.

³⁷ This act division is approved by Weissinger. The material of these two monologues is trivial padding; doubtless the trip to the harbor and back should have taken considerable time, but, if an act division is available, why invent such trivial action in order to fill time and provide for change of roles?

In these combinatory sequences the exit monologue is never of excessive length, but the content is often trivial. On the other hand, when the time-filling is achieved by the exit monologue per se, without additional elements, there are a few striking cases of extraordinary length or of eccentric subject matter or of both. And it is noteworthy that the peculiar type which we have called entrance-exit monologue is represented in several of the instances. *Bacch.* 368-84, an entrance-exit speech, provides time for Chrysalus, who made his exit in 367, to find Mnesilochus and report facts to him before Mnesilochus himself appears at 385 (cf. 391). The monologue is slightly abnormal in length but the material is relevant. It seems to suffice for the needed interval of time, and the traditional act division at 367 is again superfluous for this purpose.³⁸ *Rud.* 458-84 is of extraordinary length; as an entrance-exit monologue it covers the time needed for Labrax and Charmides, practically announced in 442 ff., to make their way from the seashore to the scene of action, where they appear at 485. The content of Sceparnio's speech may seem trivial; certainly, it does not advance the action; but we should be sorry to miss the charm of his vain effort to find Ampelisca and his self-confidence as a successful lady-killer. It seems to me to fill plausibly a considerable time interval with entertaining material. But in any case it prepares us for an example which is of extravagant length and which, in material, approximates a vaudeville episode. The entrance-exit monologue of the parasite at *Capt.* 461-97 fills the interval between the exit and return of Hegio, during which he visits his brother's house and interviews his other captives. Ergasilus is loosely attached to the play as a whole, and his speech here consists of a report of trivial off-stage action and threats of future action which, like his utterances elsewhere, afford comic relief in a play that, without him, would be almost a tragedy. Roman material is somewhat conspicuous in this monologue.³⁹ In general the speech seems to be entertaining patter talk for time-filling purposes, perhaps expanded by the Roman author. In spite of its length and obvious function as a

³⁸ Weissinger accepts the traditional division. An excellent example of the distortion of time in these dramas is furnished by the contrast between "continuo . . . protinam" in 374 and the fact that Lydus was within the house during a period covered by 170-367. Fraenkel (*op. cit.*, 151-53) finds traces of Plautine handiwork in the monologue.

³⁹ Cf. Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, 108, 246 ff.

time-filler, a traditional act division is indicated just before it, increasing the amount of time-filling.⁴⁰ An entrance-exit monologue stands at *Rud.* 892-905. Here the speaker is an organic role, *Daemones*; the speech is relatively short but manifestly trivial in content; it refers to off-stage action briefly, introduces *Gripus* for the following scene, but otherwise is mere padding to provide for *Charmides*, who exits at 891, to appear in the role of *Trachalio*, who appears at 906 in close attendance on *Gripus*, as I have argued fully in *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LXIII (1932), 120-24. And in this case, again, we find the advocates of act division extending the lapse of time unwisely by beginning the third act just before *Daemones'* speech.⁴¹

Other examples of time-filling exit monologues are not marked by any eccentricities in length or in subject matter.⁴² *Cas.* 504-14 fills

⁴⁰ The act division after 460 is approved by Weissinger.

⁴¹ On the various views of act division in the *Rudens* cf. Weissinger (*op. cit.*, 73-74), who brings out the fact that all the critics agree in an act division after 891, although in other respects they are at odds; he himself approves this act division.

⁴² Other critics might expect to find in the list of exit monologues of extraordinary length and unusual content the notorious passages at *Curc.* 462-86 and *Pseud.* 767-89, which are manifest time-fillers. If the *choragus* and the *puer* made their exits at the end of these speeches, they might well be entrance-exit monologues according to my terminology. But I have regretfully convinced myself that such exits cannot safely be assumed at the ends of these speeches and that the speakers may have held over into the following scenes. The evidence for this conclusion lies in the phraseology at the ends of the two monologues:

Curc. 486: sed interim fores crepuere: linguae moderandum est mihi.

Pseud. 787: sed comprimenda est mihi vox atque oratio:
erus eecum recipit se domum et ducit coquam.

This phrasing does not point to exit but to remaining on the stage for the next scene. The creaking doors are the regular formula at the end of pure entrance monologues (unless followed by indication of exit) or link monologues (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV [1939], 5 and 116, n. 27), and such expressions as *linguae moderari* and *voce comprimere* are quite unlikely as a prelude to exit. So they regularly appear elsewhere as part of the announcement of an oncoming character:

Amph. 495: orationem comprimam: crepuit foris.
Amphitruo subdituos eecum exit foras.

Pseud. 409: sed comprimunda vox mihi atque oratiost:
erum eecum video huc Simonem simul
cum suo vicino Calliphone incedere.

Miles 270: sed fores crepuerunt nostrae, ego voci moderabor meae;
nam illic est Philocomasio custos meus conseruos qui ite foras.

This conviction will lead me to retract some statements that I made in earlier articles regarding these two monologues but fortunately without invalidating the arguments there presented.

an interval between the exit and the return of Lysidamus, during which he has found his next-door neighbor. The act division before 515 seems unnecessary.⁴³ *Curc.* 527-32 intervenes between the exit and return of Lyco, who in the interval has met Therapontigonus and appears with him at 533; the return of Lyco is curiously speedy unless we are to assume that he met Therapontigonus almost as soon as he left the stage. Traditional act division allows for no pause after 532, but individual critics, such as Weissinger, posit one.⁴⁴ Similarly, *Men.* 876-81 is almost too short to cover plausibly the absence of the *senex* (cf. 882-83),⁴⁵ and *Merc.* 792-802 allows scanty time for the removal of the *vasa* and for Syra to seek unsuccessfully Dorippa's father;⁴⁶ in these two cases, again, Weissinger puts act divisions after the monologues, contrary to the traditional act division; and, if we were sure that these dramatists were at all meticulous in accurately covering intervals of time, we should approve his modification of the tradition. *Men.* 1039-49 allows Messenio time to fetch the baggage from the *taberna*.⁴⁷ *Miles* 1388-93 is probably an exit monologue and allows the soldier adequate time to enter the house of Periplectomenus in 1387, only to be driven out in 1394; here the act division at 1394 destroys the dramatic effect of his immediate expulsion.⁴⁸ *Poen.* 787-95 is a quasi-monologue in the presence of the *advocati*; in this interval Agorastocles rushes into the house of the *leno* and drags out Collybiscus. In *Rud.* 440-57 (but actually only ten verses) Ampelisca covers the interval between Sceparnio's exit to the house of Daemones and his return, and in the same play (1184-90) Gripus covers the absence

⁴³ The traditional act division at 515 is not accepted by Weissinger.

⁴⁴ The interval here is short, and there are other difficulties in the situation; cf. Langen, *Plaut. Studien*, 136 ff.

⁴⁵ Weissinger provides a pause after 881; cf. Conrad, *op. cit.*, 55; Leo, 59, n. 4.

⁴⁶ Cf. Weissinger, *op. cit.*, 71 ff., for discussion of act divisions in the *Mercator*; modern critics are pretty well agreed on a pause after 802. Conrad, however (*op. cit.*, 31, n. 29), notes the resemblance to *Men.* 737 ff. in the general situation and in the interval of time.

⁴⁷ The necessity for rapid dramatic action after 1049 prevents a pause at that point, as most modern critics admit; cf. Conrad, *op. cit.*, 50, 55.

⁴⁸ The traditional act division at 1393 is approved by Weissinger. Leo (60) and Conrad (*op. cit.*, 51, 58 n., 65) appreciate the necessity of rapid action at this point.

of Daemones within the house.⁴⁹ *Stich.* 673-82 is an entrance-exit monologue, somewhat unusual in content, and fills the time between the exit and the return of the two male slaves. *Truc.* 434-37 is a somewhat expansive elaboration of the lover's delight, filling the interval of Phronesium's preparations, within the house, for her role as *puerpera*.⁵⁰ A brief interval, in which Demipho enters the house to fetch Nausistrata, is covered by Geta's monologue in *Phorm.* 778-83. Two other passages in Terence excite considerable discussion. At *Phorm.* 308 Geta guarantees the presence of Phormio and seems to exit at 310, returning with Phormio at 315; Demea's exit monologue (311-14) is supposed to cover the interval in which Geta finds Phormio and brings him on stage—a remarkably short coverage; here a pause in the action after 314 would make the interval more plausible.⁵¹ Somewhat similarly, the four verses of Demea's exit speech at *Adelph.* 507-10 cover the time during which Hegio is absent from the stage, consoling Sostrata; here the problem arises in connection with 511-16, which some modern critics expunge from the text; in that case 507-10 do not fill an interval of time.⁵²

From this analysis⁵³ we gather that half of the exit monologues in

⁴⁹ Weissinger puts a pause after 1190; for variant views of modern critics cf. Weissinger, *op. cit.*, 73-74; also Conrad, *op. cit.*, 55.

⁵⁰ Weissinger marks a pause after 447 and here Leo (59) ends a *meros*; cf., however, Conrad, *op. cit.*, 64.

⁵¹ Weissinger (*op. cit.*, 81) proposes a musical interlude after 314. Leo (58) ends a *meros* at this point. Conrad (*op. cit.*, 55-56) suspects crude workmanship and a condensation of the Greek original. The difficulties are increased by Demipho's announced intention to enter his house and proceed from there to the forum; after this statement he re-enters with the *advocati* from the forum in 347.

⁵² For discussion of the textual question cf. Conrad (*Univ. of California Studies in Class. Phil.*, II [1916], 301-2), who defends the text and compares the situation at *Phorm.* 311-14. Weissinger approves the traditional act division after 516.

⁵³ Lest I may seem to have omitted *Eun.* 197-206 from the list of time-filling exit monologues, may I call attention to the extraordinary technique at this point? In the previous dialogue scene Phaedria, Parmeno, and Thais are the speakers. In 189 Phaedria commands Parmeno to bring on the eunuch and the Ethiopian slave whom he has bought for Thais: "huc fac illi adducantur." In 190 Phaedria bids Thais farewell, and the usual formula "num quid vis aliud" in the response of Thais points clearly to the departure of Phaedria. Accordingly, modern editors indicate the exit of Phaedria at 196, and Donatus' comment on 197 shows that the commentator understood that the soliloquy of Thais in 197-206 was not uttered in the presence of Phaedria and Parmeno, or at least was not overheard by them. Yet at the end of Thais' soliloquy Phaedria and Parmeno are on stage, and Phaedria strangely repeats the command to

Roman comedy are patent devices for filling time; about one-fourth per se, without additional elements, fill time; another fourth combine with brief environing passages and contribute to filling time. And this proportion is certainly an underestimate; for we cannot with certainty discover all the instances in which the doubling of roles occasions time-filling monologues.⁵⁴ It is, therefore, apparent that the exit monologue is not, as seems at first sight, directly opposed in function to the link monologue. The link monologue is an obvious device to continue the flow of dramatic action. But it is equally obvious that the exit monologue, with great frequency, bridges over, rather than interrupts, the stream of action. It serves, as one of many devices, to prevent a vacant stage and a substantial pause by filling an interval of time which might have been achieved by act division.

We have no intention of demolishing a theory of act division merely by emphasizing this function of the exit monologue. But it is at least clear that the pause in the action provided by act division only in a very few cases extends desirably a needed interval of time, and in these examples we cannot be sure that the improvement—so desirable from a modern standpoint—would have been appreciated by the ancient dramatists. They may have been relatively indifferent to any plausible correspondence between the actual time for off-stage action and the length of intervening action on the stage.⁵⁵ It is certainly

Parmeno, given in 189, in the words "fac, ita ut iussi, deducantur isti" of 207. If Phaedria did exit at 196, Thais' monologue is certainly a time-filling monologue covering the interval before his return, and we observe the traditional act division posited after 206 and approved by Weissinger. But where did the master and slave go? And what were they doing? There is no definite indication of exit in 196, though the preceding farewells point to it. And how are we to explain the strange repetition in 207 of the command in 189? If we imagine that Phaedria and Parmeno did not withdraw but remained on stage without hearing Thais' soliloquy, the situation is awkward; nor is the awkwardness relieved by a vacant stage and act division. Cf. Conrad, *op. cit.*, 55.

⁵⁴ So, e.g., I refrain from including *Epid.* 158-65 and 306-19 among time-filling exit monologues, although I have convinced myself that, taken together, they indicate clearly that the two roles of Chaeribulus and Apocides were played by one actor; cf. my review of Duckworth's edition of the *Epidicus* in *Class. Phil.*, XXXVI (1941), 284-85. And in both these cases traditional act division is posited: after 165, accepted by Weissinger, and after 319, not accepted by Weissinger. For other evidence, quite apart from doubling of roles, against act division at these two points cf. Conrad, *op. cit.*, 61.

⁵⁵ Conrad (*op. cit.*, 19-34) has studied the presentation of smaller intervals of time in the sections of the plays which are manifestly marked as continuous action, that is,

striking that in a large number of cases an act division, according to modern theory, appears immediately before or after a relatively long time-filling exit monologue or that, even more conspicuously, an act division intervenes between an exit and an entrance monologue which in combination obviously fill a needed interval of time. Similarly, we have noted on occasion entrance-exit monologues of unusual length and often of inorganic material which are manifest inventions to fill time; and yet modern theory posits an act division before or after such a speech. In such instances the superfluity of a pause in the action provided by act division seems to us apparent. In any case advocates of act division cannot successfully defend their position without a more intensive study than they have hitherto exhibited of the entire dramatic structure and the general economy of action.⁵⁶

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

which are clearly free from any possibility of vacant stages; his conclusion is that the time interval allowed for off-stage action may be shortened or lengthened practically without limit. If correct, this conclusion should throw doubt on any act divisions posited in order to increase apparently meager intervals of time. Brasse (*Quatenus . . . species veritatis negligatur* [Gryphimontii, 1914], 84-92), being interested mainly in the unities of time and place, dismisses all too briefly a few passages in Plautus in which the time is unduly lengthened or abbreviated but reaches the same conclusions as Conrad.

⁵⁶ Exit monologues in the new fragments of Menander are few and some of them uncertain. I refer to the third edition of Koerte (Leipzig, 1938). *Epitr.* 25-27 is spoken in the presence of others and at best is only a quasi-monologue; it is merely a program of action. *Epitr.* 240-42 (199-201 [Jensen]) seems to be an exit monologue, though it contains no definite indication of exit; it is, however, immediately followed by a *chorou*. *Epitr.* 285-87 (244-46 [J]) is probably not a monologue. *Samia* 269-70 seems to be a monologue, wholly reflective but without any precise indication of exit except as a *chorou* follows it. *Perik.* 425-27 contains the Greek background of the "ille-abiit" formula and a brief statement of future action. These are all consistently brief. Three others are of greater length and more interesting. *Perik.* 164-70 is an entrance-exit monologue, but in the presence of another; there is no specific indication of exit, however; the content may be regarded as a program of action. *Epitr.* 558-87 (494-523 [J]) is evidently regarded as an entrance-exit monologue by Koerte, but the text and action of the subsequent verses leave us in doubt (note particularly 614-16); possibly Onesimus was in hiding during the subsequent soliloquy of Charisius in 524 ff. In any case the two monologues seem to cover the time interval during which Habrotonon has her interview with Pamphila. *Epitr.* 381-406 (340-65 [J]) is a clear case of a long exit monologue, reflective in content; it resembles the reflections of the archintriguer in Roman comedy, but its length may be occasioned in part by its time-filling function in combination with the following monologue of Smicrines (407 ff.); in this case we find in Menander an example of exit monologue plus entrance monologue, such as we have noted in Roman comedy, for time-filling purposes (cf. Koerte, *Praefatio*, xxi; Jensen, *Praefatio*, xxv); during this long interval Habrotonon has the time required for carrying out her plans.

CAESURA REDIVIVA

O. J. TODD

IN A series of careful studies on the technique of Latin verse Professor E. H. Sturtevant has expressed the view that the doctrine of caesura, except in the sense of a rhetorical pause, is a "figment of the imagination," a "philological ghost."¹ But I still find it a friendly spirit, in whose company I take considerable aesthetic pleasure, and so propose letting it approach the pit for a taste of blood in the hope of putting a bit of strength, if possible, into its nerveless frame.

One must begin such an adventure with a radical difference in concept from that of those who murdered or thought they were murdering caesura. In what follows I shall regard as a caesura any instance of a word ending within a foot. This means taking issue with Sturtevant's thesis that unless such word-ends involve "interstices," i.e., sensible pauses or musical rests, they are not present to a speaker's or hearer's consciousness.²

It is true that some weakly pronounced consonants in closely connected English phrases have shown a bad habit of slipping about; and so we get "an adder," "an ought" (so spelled by Dickens and De Morgan) as against "a newt," "a nickname," "the nonce," or even, in illiterate speech, "I druther." But in educated English speech I submit that a sentence or a breath-group is not a mere continuum of syllables; there is a real (though admittedly delicate) difference between "at all" and "a tall," between "it's old" and "it sold," between "I would rather" and "I wo' drather." This does not predicate a musical rest, but it does predicate an awareness of word-ends on the part of both speaker and listener. The findings of Sapir³ to the effect that the "naïve Indian" recognizes words as entities does not seem to me to have been given due weight.⁴ On the other hand, the citation of

¹ *TAPA*, LIV (1923), 51; *AJP*, XLV (1924), 329.

² See *TAPA*, LIV, 51, 68; *AJP*, XLII (1921), 307; XLV, 346-48.

³ Quoted by Sturtevant, *AJP*, XLV, 347.

⁴ The point made in rebuttal by Bloomfield (cited *ibid.*, p. 348) that a person cannot tell offhand how many words he has used in a sentence hardly appears to be serious

phrases like ἐγ Κορινθῶ from Greek inscriptions and papyri, I feel, has been too heavily weighted. Normally these assimilations occur with clinging words; the really pertinent instances are as few as cockneyisms or misspellings. Against them one might note the constant interpunctuation in Latin inscriptions (even sometimes between adverbial prefix and verb) or the fact that, while *-br-* gives "common" measure in such words as *tenebrae*, it never does in such words as *abripit*. Why not, if there was no consciousness of a division after *ab-*? But we can go further than analogy and theory and get a bit of positive testimony from Quintilian,⁵ who tells us that "it is a bad practice to have a number of monosyllables one after the other, because the inevitable consequence is that the sentence is cut up into little chunks (endings) and goes by jerks." Obviously a string of, say, five monosyllables could not produce this effect any more than a single word of five syllables unless one were conscious of the several termini.

Slovenly speech, of course, is liable to produce a different situation; what is discrete in careful articulation may become there a mere jumble. But what warrant could one have for assuming that educated readers of Vergil were slovenly in their enunciation? Is not the general impression that the Roman *litterati* of the great age, if anything, were more nice in composition or oral reading than most of us? Certainly, Vergil went out of his way to frame verses that were not to be read hurriedly. He could have written "*quae regi talia fatur*" or, one stage more from the prosaic, "*regi quae talia fatur*"; but instead he gives us "*fatur quae talia regi*." He could have written "*amissos socios longo sermone requirunt*" but preferred "*amissos longo socios sermone requirunt*." He could have written "*memorem saevae Iunonis ob iram*" but wrote instead "*saevae memorem Iunonis ob iram*." He could have written "*et maestas voces alto de limine fundunt*" but chose, out of more than a dozen other possible and unimpeachable arrangements, the highly artificial one (from the point of view of normal prose or colloquial Latin), "*et maestas alto fundunt de limine voces*." One could multiply instances.

argument. He would be just as much liable to miscount his breath-groups or the number of sentences in a paragraph. A man afflicted with lumbago may not be able to tell how many steps he has taken, although acutely aware of every one at the time.

⁵ *Inst. orat.* ix. 4. 42: "Etiam monosyllaba, si plura sunt, male continuabuntur, quia necesse est compositio multis clausulis concisa subsultet."

If we take the word-end, then, as an entity (however tenuous and subtle) in the ears of educated Romans (for whom alone one may presume Vergil to have composed), we may call it caesura where it cuts into a metrical foot and consider its use and development in the Latin dactylic hexameter. It is not a pause in sense, which is a rhetorical, not a rhythmical or musical, division. It is not normally an isolated phenomenon but may occur, and usually does, several times in the same line; one may not speak, then, of "the" caesura, except possibly of the "masculine" caesura in the third foot, which occurs so frequently as to become expected. The purpose of caesura, it has been assumed⁶ (and I confess that I concur in this), was to prevent too much duplication in the two sorts of verse division—rhetorical and musical, words and feet—or, at any rate, to introduce a certain amount of overlapping and so prevent the line from becoming jerky. Here the caesura-slayers and the ghost-revivers disagree. Would thoroughgoing coincidence of words and feet cut the line into chunks and make it jerky? The testimony of Quintilian cited above on the effect of series of monosyllables favors the affirmative. Note that he is not discussing relation of accent and ictus, or "pitch-pattern," or breath-groups but is simply pointing out the hopping or jerky effect produced in prose by multiplicity of word-ends. Moreover, that word-ends were not "imperceptible" to the ancients in verse, either, is attested for Latin by Varro's having noticed the frequent (he overstates the case by calling it universal) ending of a word with the first syllable of the third foot: "M. etiam Varro . . . scripsit observasse sese in versu hexametro," says Gellius (xviii. 15. 2), "quod omnimodo quintus semipes verbum finiret"; and by the observation of other anonymous metricians quoted by the same compiler (*ibid.*, 1): "in longis versibus, qui hexametri vocantur, item in senariis, animadverterunt metrici primos duos pedes, item extremos duos, habere singulos posse integras partes orationis, medios haut umquam posse, sed constare eos semper ex verbis aut divisis aut mixtis atque confusis." Further, Marius Victorinus⁷ makes it clear that in his opinion the value of caesura was (not to secure conflict of accent and ictus but) to avoid coincidence of word-ends and foot-ends: "metrorum fere omnium natura talis est, ut caveant ne singulas partes

⁶ See Bassett's statement at the end of his "Theory of Homeric Caesura," *AJP*, XL (1919), 370-72; and references in Sturtevant, *AJP*, XLV, 340, n. 28.

⁷ Quoted by Bassett, *op. cit.*, p. 368, n. 42.

orationis singulorum pedum fine concludant." But test the matter empirically. Read Ennius' line "poste recumbite vestraque pectora pelite tonsis" against Ovid's "luridus, exanimi similis, sine vestibus ullis"; or Ennius' "sparsis hastis longis campus splendet et horret" against Vergil's "(hic inter flumina nota) et fontis sacros frigus captabis opacum." Even though one reads these lines (as one should not) with regard only for ictus and none for word accent (so that the question of clash or harmony does not enter), I think one will find that the mere use of word division by the later poets marks a genuine improvement.⁸

But what becomes of Sturtevant's main contention, viz., that word arrangement cutting into feet (especially in the first four) was due to the effort of the Roman poets to secure a conflict of accent and ictus early in the hexameter and a harmony in the latter part? With all deference I suggest that it is an instance of putting the cart before the horse; that such conflict was not the *cause* but the *result* of the adoption of the principle of caesura and was manifested originally throughout the Latin hexameter from end to end; that the harmony was due, in the later generations of writers, to the age-old process of a majority ousting a minority.

It is to me simply incredible that Ennius should have felt an urge to introduce clash of accent and ictus. There was nothing in either Greek or native Latin verse to suggest such a novelty. If there had been such a conflict in his Greek model, one might have understood an attempt on his part to reproduce what he found there. But there was nothing of the sort in Greek heroic or other verse. And it was dead against the usage of the native Latin versification on which he had been brought up.⁹ With nothing to guide him, therefore, either in the foreign model or in his own experience, what would ever have induced him to make such a radical innovation? One would have thought that

⁸ Sturtevant (*AJP*, XLV, 341) holds that if Ennius' line "sparsis hastis," etc., were re-written "nunc sparsis hastis longis campus splendescit," it would not be improved but made worse by increasing the "harsh consonant clusters containing the sound *s* in various surroundings." To my way of thinking, the blemish in the altered line is not the addition of one *s* (Vergil in *Aen.* iv. 10 goes to eleven) but the production of a monstrosity found only once (Catull. cxvi. 3) after the days of Ennius, i.e., a line of six disyllabic feet. In the earlier part of the line, in spite of its monotony, I should say that the new form is much superior to the old.

⁹ May I refer to an article in *CQ* for October, 1940, where the nature of the Saturnian meter is discussed at some length?

Ennius had his hands full as it was and would rather have expected him simply to follow as best he could in his new experiment the usage of the verse he had set out to reproduce in Latin and, unless something forced his hand, to go on in the Latin fashion of letting accent and ictus coincide as far as possible. But, I suggest, he found a snag. There *was* something in his Greek exemplars that compelled him to indulge in disharmony of accent and ictus, viz., the practice of caesural arrangement, the ending of a noticeable number of words within feet. And this faithful pioneer managed to reflect his original fairly well in the matter of caesura, letting it interfere to a considerable extent with the natural Latin tendency toward coincidence of accent and ictus, not merely in the first part of the line but *in the last as well*. Such line endings, therefore, as "quassat simul albam," "spumas agit altas," "conferta rate flavom," "toga superescit," "iubet horiturque," "vadunt solida vi" are a commonplace in the *Annales*. In such lines as "sparsis hastis longis campus splendet et horret," "cum legionibus quom proficiscitur induperator" it is noteworthy that Ennius pays some slight deference to caesura, but none whatever to conflict of accent and ictus.

But, as has often been remarked, there followed in the next two centuries a progressive elimination of this clash in the last two feet. If one takes, e.g., the figures for Ennius, Lucretius, and Vergil, he has before him a graphic representation of this change. Of the five possible final word divisions connected with these two feet ($\parallel \text{ } \text{—} \text{ } \text{—}$, $\parallel \text{ } \text{—} \text{ } \text{—}$, $\parallel \text{ } \text{—} \text{ } \text{—}$, $\parallel \text{ } \text{—} \text{ } \text{—}$, $\parallel \text{ } \text{—} \text{ } \text{—}$), the first and the last were bound to occur fairly infrequently—the first, I take it, because of the small number of monosyllables suitable for the end of a line, the last because of the small number of words of the requisite prosody. Of the other three, the second and the third (involving harmony of accent and ictus) taken together outnumber in the poet's vocabulary the fourth, which provides only part harmony and part conflict. Now, although caesural practice in the earlier feet of the line shows slight differences from poet to poet,¹⁰ there is no discrepancy among individual poets in this part of the line anywhere approaching the startling shift exhibited from Ennius to Vergil in the treatment of the final word division. In Ennius the tetrasyllabic word ending occurs about once in

¹⁰ See Sturtevant's figures, *TAPA*, LIV, 60, 63.

every 15 lines;¹¹ in Lucretius about once in every 43.6 lines (170 instances, of which only 4 involve Greek words); whereas in Vergil's *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Aeneid*, if one disregards 48 or 49 Greek words and Greek names,¹² there are but 5 tetrasyllabic words at the end of the line, or about 1 in 2,571.¹³

The natural interpretation of these phenomena, it seems to me, is this. In the late third century B.C. a Roman poet from near the Greek fringe of southern Italy, a man of unusual linguistic accomplishments, acquainted with Greek literature as well as with the little that existed in his day in Latin, turned away from his native Saturnian meter, where word accent quite naturally served as verse ictus, and adopted from the Greeks a new verse form wherein he found two strange elements—a superimposed foot stress (ictus) and a large amount of caesural division. Without compiling statistics or attempting to compose after a formula, he began in a rather halting and imperfect fashion to try reproducing his model. The relatively greater number of long syllables in Latin¹⁴ forced him to write with more spondaic feet than he found in Homer, but he compensated for this somewhat (whether deliberately or not) by keeping spondees to a smaller proportion in the fifth foot;¹⁵ otherwise there was a rough approximation to the Greek

¹¹ The figures here (more exactly, *ca.* 1:14.75) are based on the text of Baehrens (*Frag. poet. Rom.*); another text would doubtless give a somewhat different result, but I venture to believe that the present figures are close enough to present the picture with reasonable accuracy. There is a striking fact in this connection. According to my count, Ennius has words of the metrical value $\sim - \approx 50$ times within the line, 36 times (including 2 Greek words) at the end. Since there are 5 conceivable places for such words, according to the theory of probability they should occur as finals 17 times. Yet he has used them so, with resultant clash of accent and ictus in the fifth foot, more than double this number of times. It seems obvious that he was more interested in caesura than in harmony of accent and ictus.

¹² One need hardly dwell on the practice of Vergil and other later hexametric authors of yielding up their own normal practice in matters of caesura (and hiatus and semi-elision) for something more Homeric when dealing with Greek words or names. Such lines as "Glaucō et Panopea et Ino Melicertae" (*Verg. Georg.* i. 437) or "et Cyane et Anapus et Ortygie Arethusa" (*Sil. Ital. Pun.* xiv. 515) illustrate the point thoroughly.

¹³ Or, to put the matter another way, where Vergil uses 5 Latin tetrasyllables as finals in about 12,854 verses, Ennius is quite willing to use 40 per cent of that total in a passage of no more than half-a-dozen lines (see *Frag.* 73 and 187 [ed. Baehrens]).

¹⁴ Anyone can satisfy himself of this elementary fact by comparing random passages of Homer and Vergil, Tyrtaeus and Ovid, Thucydides and Livy, or Demosthenes and Cicero.

¹⁵ In three books chosen at random from the *Iliad* (i, ix, xxii) lines showing a spondee in the fifth foot run to 1 in 24; in Ennius' *Annales* (Baehrens' text) 1 in 48, or, with

exemplar and no marked attempt at further control.¹⁶ But meantime there had been injected, with caesurae, something new, viz., a conflict between word stress and rhythmical stress.¹⁷ In the last part of the line, however, where the diminution in the number of spondaic fifth feet limited the possible varieties rather severely, the Roman poet had a clear majority of lines showing a coincidence of these two stresses. So in the next two centuries there followed a conscious and progressive effort to let the majority rule and run the minority out of existence.¹⁸ But here is a significant fact: *the ousting of clashes in the last two feet was not accompanied by a proportional ousting of caesurae*. Vergil represents almost the final extreme of devotion to — z and ~ — z for the last word. For example, the *Fourth Georgic* (of 565 or 566 verses) ends 3 lines with monosyllables ("si quem," "et vox," "aut hos") and 7 or 8 with longer Greek words and names ("hyacinthi," "hyacinthos," "centaurea," "Phyllodoceque," "[Cymodoceque]," "Deiopea," "Orithyia," "hymenaei") but confines the other 555 to disyllables and trisyllables. A study of the vocabulary in the first hundred complete verses in the *Aeneid* would suggest that the probable ratio of — z to ~ — z would be roughly as 181:60, or 3:1, yielding for the finals of the *Fourth Georgic*, respectively, 416 and 139. The actual numbers are 355 (including "una est" and "umbra est") and 200. Sturtevant¹⁹ finds this situation "interesting"; to me it is highly significant. While presenting as finals practically nothing but words of two and three syllables, the poet has gone out of his way to

omission of lines of uncertain text or not ascribed by the ancients to Ennius, according to taste, 1 in 66 or 1 in 105; in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, 1 in 307; in Vergil's *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Aeneid*, 1 in 403.

¹⁶ As appears to be conceded by Sturtevant (*TAPA*, LIV, 56): "While, as I have shown, . . . Ennius made a distinct effort to secure harmony of accent and ictus in the last two feet of his hexameters, his success was only moderate."

¹⁷ In which case it would seem reasonable to suppose that, while the pitch element in the Latin word accent remained, its stress was overridden, though perhaps not quite eliminated, by the ictus (see Sturtevant's remarks on this point, *ibid.*, 61 f.).

¹⁸ In fact, Vergil goes every once in a while so far as to end the line with three harmonies, e.g., "caeco carpitur igni" (*Aen.* iv. 2), "infixi pectore vultus" (*ibid.*, l. 4), "lustrabat lampade terras" (*ibid.*, l. 6), "suspensam insomnia terrent" (*ibid.*, l. 9); and even four are not impossible; cf., e.g., *Aen.* i. 295: "saeva sedens super arma et centum vinctus aenis."

¹⁹ In *AJP*, XLII, 295, where it is noted that "trisyllables with iambic beginning constitute only about 6 per cent of Vergil's words. . . . Vergil favored the latter verse-final [i.e., ~ — z] as much as his resources allowed. . . ."

use the trisyllable in a much higher proportion than his stock of these types would warrant. Why? I can see no answer save that he deliberately introduced as much caesura as the limits he had set would allow.²⁰

This view finds corroboration in an inspection of Vergil's handling of "spondaic" verses.²¹ Outside of a repeated tag of Ennius,²² he confines himself in the line ending to words of 3 or 4 syllables, such as "convallis," "abscondantur."²³ Why did he not replace at least the former type by 2 disyllables (e.g., "regi fatur") and thus have two instances of harmony as usual instead of one harmony and one dissonance? I suggest that it was because he did not like this word division; that rather than submit to it he brooked the clash of accent and ictus involved in placing a caesura in the fifth foot; and that this is exactly in line with his pull toward $\parallel \sim - \approx$, which, as we have seen, is out of all proportion to the number of words of this type available.

This view gains further support from a consideration of the beginnings of hexameters. Vergil will frequently permit himself such openings as "Liber et alma Ceres" (*Georg.* i. 7), "munera vestra cano" (*ibid.*, 12), "dique deaeque omnes" (*ibid.* 21), "numina sola colant" (*ibid.* 30), "panditur ipse tibi" (*ibid.* 34), "nec repetita sequi" (*ibid.* 39), "gramina nonne vides" (*ibid.* 56), "iactat et ipsa suas" (*ibid.* 103), "elicit illa cadens" (*ibid.* 109)—in this passage about as often as one line in twelve—or even, on occasion, "adsis O Tegeae favens" (*ibid.* 18), "Daphnin ad astra feremus" (*Ecl.* v. 52), "una Eurusque Notusque ruunt" (*Aen.* i. 85), "quattuor hic invectus equis" (*Aen.* vi. 587), where the first two or occasionally the first three feet exhibit coinci-

²⁰ An instructive line is the one in *Aen.* vi. 429 and xi. 28: "abstulit atra dies et funere mersit acerbo." This became very popular as a funeral inscription and is found quoted, misquoted, and echoed from Dalmatia to Mauretania and from Spain to Phrygia. One type of misquotation is of interest: "abstulit atra dies et acerbo funere mersit." Why did not Vergil write it so? He would have secured precisely as much harmony of accent and ictus where he wanted it, and in addition he would have observed his strong tendency (the ratio is about 7:3) toward having a spondee rather than a dactyl in the fourth foot. Besides, he would have adhered to a still stronger tendency toward placing the adjective before its noun rather than letting it trail after. What purpose was served, then, by resisting both these pulls? I submit that it was merely our old ghost once more.

²¹ I use this old, unscientific expression for verses having a spondee in the fifth foot.

²² *Aen.* iii. 12; viii. 679 ("et magnis dis," an echo of *Enn.* 143. 8 [Baehrens], "cum magnis dis").

²³ The totals for these two types are respectively 13 and 17.

dence of accent and ictus; but he does not favor such openings as "vomere vertere nunc," or "sidera lucida nocte." Why not? The harmony of accent and ictus would be just as marked in such openings as in "numina sola colant" or "Daphnin ad astra feremus," and no more. The only possible solution, so far as I can see, is that, while he is willing to let the first word coincide with the first foot, he does not care to repeat this effect in the next succeeding foot. In other words the "ghost"—caesura—appears to walk once more.

When we turn from Latin hexameters to Greek, we find again certain tendencies in regard to the position of word-ends. Homer is not so rigorous in this matter as Vergil, except for the avoidance of a feminine caesura in the fourth foot; but then Homer is not so regular in the matter of hiatus, either, or prosody; witness hiatus *passim* and the considerable number of what Plutarch and other ancient writers term *στίχοι ἀκέφαλοι, λαγαροί, μείουροι*. Still his tendencies in regard to caesura are fairly manifest;²⁴ and, if we properly discount differences due to Homer's greater abundance of short syllables and to the limitations set for themselves by the later Roman epic writers, we notice that his usage, broadly speaking, is much the same as theirs. For instance, the frequency of "bucolic diaereses" in the *Aeneid* contrasted with the paucity of feminine caesurae in the fourth foot,²⁵ laid by Sturtevant entirely to "the effort which the Roman dactylic poets made to secure coincidence of accent and ictus in the last two feet and clash of accent and ictus in the first four feet,"²⁶ is fully matched in Homer. Is this similarity a mere coincidence? That is what we must believe if we cannot discover a common basis for the usage of the two poets. Now Homer's practice cannot be explained on the grounds al-

²⁴ And when we examine the more careful Attic versifiers of the fifth century, we discover that such trimeters as *Θρήνην περάσαντες μόγις πολλῶ πόνῳ* (Aesch. *Pers.* 509) or *μη πρὸς θεῶν φρονῶν γ' ἀποστράφῃς ἐπεί* (Soph. *OT* 326) or *Φοίβη Κλυταιμῆστρα τ' ἐμὴ ξυνάορος* (Eur. *IA* 50) are merely the exceptions that try the rule.

²⁵ It is puzzling, incidentally, to account for Bassett's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 350) that Terentianus Maurus was "obliged to construct a verse of his own" to illustrate the feminine caesura in the fourth foot. There are some 30 instances, e.g., in *Aen.* i, nine of them followed, as in Terentianus Maurus' concocted illustration, by a feminine caesura in the fifth foot.

²⁶ *AJP*, XLII, 294 f. The percentages given there for Vergil are 52.4 versus 3.8; for Homer, 62.4 versus 2.2.

ready employed by Sturtevant in the case of Vergil, for the obvious reason that accents in Greek polysyllabic words are distributed almost indiscriminately over the last three syllables. I am prepared to regard caesura as the foundation for this phenomenon in both Homer and Vergil; but find the ghost exorcised from his Greek haunts by Eugene G. O'Neill, Jr.,²⁷ through an entirely different medium, "pitch-pattern."²⁸

The pitch of long syllables "in arsi," we are told, is not the same as that "in thesi";²⁹ the pitch of the arsis itself is not the same as that of the thesis;³⁰ the pitch varies also among the different feet;³¹ the "phonetic peculiarities" of finals which distinguish them from non-finals were phenomena of pitch;³² but these finals differed among themselves according to whether they were true finals, quasi-finals, artificial finals, or artificial quasi-finals, except perhaps as between the second and the

²⁷ "The Importance of Final Syllables in Greek Verse," *TAPA*, LXX (1939), 256-94.

²⁸ Once again we are told (*ibid.*, p. 293) that caesurae in the sense of word-ends within feet are not "phonetically real," that caesura can be nothing but an "interstice" (a pause or rest) and so can be present only at the end of a breath-group. A rebuttal as regards Latin has already been offered above, pp. 22 f. For the Greeks one may now cite the passage quoted by Bassett (p. 368) from Eustathius:

... τοῖς παλαιοῖς, οἱ φασιν ὅτι τὸ μέτρον χαίρει μὲν (τῷ?) συνδεσμεῖσθαι τοὺς πόδας ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατὰ μὴδὲν εἰς μέρος ἀπαρτίζειν λόγου, οἷον

Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσε.

παρατεῖται δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ κατὰ πόδα τέμνεσθαι, οἷον

ἔβριος εἶνεκα τῆσδε, σὺ δ' ἰσχεο, πείθεο δ' ἡμῖν.

To this may be added the schol. B on Hephaestion (p. 167 of Westphal's 1866 ed.):

ὑπόρρυθμον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πόδα ἀπαρτίζον εἰς μέρος λόγου, οἷον

ἔβριος εἶνεκα τῆσδε, σὺ δ' ἰσχεο, πείθεο δ' ἡμῖν.

So schol. A (*ibid.*, p. 161):

τὰ . . . εὐρύθμα τῶν ἐπῶν οὐ συναπαρτιζόμενας ἔχει τὰς βάσεις τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου [1. λόγου], ὡς τὸ "ἔβριος εἶνεκα τῆσδε" ἄρρυθμον γὰρ τοῦτο.

That the ancients were slow and at conflict one with another in analyzing verses from the point of view of word endings or that none of their doctrines is looked upon as entirely satisfactory appears odd. But there are parallels in various other matters, such as etymology; and even in rhythm one has to accept the fact that Cicero, who had a very keen ear for prose rhythm, is not so reliable a guide to his own usage as a man of our own times, Zielinski, has proved to be.

²⁹ O'Neill, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 281.

fourth kinds;³³ dactylic foot endings had a different pitch from that of spondaic endings;³⁴ and even short finals differed from long finals.³⁵ "The succession, then, or pattern, of long and short finals within the verse would constitute something that we might, without stretching the term too far, call the 'melody' of the spoken verse. Such a melody would be inevitably a very narrow one."³⁶ Why all the variety of pitch to be attained through the differences between long syllables in arsis and thesis, between arsis and thesis in themselves, between successive feet, between dactylic and spondaic foot endings, and through the permutations afforded by the differing pitches of true finals, quasi-finals, artificial finals, and artificial quasi-finals is here neglected I cannot see. But let us take this much-attenuated formula, and, if it is not to be simply another wraith, let us try to give it a more substantial and tangible body. We are bound to lay down one premise at the outset. Obviously, if these varying pitches of final syllables are to mean anything and be manifest to the hearer, they must not be nullified by normal word accents, i.e., by syllables either having no accent or having the acute, the grave, or the circumflex accent.³⁷ To be concrete, if an unaccented non-final is pitched at middle C and the unaccented long final is assumed to rise to D, it would be merely confusing and destructive of the pitch-pattern to have the non-final, if under the acute accent, also raised to D. If the pitch-pattern, then, produced by the finals is to be something "capable of almost indefinite preservation,"³⁸ it must be something distinct and beyond the interference of

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 276, 277, 278 f. The meaning of these four terms may be illustrated, respectively, in βῆσε, σε, ἐπεβήσερ', ἔρ'.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ For the relative values of the acute and the grave accents I follow Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin* (1920), pp. 201 f. One need hardly point out, I presume, that normal word accents were not lost in dactylic hexameter; the testimony of Aristotle (*AP* 1461 a 21 ff.: κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν [sc. δεῖ διαλβεῖν] ὥσπερ Ἰττίας ἔλυνε ὁ Θάσιος τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ" καὶ "τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπίθεται δμβρῳ") is decisive enough for the classical period, and a glance at the scholia on Homer or Aristophanes will show that accents were taken account of by scholars in the Hellenistic age.

³⁸ O'Neill, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

the shifting pitch due to normal word accents, i.e., it must be higher or lower than the pitches reached under normal accentuation.


To get away, then, from mere references to a vague pitch-pattern, let us assign arbitrary pitches to accented and unaccented syllables and to short finals and long finals. Although O'Neill tells us that these finals have a different pitch from that of non-finals, he does not suggest whether both kinds were higher or lower, or one higher and one lower, and, if so, which was which. But, since all we want is to test the assertion that the result is "simple, easily perceived and easily preserved,"³⁹ we can do so by observing his principle that long finals differed in pitch from short finals, and both differed from non-finals, even though the actual pitch interval that we assign for the acute accent, e.g., in relation to the grave, is too little or too much and even though we arbitrarily take one of the choices offered and set both short and long finals at a lower pitch than that of non-finals. We must simply guard against any overlapping of pitches so as not to annihilate the pattern. Hence we will assume, for purposes of illustration merely, not only that finals are pitched lower than non-finals but also that long finals fall below the pitch of short finals.

Let us, then, assign the following arbitrary pitches: (1) non-finals (a) unaccented, middle C; (b) under the acute accent, E; (c) under the circumflex, slurred from E to D; (2) short finals (a) unaccented, G; (b) under the grave accent, A; (c) under the acute, B; (d) under the circumflex,⁴⁰ slurred from B to A; (3) long finals (a) unaccented, low D; (b) under the grave accent, low E; (c) under the acute, F; (d) under the circumflex, slurred from F to E.


We will take the first passage that comes to hand on opening our copy of Rzach's *Iliad*, plus a few additional verses chosen to add a bit to the variety of accents and to include some "spondaic" lines.


³⁹ O'Neill, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

⁴⁰ There might be some argument as to whether a circumflex accent comports with a short quantity, as in the word *roû* in the fourth line cited below. But it comes up only once in the examples, and anyone who wishes may disregard it and still get the main point.


II. iii. 84: 


85: 

86: 


87: 


88: 


89: 


90: 


98: 


100: 

107: 

169: 

172: 

179: 

181: 

II. iii. 84-90: ὡς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἔσχοντο μάχης ἀνέῳ τε γέγοντο
 ἐσσυμένως· Ἐκτωρ δὲ μετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔειπεν·
 κέκλυτέ μευ, Τρῶες καὶ ἐνκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,
 μῦθον Ἀλεξάνδρου, τοῦ εἵνεκα νείκος ὄρωρεν.
 ἄλλους μὲν κέλεται Τρῶας καὶ πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς
 τεύχεα κάλ' ἀποθέσθαι ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ,
 αὐτὸν δ' ἐν μέσσω καὶ Ἀρηίφιλον Μενέλαον

98: θυμὸν ἐμόν· φρονέω δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἤδη

100: εἵνεκ' ἐμῆς ἔριδος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἀρχῆς

107: μή τις ὑπερβασίῃ Διὸς ὄρκια δηλήσῃται

- 169: καλὸν δ' οὕτω ἐγὼν οὐ πῶ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
 172: αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἔσσι, φίλε ἑκυρέ, δεινός τε
 179: ἀμφοτέρων, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερὸς τ' αἰχμητής
 181: ὥς φάτο, τὸν δ' ὁ γέρον ἠγάσσατο φώνησέν τε

When put into the concrete form chosen above, these lines exhibit the pitch-patterns shown on the opposite page.

If one concentrates his attention on the notes from low D to B, which represent finals only, he finds that even in the meager sample of verses chosen for graphic presentation, there emerges nothing like a stable pattern, nothing simple and easily carried in the memory, capable of transmission for generation after generation through the centuries.

We have given the theory its best chance through basing our concrete embodiment on an extremely and unjustifiably simplified foundation, that is, on the variation in pitch caused by word accents and the assumed differences between long and short finals and between these and non-finals. This is only a small fraction, of course, of the variations assumed by O'Neill to exist in the hexameter. Yet as a whole the result is shapeless; that is, it is so full of separate shapes for individual lines as to be chaotic. Now conceive of it complicated by the other factors of variation postulated in O'Neill's discussion, remembering that these must not overlap and so cancel one another. The ensuing confusion is simply ineffable. The differing pitches of thesis and arsis, of long syllables in thesis and arsis, of separate feet, of spondaic versus dactylic foot endings, of finals as against non-finals, of long finals versus short finals, of the differing kinds of finals among themselves (true, quasi-, artificial, and artificial quasi-), plus the regular word accents create permutations and combinations that are beyond human calculation.

So long as we are content to speak vaguely of pitch-pattern, we feel, in spite of reassurances as to simplicity and narrow range,⁴¹ that the whole matter is very nebulous, as shadowy as Dido's ghost:

obscuram, qualem primo qui surgere mense
 aut videt aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam;

⁴¹ *TAPA*, LXX, 281, 287, 290 f.

but when we try to get a concrete view, we might be justified in feeling that we had encountered not a ghost but a far different inhabitant of the realm of shades, a phenomenally active Empusa.

To be a simple melody capable of easy memorization, the ups and downs of the pitch-pattern would need to be not only few and uncomplicated but also arranged line after line in the same places. Now the pitch-pattern assumed by O'Neill is based on statistics of percentages. Even the most accomplished rhapsode could not sing percentages, nor high and low at the same time. To say that in a thousand lines of Bach statistics show that he gives us the note middle C 75 per cent of the time in the first two beats of the second bar, low E 49 per cent of the time in the first two beats of the third bar, and middle A 51 per cent of the time in the third beat of the third bar, while he has middle A only 2.2 per cent of the time in the third beat of the fourth bar, is not to provide us with a tune that we can recognize and memorize and transmit. If a dozen lines in succession show differences in their pitch-pattern, no matter what their *average* may be, we have a dozen different tunes.

Neither the relation of ictus and accent, then, nor the hypothetical pitch-pattern seems to offer a satisfying explanation of the phenomena of word-end placements in Greek and Latin hexameters; the doctrine of caesura, on the other hand, to me is adequate because it is simple, does not profess too much, explains the facts in both the original Greek verse and its derivative, the Latin hexameter, on the same basis, and provides something rhythmically satisfying. It is simply a modest form of the old Greek feeling *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, a disinclination to let word division and foot division coincide throughout the line without alleviation.⁴² It does not profess to present a definite pattern, although it is quite true that individual poets, Greek and Roman, developed their special likes and dislikes and so differed one from another. Its very

⁴² It is true that lines can be found in Homer with much coincidence of words and feet, or even with a word-end coming at every foot-end. But to stop here is to miss the point. Take the line (*Il.* i. 214) cited by Eustathius and the scholiast on Hephaestion as a poor one: *ἔβριος εἶνεκα τῆσδε, σὺ δ' ἴσχειο, πείθεο δ' ἡμῖν*. This may not be one of Homer's best efforts; but it does exhibit one caesura. So in the other dozen similar lines culled from eight books of Homer by Sturtevant in *AJP*, XLV, 341 (except *Il.* xx. 193, which I judge is a slip for some other verse) there are anywhere from one to five caesurae in each.

flexibility is one means (along with shifting in the placing of dactyls and spondees, of elisions, and of rhetorical pauses) to turn what might have been a very monotonous type of verse into one of subtle and almost infinite variety.⁴³

⁴³ Since this article was sent to press there has come to hand Professor O'Neill's paper in *TAPA*, LXXI (1940), entitled "Word-Accents and Final Syllables in Latin Verse," in which, after presenting statistical argument against the view that the relation of accent and ictus was the main factor in determining the form of Latin verse, the author states (p. 351) that the position of words in Latin verse is to be explained on the same basis as for Greek, where final syllables "possessed peculiar phonetic values that initial and medial syllables did not have." But one notes that in the ensuing discussion there is no reference to the varieties of pitch assumed to exist among the syllables of Greek words, except in the general statement (p. 352) that "we should have good reason to suppose that the phonetic basis, or primary phenomenon, was the same in both the Latin and the Greek inner metrics." If there were in Latin verse differences of pitch among initial, medial, true final, artificial final, quasi-final, and artificial quasi-final syllables, etc., and these differences are supposed to offer a "melody," we are faced with the same chaos as in the realm of Greek verse; if, on the other hand, word placement is not a matter of pitch but of location of final syllables, then I suggest that we are merely dealing with caesura under another name.

PHILOCTETES AND ARETE

JOHN S. KIEFFER

ALTHOUGH Aeschylus' and Euripides' tragedies of Philoctetes are no longer extant, enough of them, especially of the latter, is known from fragments and from two essays by Dio of Prusa¹ to afford a comparison and contrast with Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. Such a comparison brings to view two opposed conceptions of *arete* and ranges the poets on opposite sides of the enduring question of human conduct. It shows the greater depth of understanding possessed by Sophocles and with what sort of premises he exercises that dramatic art by which he is recognized to be one of the poets most surely touched with universality.

Sophocles' play is the latest of the three² and in externals owes something to each of his predecessors and particularly to Euripides. The fact that we can estimate this debt and draw comparisons we owe to our ability to interpret the fragments of the lost plays in the light of Dio's essays. But Dio's information is incomplete; he assumed in his reader a knowledge of the text of the plays. How could he have dreamed that his modest essays would outlive two of the three classics he was criticizing? The details of plot that he mentions are incidental to his main interest in character and style. Thus mere information about the plays is deficient; what is worse, it is uneven, at least in the case of Aeschylus and Euripides—where it matters most. We are told much more about their beginnings than about their endings and are left groping as to how they turn out. And, finally, Dio has confused two methods of procedure. Though he treats the plays in chronological order, he tries also to contrast their virtues and defects by anticipating the discussion of Euripides' play in his discussion of Aeschylus'. In this way he sometimes obscures the sequence of events followed by either author.

¹ *Dionis Prusaensis, quae extant omnia*, ed. J. von Arnim (Berlin, 1896), Vol. II; Oration 52 compares the three tragedies, Or. 59 paraphrases Euripides' Prologue.

² Sophocles' *Philoctetes* was produced in 409 B.C., Euripides' in 431 with the *Medea* and the lost *Dictys*; the date of Aeschylus' is unknown.

Handicapped as we are by Dio's defects, we can still learn much that is fruitful about the lost plays. We learn less about Aeschylus' play; nevertheless, it is enough to show that his plot is a point of reference for the comparison of the other two. It gives the dramatic framework that they preserve in spite of their elaboration. As commentators point out, Aeschylus' substitution of Odysseus for Diomed as the messenger sent to recall Philoctetes makes the epic theme suitable for drama. From this substitution follows the necessity of disguise and deception, the theft or seizure of the bow, and the complication of Philoctetes' anguish by the addition to the plot of his rancor against Odysseus, more personal and intense than his resentment against the Greeks in general. We do not learn how much plot Aeschylus developed. From Dio's account we know of no other characters than Philoctetes himself and Odysseus.³ Unrecognized by Philoctetes, Odysseus wins his trust by a false report of disasters to the Greek army and of the death or disgrace of the chieftains. When Philoctetes swoons from a paroxysm of his disease, Odysseus seizes the mighty bow and arrows of Heracles; upon his recovery Philoctetes is at his mercy and willy-nilly returns with him to Troy.⁴ Dio says that the play is marked by "loftiness" and "old-time simplicity," its diction and thought are "striking"; all is appropriate to the ancient ways of heroes, nothing "recherché," or "wordy," or "flat."⁵ Odysseus is shrewd and tricky in an old-fashioned way, far different from modern crookedness.⁶

After Aeschylus, both Sophocles and Euripides use the disguise or hiding of Odysseus, a false story told Philoctetes, the acquisition of the bow during one of Philoctetes' paroxysms, and an ultimate return to Troy. In both plays Odysseus is the leader of the expedition sent to fetch Philoctetes. Each of the two, however, differs from Aeschylus' play and from the other.

³ Dio does not say that Aeschylus sent Odysseus to Lemnos alone; he says that Euripides did not send him alone but with Diomed (Or. 52. 14).

⁴ Or. 52. 2: "He [Philoctetes] himself setting sail for Troy willingly for the most part, but partly, too, *πειθοῖ ἀνάγκη*." In Sophocles we know that Philoctetes returned willingly; the rhetorical winning of Philoctetes in the play of Euripides precludes "the persuasion of compulsion." Therefore the phrase must refer to Aeschylus.

⁵ *Ibid.* 4.

⁶ *Ibid.* 5.

Dio finds the style⁷ of Euripides the antithesis of that of Aeschylus. His concern for credibility is more "political" and exact; his hallmark is cleverness and precision in detail; nothing must be unconvincing or negligent. Simplicity of incident gives way to elaborateness of diction. In his "political" and rhetorical style he exploits every occasion for set speeches on opposite sides of a question. In general, says Dio, Euripides displays the greatest knowledgeability, and persuasiveness in the action, an admirable skill in his set speeches, while his iambics are clear, natural, and "political," his choral odes not only pleasing but full of exhortations to *arete*.⁸ Sophocles, as a mean, has neither the boldness nor the severity of Aeschylus or the pedantic, sharp, and "political" quality of Euripides, but a certain solemn and lofty poetry that is in the highest degree tragic and eloquent, giving a sublime and dignified pleasure. His plot construction is the best and most credible; his characters dignified and noble. His choral odes are not "gnomic" and do not incite to virtue, but they have an admirable charm and elevation.⁹

Euripides' stage is as crowded as Aeschylus' is bare. Dio tells that he added Diomed, Actor, Paris, and a Trojan embassy to the cast. Thus he gained scope for rhetorical display and the expression of moral maxims. The plot follows the outline already given, but with a greater wealth of incident and a transfer of interest from the level of bold action to that of clever argumentation.

We are in better case to learn what the plot was like from the greater number of fragments¹⁰ and from Dio's information. Thus we are left in no doubt as to the Prologue. It consists of an opening soliloquy spoken by Odysseus, followed by an encounter between him and Philoctetes. In his soliloquy Odysseus gives the facts of the situation and reflects on his own motives for undertaking such a dangerous mission: in spite of an insatiable desire for the acclaim given his ever more daring deeds of audacious shrewdness, his fear of Philoctetes' hatred led him to refuse the mission until Athena promised to dis-

⁷ I use the word in a wider sense than diction.

⁸ Or. 52. 11-14.

⁹ *Ibid.* 15-17.

¹⁰ In addition to six iambics reconstructed with probability from Dio 59, Nauck (*Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta* [2d ed.; Leipzig, 1889]) gives thirteen fragments totaling thirty-four complete lines and three consisting of one or two words.

guise him. Even so he still feels trepidation. The time is short, for he has heard that an embassy of Trojans is coming to bribe or persuade Philoctetes to take their side. Naturally, they, too, know Helenus' prophecy that Philoctetes will bring victory to the side he joins. At this moment he sees Philoctetes, miserable in appearance, drawing near. When Philoctetes finds out that Odysseus comes from the Achaeans, he makes as if to shoot him down immediately, but by fast talking Odysseus convinces him that he is a follower of Palamedes, the victim of Odysseus' treacherous betrayal; that he has barely escaped the misfortune that befell all Palamedes' company. He appeals as a fellow-sufferer for Philoctetes' helpful advice on how to get home to Greece. At the end of the scene Philoctetes invites him to share his miserable quarters in the cave. It is obvious that Diomed does not appear in the Prologue.

After the Prologue we see less clearly.¹¹ The general sequence seems to be as follows: Paris and the Trojans make their plea, which Philoctetes rejects after the disguised Odysseus, pretending to put patriotism above personal feeling, argues against it.¹² A paroxysm seizes Philoctetes, whose Lemnian friend, Actor, tends him with Odysseus' help. Odysseus sends Actor to fetch Diomed from the shore; when he has gone he steals the bow. Diomed¹³ comes openly to Philoctetes, no longer fearing the bow, and tells him of Helenus' oracle; finally he persuades him to agree to return, but on condition that Odysseus be banished. At this juncture Odysseus reappears¹⁴ in his own person,

¹¹ The reconstruction of the plot is undertaken by I. A. Hartung (*Euripides restitutus* [Hamburg, 1843]), whose work I follow in part. He assumes that Accius' *Philocteta* represents Euripides'. This is denied by T. von Wilamowitz (*Philol. Untersuchungen*, XXII, 315). Gilbert Murray in his edition of his translations of Euripides offers a brief but imaginative reconstruction. Welcker, *Die griechischen Tragödien*, has not been available to me.

¹² Frag. 796 (Nauck). Frag. 794 may come from Paris' speech. Philoctetes' rejection of the embassy is the first alleviation of his resentment against the Greeks.

¹³ The same actor had the parts of Actor and Diomed. Frags. 798 and 799 may be part of Diomed's speeches.

¹⁴ So both Hartung and Murray. Frag. 797, quoted by the *Rhetor ad Alexandrum* as an example of antiprocatalepsis, suits this reconstruction and is an instance of the rhetorical character Dio notices. I cannot accept Murray's suggestion that Odysseus generously returns the bow and wins a hearing from Philoctetes by giving him an opportunity to kill him but is saved by Athena's intervention. That there was a theophany, however, is possibly suggested by Frag. 800, which reads like a concluding couplet spoken by the chorus.

somehow overcomes Philoctetes' rancor, and leads the way back to the ship and Troy. The chorus of Lemnians¹⁵ probably reinforces the appeal to Greek patriotism by which Philoctetes seems to have been won over.

On this view of Euripides' theme and the structure of his play, Dio's emphasis on its "political" tone becomes clear. The adjective is not, as some have interpreted it, merely a synonym for "rhetorical"; the latter word refers rather to style in the narrower sense and to linguistic devices. What is political is the rhetorically expressed view of human motives that Euripides adopts in this play—conformity to opinion—whether, as with Odysseus, that opinion is the throng's acclaim of audacity and cleverness or, with Philoctetes, the expected behavior of one who wishes to be thought patriotic. When Philoctetes rejects the Trojans' offer, he establishes his essential patriotism. Thereafter he cannot escape being rhetorically persuaded, on the premise that "the patriotic man puts love of country ahead of personal resentment," to return to Troy and even to accept reconciliation with Odysseus. The chorus' exhortations to *arete* underscore this dominant theme. This *arete* is the kind the Sophists (except Gorgias) professed to teach, the man's *arete* of *Meno*: "to be able to conduct the city's affairs."¹⁶ Rhetoric's teaching of it and incitement to it are the commonplaces of Greek oratory. Men who act according to that teaching and incitement become the citizens of good repute, Anytus' teachers of *arete*.¹⁷

In view of the belief widely held today that Sophocles' tragedies are concerned with the *arete* of their heroes,¹⁸ it is something of a surprise to read in Dio¹⁹ that Sophocles' choral odes "have not exhortations to *arete* as those of Euripides do." A discussion of the question raised by this difference in the two plays will illuminate a fundamental difference between Euripides and Sophocles; and an understanding of Sophocles' views of *arete* will bring out some of the secret of his dramatic art.

¹⁵ To it may perhaps be assigned Frags. 798 and 799, if they are not Diomed's.

¹⁶ Plato *Meno* 71e, 95c (referring to the man Gorgias).

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 92e.

¹⁸ J. F. Moore, *Sophocles and Arete* (Cambridge, 1938).

¹⁹ Or. 52. 17.

A noticeable fact about Dio's essay is that, while he gives a deficient and uneven account of the plots of Aeschylus' and Euripides' plays, his account of Sophocles' is straightforward and almost complete from Neoptolemus' reluctance to take part in deception to Heracles' theophany, with only the episode of the false trader omitted. Moreover, the manner in which he gives the plot is remarkable; he begins to describe Neoptolemus' character²⁰ and before he finishes has come all the way to the theophany. Nothing could illustrate better the way in which Sophocles' plot develops out of character. Even so, Dio's reading is inadequate; the character of Philoctetes is hidden, and we learn the plot in one aspect only. We learn how Neoptolemus responds to a situation in which his inherited *arete* conflicts with an action he has been induced to perform and how he resolves that conflict, but it does not appear that there has been any conflict for Philoctetes to resolve. How the "gentler and simpler"²¹ quality that Dio observes in Odysseus compares with the character of Euripides' Odysseus is not explained, although this, too, has a part in the meaning of the play.

Philoctetes and Odysseus, of course, are common to the two plays: Neoptolemus is newly introduced by Sophocles and mediates between the two antagonists. Thus a comparison of the way the two poets portray their common characters may bring out what Dio omits and prepare for a study of how far Sophocles' plot turns on Neoptolemus' *arete*. Then it will be considered how Neoptolemus' *arete* is an instance of Sophoclean *arete* in general.

In Euripides' Prologue Odysseus reveals his motives for undertaking this mission.²² He is not the sort to bask in the reflected glory of other men's achievement but must ever be seeking new plaudits for daring and clever accomplishment. Now he fears that failure in this enterprise will rob him of the acclaim he has won by other deeds: "I shrink from confounding the glory of my former toils and do not push away the present labors."²³

A slightly reminiscent couplet from Sophocles shows a different Odysseus: "Lest he learn my coming and I confound the whole device

²⁰ *Ibid.* 15.

²² Or. 59. 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²³ Frag. 789.

by which I expect to catch him now."²⁴ He speaks this couplet in explaining to Neoptolemus why he must keep out of sight. In both contexts he fears failure: in Euripides for the effect failure may have on his reputation; in Sophocles his fear is that his reputation may bring failure upon his mission.

Euripides' Odysseus is an egotist and an exhibitionist, romantically yearning to "live dangerously."²⁵ He desires "the reputation of the bravest and wisest of the Greeks."²⁶ Even so, he needs Athena's disguise before he dares undertake the task intrusted to him by the Atridae. Sophocles' Odysseus at first sight is similar. For him, too, *arete* is external respectability.²⁷ Yet in asking Neoptolemus' consent to "a bit of shamelessness"²⁸ he recognizes a further standard. He is in a sense a Sophist who sees "the tongue and not deeds the leader in everything among men."²⁹ Yet he differs from Euripides' Odysseus in obeying the Atridae because he believes he is serving a cause that is willed by Zeus to triumph.³⁰ His trickery is used in furthering this cause; he skulks off stage, not from cowardice but because he knows that Philoctetes will shoot him on sight and thus the cause will be lost.³¹ By his own efforts and with no goddess' assistance he finds a way to trap his quarry. The notion of service to a cause, as well as the desire for glory, helps him to overcome Neoptolemus' reluctance to use treachery.³² Thus in Sophocles, Odysseus acts from patriotism; in Euripides, patriotism is for him a means to increase his own glory; it is the lure that brings Philoctetes to Troy.

Philoctetes' entrances in the two plays make a similar contrast. In Dio's paraphrase of Euripides³³ we learn that Philoctetes points an arrow at Odysseus as soon as he learns that he is a Greek. When Odysseus begs him not to shoot, he says: "If you are really a Greek, you cannot this day fail to perish." Contrasted with this fee fi fo fum is Philoctetes' courteous greeting in Sophocles' play and his obvious pleasure in meeting some Greeks;³⁴ nor does Neoptolemus' avowal

²⁴ Sophocles *Philoctetes* 13 f.

²⁵ Or. 59. 2.

²⁶ Or. 59. 1; 52. 12.

²⁷ Soph. *Philoct.* 82, 85.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 83 f.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 98 f.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 989 f.

³¹ *Ibid.* 13 f.

³² *Ibid.* 53.

³³ Or. 59. 7.

³⁴ Soph. *Philoct.* 219 ff.

that he comes from the camp at Troy cause any flare of anger. Yet his implacable feeling against those who have wronged him is conveyed in Odysseus' words: "he would rather get me than all the Greeks,"³⁵ and without Euripides' melodrama. In short, Euripides' Philoctetes is as unreal as his Odysseus, while Sophocles' characters are both real. Euripides' unreal Odysseus traps the unreal Philoctetes with the unreal aid of Athena and the unreal art of rhetoric. Sophocles' Odysseus fails, yet the reality of his characters' struggle brings Odysseus' aim to fulfilment, because it was right.

The invention of the role of Neoptolemus is, of course, Sophocles' great stroke of originality; it perfected the work begun by Aeschylus' substitution of Odysseus for Diomed and brought the old epic material to a suitably dramatic form. Aeschylus' play ended in more of the epic manner with the involuntary departure of Philoctetes; Euripides' unreality is a melodramatic evasion of the problem; the mere substitution of rhetoric for force leaves the plot, in terms of human action, of drama, unresolved. Aeschylus' innovation, though it created a dramatic situation, introduced an almost insuperable difficulty: Odysseus and Philoctetes could not meet. Sophocles recognized the difficulty frankly and turned it to account. In Neoptolemus the antagonists could meet. The young, untried boy had qualities like those of both the others. Ambitious and soldierly like Odysseus, his heritage of nobility and trustworthiness responded to the nature of Philoctetes. The Prologue, in which Odysseus overcomes his scruples, is balanced by the first episode: here in conversation with Philoctetes the young man praises the noble and condemns the base among the Greek leaders and at last finds himself coupling Odysseus with Thersites.³⁶ Even in deceit, his responsibility to his own nature contradicts the claim that military service makes upon him. This subtly indicated conflict comes to a head when Philoctetes generously promises to let him handle the awe-inspiring bow; it is decided when the pity aroused by Philoctetes' paroxysm and the overpowering feeling of actual possession of the bow cause him to give up the deception. Thereafter the epic solution of force and the Euripidean solution of rhetoric successively fail; Philoctetes can really be moved by neither. Each was unsatisfactory

³⁵ *Ibid.* 46 f.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 441 f.

because it required that Philoctetes be considered as merely a passive object to be worked on by one device or another.

How Sophocles' drama is brought to a conclusion will be misunderstood by those who see it merely as the study of the psychology of a young man whose better nature revolts against the unscrupulous methods of Odysseus and whose revolt would have caused him to abandon the Greek army and return to Greece had not Heracles intervened to bend Philoctetes' will and set both on the right course. It is the context of Neoptolemus' change of heart on which Sophocles has exercised his talent even more than on the portrayal of that change of heart. This context has two main elements: on the one hand, the past relations of Philoctetes and Odysseus, their common association in the Greek enterprise at the start, followed by Odysseus' part in marooning Philoctetes for reasons perhaps necessary to military efficiency but no less embittering to the abandoned man. The other element looks to the future. The taking of Troy calls for leaders whose capacities exceed the limited, military habits of mind of the Atridae and Odysseus. These leaders are the young Neoptolemus, who must replace the loss of his father's demonic courage; the wise and god-favored Philoctetes, strengthened to the utmost of single-minded tenacity by his lonely sojourn on Lemnos and removed from the dulling routine of ten years' encampment at Troy; together they can give the Greeks the heart for the final attack. This is what the oracles and omens have been signifying; the fulfilment of these oracles is the task of Odysseus and the plot of the tragedy. The way in which the characters work up to their destiny by their grappling with the condition in which they find themselves shows Sophocles' understanding of the essence of tragedy: the success with which particular human beings achieve their true place in a universal order or destiny. The common misconception that tragedy portrays the struggle of an individual against a destructive fate is due to the way in which the limitations of particular human beings stand in the way of their realization of their proper place and make them seem to struggle and fail.

The oracle of Helenus is used with great skill to reveal the unity of the drama, to foreshadow the end, and thus to show the actions of the characters in relation to the whole that their actions are constructing.

The oracle is doubly ambiguous: First, is the coming of Philoctetes with the bow a hypothetical necessity to the fall of Troy or are both events foreordained? Then, must Philoctetes wield the bow of Hercules or are the bow and arrows alone required? Philoctetes by implication interprets both the first and the second question in the first way. The necessity of Troy's fall is hypothetical and depends on his own choice, but the actual presence of Philoctetes is required. This is evident from Philoctetes' tenacious refusal to go to Troy and his continued and spirited resistance after he has lost the bow. On the other hand, Odysseus interprets the oracle in exactly the opposite way. Troy must fall; as a good soldier he knows that. It is the bow that is necessary. This is evident in the Prologue:

For if this man's bow and arrows are not won, it is not possible for you [i.e., Neoptolemus] to sack the Dardan plain.³⁷

That you shall become a thief of the unconquerable arms.³⁸

This bow alone captures Troy.³⁹

And, of course, he proves himself to hold this interpretation when he walks away with Neoptolemus holding the bow and leaves Philoctetes behind. Philoctetes' belief in the opposite is caused or confirmed by the false trader's account of the oracle, which implies that his person is required along with his weapons.⁴⁰ This need not be a true report of Helenus' words. It is motivated by a desire to frighten Philoctetes into hastening his supposed flight, and naturally the threat to Philoctetes is made prominent.

Neoptolemus at first accepts Odysseus' version of the oracle. After his surprise at the apparent contradiction of the other oracle that made him the conqueror, he is made all the more willing to help get the bow by seeing that he and the bow are meant to work together. His change of attitude to this undertaking is reflected by several comments that he makes on the oracle in the course of the play. The third system of anapaests that he speaks in the parodos shows that, even before he sees Philoctetes, the pity inspired by the cavern home and his reflection on the misery of Philoctetes is making him think a little

³⁷ *Ibid.* 68 f.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 113.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 77 f.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 610 ff.

more deeply about the meaning of the oracle.⁴¹ This passage is an advance beyond Odysseus' callous disregard of Philoctetes. Neoptolemus, however, is still thinking of the time fated for the capture of Troy as determined by his own coming of fighting age.

The next step in his thinking is seen in the mesode of the second stasimon: "his is the crown," etc.⁴² Having seen Philoctetes and talked with him, his feeling that Philoctetes has been reserved by a god for the taking of Troy has shifted its balance so that he sees Philoctetes as the more important member of the combination.

The culmination of Neoptolemus' interpretation is reached in his last attempt to persuade Philoctetes to come with him to Troy, holding out hope of healing as well as glory.⁴³ In the Prologue Neoptolemus had not seemed to know Helenus' prophecy. At last he has learned its full meaning and is now in a position to show Philoctetes that he, too, must learn the full truth that the oracle contains.

Now the burden of misunderstanding and wrong is on Philoctetes, and the appearance of Heracles is needed to set him right. Jebb speaks of it as "bending Philoctetes' will."⁴⁴ But if that is the case, the objections against "the god from the machine" hold good. Actually its use here is one of the finest and subtlest strokes of Sophocles' art. Neoptolemus has all but persuaded Philoctetes; there was a real hesitation before the latter refused; and his refusal was based on fear of what his enemies might do in the future.⁴⁵ However, when they are ready to leave Neoptolemus asks what would happen if the Greeks should attack him, and Philoctetes says, "I and the bow of Heracles will drive them off."⁴⁶ He thereby destroys the last basis of his refusal; for if he and his bow and Neoptolemus can stand off

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 192-200. Line 196 is the key line. Neoptolemus begins to see the working of Providence in Philoctetes' sufferings.

⁴² *Ibid.* 839-42. Seeing Philoctetes as a person suffering, he sees his persistence through suffering as a symbol of the persistence needed by the Greeks to overcome Troy. Without Philoctetes, therefore, the bow and arrows are useless.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 1326-47. Having now come to a full understanding of the divine will, Neoptolemus is able to declare to Philoctetes the full meaning of the oracle and the consequent health and renown that await him.

⁴⁴ Sir Richard C. Jebb, *The Philoctetes of Sophocles*, abridged by E. S. Shuckburgh (Cambridge, 1906), p. xxi.

⁴⁵ *Soph. Philoct.* 1358 ff.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 1405 ff.

the Greeks in hostile array, he has nothing to fear from a few enemies, when he will be hailed by the army as their savior. Thus the theophany, far from bending his will, occurs just at the moment when he is finally able to recognize that he should obey the oracle. This is not to reduce Heracles to a mere symbol of Philoctetes' thought, though he is that. It is rather the objective confirmation of the fact that Neoptolemus and Philoctetes have finally, with divine help, fought their way through their own misunderstanding and Odysseus' to a knowledge of the destiny that they have discovered for themselves. Heracles' speech brings an understanding of all the motives in the play. Odysseus is right in his conviction that he is doing Zeus's will. His understanding had been partial because his conception was the military man's blind obedience to orders. Heracles, by reference to his own labors, teaches him the real nature of service. Odysseus had relied on deception and had looked on piety as something to be assumed at will; Heracles' words, "Piety dies not along with mortals,"⁴⁷ are a final condemnation of Odysseus and confirmation of the rightness both of Philoctetes' resistance and of his consent.

By a comparison with Sophocles' play the falsity of Euripides' sophistic and political conception of *arete* becomes plain. However brilliantly Odysseus argued his case, a denouement that makes Philoctetes give in to his persuasion is not tragic. Euripides asks his audience to accept a view of *arete* as a kind of respectability and right opinion and to see Philoctetes brought to change his opinion by Odysseus' unscrupulous sophistry. It is this conception of *arete* that is shown in the latter part of Plato's *Meno*⁴⁸ to fail to stand the test of reason, whether in the aspect of actual conduct or of the sophistic claims of its teachability.

Sophocles' play opposes Euripides' with a solution of the tragic problem that conforms to the lesson of the *Meno*.⁴⁹ There the illustration of the doctrine of reminiscence by showing Meno's "boy" recollecting a geometrical proposition is also meant to bring Meno to a "recollection" that *arete* is *episteme* and thus answer his original question. Similarly, in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, Neoptolemus endures an analogous reminiscence, that in turn leads to a recollection on Philoctetes' part.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 1443 ff.

⁴⁸ *Esp.* 90a-95a.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 82b-85b.

As the boy, faced with logical contradictions, is impelled by bewilderment to find solutions that lead to mathematical knowledge, so the characters in the tragedy, faced with contradictions, impelled by feelings of pity and shame, find a solution that is a kind of knowledge of human destiny. And as Plato argued that the boy's learning was done by reminiscence of things he already knew, so Sophocles may be thought to imply that it is the *eugeneis*⁵⁰—those who are *agathoi* by birth—that actually attain to *arete* by an *anamnesis* that is stirred to activity through the tragic situation. And the proposition of the *Meno* that *arete* is *episteme* is affirmed in the *Philoctetes* both by showing the identity of their way of acquisition and in the finale of the play, in which the attainment of full knowledge of what was foreshadowed by the oracles is followed by actions that are in accordance with *arete*, or, conversely, that true *arete* is not the product of force or persuasion but of knowledge won by *anamnesis*.

This interpretation of the *Philoctetes* does not make Sophocles a Platonist before Plato, a disciple of Socrates, or a teacher of Plato. It is an argument, however, for the truth of the doctrines of *anamnesis* and *arete-episteme* that Sophocles sees and states them in his own way.

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⁵⁰ Both Odysseus and Philoctetes recognize the noble breeding of Neoptolemus. Odysseus tries to overcome it, Philoctetes to appeal to it (see, e.g., ll. 50 ff., 336, 971).

PLATO'S *PARMENIDES*. I

RICHARD ROBINSON

THIS study discusses and recommends the following propositions about Plato's *Parmenides*: (1) The arguments in the first part are directed against the existence of Forms, not of sensibles. (2) The theory of Forms discussed in the first part is that of Plato's own middle dialogues. (3) Plato regarded these arguments as neither fatal nor negligible, but serious difficulties requiring serious attention. (4) Plato never answered these arguments in his dialogues. (5) The second part of the *Parmenides* contains no statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly. (6) The second part of this dialogue contains no statement of method, either directly or indirectly. (7) Both parts of the dialogue are intended to provide Plato's pupils with practice in dialectic and in the detection of errors in reasoning. (8) Professor Cornford's recent interpretation of the dialogue combines this view with another view; but the two are really incompatible.

I

It is a traditional view that in the first part of the *Parmenides* Plato represents Parmenides as bringing objections against the theory of Forms there stated by Socrates, objections which tend to make us believe that there are no such Forms. Burnet dissented from this opinion, and held that Plato here represents Parmenides as agreeing that there are Forms but objecting to Socrates' view that besides Forms there are things. The arguments, he wrote in *Greek Philosophy*,¹ "are not directed against the reality of the intelligible, but against that of the sensible." Two years later Professor Taylor declared that these words express the point "with perfect exactness in the terminology of a later generation."² He stated that "the object of the argumentation is not to throw a doubt on the existence of Forms, but to urge

¹ I, 254. For permission to quote this book and A. E. Taylor's *Philosophical Studies* I thank the Macmillan Company.

² *Philosophical Studies*, p. 42.

the need for a plain and explicit account of the *relation* which Socrates commonly called that of *participation*, by which a thing is connected with what he calls the Form of that thing." "Parmenides and Zeno nowhere raise any difficulty about the existence of such Forms as the proper objects of knowledge."³ In 1934 Professor Taylor restated this view in the following words:

[Parmenides] does not, for a moment, quarrel with the young Socrates for believing in the "separate and intelligible Forms"; on the contrary, he expressly declares that without such objects there can be no philosophy and no science, for there is nothing else that can be really known (135BC). What he does criticize in Socrates is that he is trying to ascribe at least a "phenomenal" reality to the sensible world and its contents by maintaining that they somehow "participate" in the reality of the intelligible forms. All his criticisms aim at showing that Socrates can give no coherent explanation of this relation of the sensible to the intelligible, because all possible explanations are inconsistent with the strict *unity* of the "form." It is the ascription of any reality whatsoever to the *sensible* which he feels to be inconsistent with any kind of monism; the error of Socrates is precisely that he is determined to ascribe at least a derivative and secondary reality to the things of sense, which he ought to regard as a mere illusion.⁴

Arguments showing serious difficulties in the notion of participation, that is, in the view that sensibles somehow share in Forms, could be used to discredit the existence of Forms by anyone who assumed the existence of sensibles. But they could also be used to discredit the existence of sensibles by anyone who assumed the existence of Forms. Burnet put this by saying that an argument like the "third man" is double edged. The question is, therefore, which edge Plato represents Parmenides as using in the dialogue.

Burnet's reason for his view was that the arguments in the first part of the *Parmenides* are Eleatic in origin, and an Eleatic would deny reality to the sensible and not to the intelligible. As evidence for this Eleatic origin he urged (1) that Plato puts the arguments into the mouth of the founder of Eleaticism, (2) that we know from the *Theaetetus* that Plato was busy with Euclid of Megara about the time he wrote the *Parmenides*, and (3) that there is good independent evi-

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴ *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 13. For permission to quote this book and W. F. R. Hardie's *A Study in Plato I* thank the Oxford University Press.

dence that the "third man" was invented by Bryson the Megaric. We must also reckon, as part of Burnet's case for this doctrine, his other doctrine that the latter part of the dialogue is primarily a refutation of the Megarics' first principle.

Professor Taylor dissociates himself from the point about the "third man." A detailed and learned study has brought him to the conclusion that there appears to be no independent evidence that this argument was invented by a Megarian. The rest of Burnet's argument he accepts; and he adds that Plato makes Parmenides expressly declare that without the Forms "there can be no philosophy and no science, for there is nothing else that can be really known."⁵

We may omit Burnet's point about Euclid as too slight to have any effect, and his point about the "third man" because it is abandoned by Professor Taylor. We are then left with three distinct lines of argument for the view that Parmenides is represented as throwing doubt on the sensibles and not on the Forms. The first line includes all the considerations that may arise out of the facts that Plato put these arguments into the mouth of Parmenides and Parmenides believed sensibles to be illusions. The second includes all the force that this view gains from making a unity out of the dialogue by connection with the view that the second part also concerns Eleatics. The third is the appeal to the passage where Plato makes Parmenides declare that, if you deny that there are Forms, you will have nowhere to turn your mind and so will completely destroy the power of dialectic. This appears to be the total of Burnet's and Taylor's evidence in the three works quoted. At first those works give the impression of containing a multitude of arguments; but this is because the mere unreasoned statement of the doctrine itself has the air of being an argument when it recurs after one of those fine passages of analysis and comment in which these writings abound.

We shall not deal in this section with the second argument, namely, that, by interpreting the first part of the dialogue as an Eleatic argument against the sensibles, we make the dialogue a unity, because the second part of it also concerns the Eleatics. In later sections we shall show that the second part of the *Parmenides* is not concerned with Eleatics. Therefore, no unity is effected by finding Eleatic doctrines

⁵ *Ibid.*

in the first part, and this argument falls to the ground. In this section we shall first examine the two other arguments of Burnet and Taylor and then offer positive reasons for the traditional view.

The argument from the fact that these objections are put into the mouth of Parmenides is difficult to estimate, because there seems to be no close parallel in the dialogues. There is no other first-class thinker whom Plato ever represents as speaking in his own person except Socrates, and Plato's relations to Socrates were importantly different from his relations to Parmenides. But two things may be said. (1) In the first place, there seems to be a large probability that this argument stands and falls together with the principle that Plato never makes Socrates utter doctrines which he did not in fact hold. This "Principle of Historicity" will not be discussed here but dogmatically assumed to be false; and from that assumption we may infer with considerable confidence that Plato's giving these objections to Parmenides is no evidence of their being directed against the sensibles. (2) In the second place, Plato's picture of Parmenides is on any theory hopelessly unhistorical in two major points. It represents him as seriously reaching that absurd conclusion with which the dialogue ends, and the real Parmenides certainly never did any such thing. Worse still, in the very passage to which Professor Taylor appeals for his interpretation, it unmistakably represents him as a pluralist, as believing in a plurality of Forms.

But, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man will not allow that there are *Forms* of things, in view of all that we have just said and similar considerations, and will not distinguish a Form *for each thing*, he will have nowhere to turn his mind, since he does not admit the eternal and identical existence of an Idea *of each thing*, and so he will completely destroy the power of dialectic.⁶

(The same pluralism is probably implied also in Parmenides' rebuke to Socrates for not allowing Forms of hair or mud or dirt;⁷ but Professor Taylor follows Burnet in taking this as ironical, and it could be so interpreted if other considerations demanded.) For these reasons the fact that the objections are ascribed to Parmenides is no evidence for their being directed against the sensibles.

Let us now examine the particular passage to which Professor

⁶ Pa. 135BC.

⁷ 130E.

Taylor appeals, and which has just been translated in another connection. It is the second part of a dilemma, which as a whole is to this effect: "If a man declares that there are Forms, he runs into very great perplexities, which tempt him to declare that there are no Forms after all, or if there are man cannot know them; yet, if he denies that there are Forms, he will have nowhere to turn his mind, and so will completely destroy the power of dialectic." This dilemma is Parmenides' last word on the Forms in the dialogue. Now here Parmenides unmistakably represents the first alternative as a summary of the previous objections, and thus he quite definitely says that what the objections tend to prove is that "these [Forms] do not exist, and if they did exist it is quite necessary that they should be unknown to human nature."⁸ The whole statement of the first alternative may be translated as follows:

These, Socrates, and many others in addition to these, are the inevitable consequences if there are these Ideas of things and a man insists on distinguishing some Form itself for each thing. So that the hearer becomes puzzled and suspects that they do not exist, and that if they did exist it is quite necessary that they should be unknown to human nature; and in saying this he thinks he is really saying something, and, as we just said, he is amazingly hard to persuade to the contrary.⁹

Thus an examination of the context of the passage to which Professor Taylor appeals shows, not merely that the passage does not support his view, but actually that it is a first-class positive argument for the traditional view.

Of all the considerations offered by Burnet and Taylor for their view, only one is an appeal to the actual text of the *Parmenides* to see what Parmenides himself is there made to say he is doing and what his hearers are made to regard him as doing. This surely is an anomaly. When the question is what Plato represents Parmenides as proving by his arguments, the first thing to do is surely to look to the text to see whether Parmenides is made to say what he thinks he is proving, and if so what it is. Yet Professor Taylor, after appealing to a single passage, devotes himself to a different matter, namely, a brilliant philosophical examination of the arguments to show how they *might* be turned against the sensibles. He has made it clear that

⁸ 135A.

⁹ 134E-135A.

the arguments about participation might be so used; but, if we turn to the text to see how Parmenides and Socrates thought they *were* being used, we find abundant positive evidence that they were being used to throw doubt on the existence of the Forms.

To begin with, what novelty does Socrates regard himself as introducing in his original statement?¹⁰ The doctrine that sensibles exist and participate in Forms, it being already assumed by the company that Forms exist? Clearly not. What the company already assumes is that sensibles exist; and Socrates' novelty is that Forms exist and are participated in by sensibles. His first words are: "Don't you think that there is some Form of likeness itself by itself, and something opposite thereto which is unlike; and that in these, which are two, you and I and the other things, which we call many, participate?" Here Socrates assumes the existence of you and me and the many, and urges that Forms also exist and that the many participate therein.

It was still open, however, for Parmenides to rejoin thus: "Yes, Socrates, you are quite right in believing that there are Forms, and I agree with you. Where you go wrong is not in asserting the existence of Forms, but in assuming the existence of sensibles also, which you say participate in the Forms. I will now show you that participation is an impossibility, from which it will follow that sensibles do not exist." Parmenides might have taken this line. But does he? After one sentence of praise he says this: "And tell me, you yourself have made the distinction you mention, on the one hand certain Forms themselves, on the other the participators therein?"¹¹ By itself, this sentence only tells us that the novelty lay in making the distinction, and does not say which of the distincts, if either, was newer than the other; but the next sentence is explicit. "And does there seem to you to be some likeness itself distinct from the likeness we possess, and one and many and all that you heard Zeno speaking of just now?" Here, plainly, the novelty is likeness itself, and the likeness we possess is assumed. Parmenides at once explores just what Forms Socrates believes in, not what sensibles he believes in. He asks whether Socrates believes in a Form of man distinct from us and all who are such as we; he does not ask whether Socrates believes in us and all who are such

¹⁰ 129.

¹¹ 130B.

as we, distinct from the Form of man. He asks whether there is a Form of hair distinct from the hair we handle, not whether we handle hair distinct from the Form of hair.

Later on Parmenides speaks as follows: "I think the reason why you think each single Form to exist is of this sort. Whenever there seem to you to be many things that are large, there perhaps seems to you to be one and the same Idea as you look at them all, and so you hold the large to be one."¹² This cannot be offered as evidence for the traditional view, because it is capable of various interpretations; but to make a complete statement of the traditional view we must say that according to it this passage implies that what Socrates is asserting, and what Parmenides is offering grounds for denying, is that Forms exist; and it also implies (though Plato would perhaps not have agreed to this on reflection) that if there were no many (that is, no sensibles) there would be no reason for believing in the Forms.

Parmenides introduces his last argument with these words:

So do you see, Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one distinguishes Forms as existing themselves by themselves?—Yes, indeed.—Then let me tell you that you practically have not yet *touched* on the immensity of the difficulty, if you intend to be always distinguishing and positing one Form for each set of things.¹³

Surely this language quite clearly and quite certainly entails that Socrates is not defending and Parmenides not denying the reality of sensibles. We may be uncertain just what version of the theory of Forms is in question; but we cannot doubt that it is a theory of *Forms* and not a theory of sensibles.

After the last argument Parmenides poses his dilemma, and we have already seen that here, too, his language quite sincerely and irrevocably implies that he has been giving reasons for believing that there are no Forms. He now says, or clearly hints, that in spite of those reasons there must *be* Forms. But still they were reasons against there being Forms; his present assertion is in spite of, and not in accordance with, his previous arguments. We may, therefore, confidently accept the traditional view that Parmenides is objecting to the existence of Forms.

¹² 132A.

¹³ 133AB.

II

The next proposition to be maintained is that the theory of Forms discussed in the first part of the *Parmenides* is identical with the theory of Forms set out in Plato's middle dialogues, especially the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. This needs no defense at the present time (for it is, as far as I know, generally accepted), but only a little explanation. It does not mean that every proposition asserted in the middle dialogues as part of the theory of Ideas is reasserted here. On the contrary, the few doctrines given here are very far from exhausting those expositions. There is nothing of what the *Republic* says about the Idea of the Good, or about the relation of the Ideas to the distinction between knowledge and opinion. There is nothing of the *Symposium's* stages in the ascent to the Idea of Beauty. There is nothing of the *Phaedo's* doctrine of recollection, although on the whole the *Phaedo* corresponds most closely to the account in the *Parmenides*. Socrates in the *Parmenides* gives only enough of the theory for his immediate purpose, which is to point out that not all things are liable to Zeno's contradictions. When we say that what he asserts is the theory of Ideas found in Plato's middle dialogues, we mean that he gives enough for us to recognize a central core of identity, and that the author, in composing the piece, intended this identity and did not intend to depict a theory distinct from that of the middle dialogues. If we add to this a denial of the Principle of Historicity and an assertion that the theory of Ideas in the middle dialogues was Plato's own belief at the time when he wrote them, we must conclude that in the *Parmenides* Plato presents objections to a theory that he himself had held at a previous time and perhaps still held.

III

Our third proposition is that Plato reckoned these objections to his doctrine of Ideas as neither fatal nor negligible, but serious difficulties requiring serious attention. That he did not think them fatal to any and every form of the doctrine seems evident at once. The dilemma with which *Parmenides* concludes his discussion of Socrates' theory hints clearly enough that there somehow must be Ideas after all. The *Timaeus* reaffirms the theory much later. External evidence, and especially the writings of Aristotle, make it certain that Plato went on

believing in some form of the doctrine to the end of his life. Therefore he did not think these objections fatal.

There is, indeed, one way out of this conclusion, and that is to say that Plato was a skeptic. If he held that human reason is essentially self-contradictory, he might have judged the objections fatal and gone on holding the theory nevertheless. And the view that he was a skeptic is not without plausibility, as the history of the Academy shows. Jackson thought that Plato was convinced by the final argument that Ideas really are unknowable. Some degree of skepticism is attributed to Plato by any Neo-Platonic interpretation, especially if it makes him hold that the conclusion of the second part of the *Parmenides* is true. Extremes meet; and Shorey, who was as far as possible from the Neo-Platonic interpretation, also made Plato a skeptic, though he would not have admitted it, when he wrote that "any philosopher who cannot or will not accept the alternative of pure positivism or thoroughgoing materialism must disregard or evade these difficulties as Plato did."¹⁴ In the present discussion, however, we shall assume without argument that this view is mistaken. It will be a postulate here that Plato was not a skeptic, as it is to Professor Taylor.¹⁵ Adding to this postulate the strong evidence that Plato continued believing in Ideas to the end of his life, we must conclude that he judged the objections in the *Parmenides* less than fatal.

The second part of the present proposition, to which we may now turn, is that, on the other hand, Plato did not consider these objections contemptible.

The evidence for this follows.

1. They are presented with considerable gravity. They are put into the mouth of a thinker for whom Plato professes a deep admiration; and this thinker insists on their seriousness,¹⁶ ending by saying that in view of them it needs a very good natural endowment to follow, and a still more amazing endowment to invent, a proof that there really are Ideas.¹⁷

2. The *Philebus*¹⁸ mentions the problems whether there are certain henads, and whether they become plural and split up among the infinity of gignomena "or are one and the same at the same time in one

¹⁴ *What Plato Said*, p. 289.

¹⁶ 131E, 133AB.

¹⁵ *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 8.

¹⁷ 135AB.

¹⁸ 15BC.

and many things, as wholes separated from themselves, which would seem most impossible." The context makes it certain that these henads are the Ideas, so that Plato is here restating both the general problem of the first part of the *Parmenides*, namely, whether there are Ideas, and the special problem of the first objection, namely, how things can participate in the Idea without dividing it from itself. The context explicitly tells us that these are serious problems, unlike some other problems about the one and the many. And one sentence in particular confirms not merely our present contention that Plato thought these objections serious but also our former contention that he did not think them fatal; it is to the effect that these problems "cause utter difficulty if you make the wrong admissions, and convenience if you make the right."

3. Parmenides' critique shows that Socrates' theory is not yet formed on two important questions, namely, (a) what Ideas there are, or to which collections of things an Idea corresponds; and (b) what is the nature of the participation in the Idea by the many. Now there is no satisfactory answer to either of these questions anywhere in Plato's writings. Interpreters have found hints of answers, and passages which logically imply a certain answer; but it is never indubitable that Plato saw and intended the implication or the hint. Aristotle's discussion suggests that neither problem ever received a definitive solution. Surely, therefore, Plato must have regarded these objections as serious, since they point to two lacunae which he was never able to fill.

4. The foregoing arguments are independent of our estimate of the true value of Parmenides' objections. They retain the same amount of force, even if we hold that the objections are in truth negligible. But if anyone believes that these objections really are philosophically profound, and that Plato was far too good a thinker to have overlooked their profundity, this will constitute for him a fourth reason for holding that Plato considered them serious difficulties.

The conclusion at which we thus arrive—that Plato thought he was stating serious objections to the theory of Ideas in the first part of the *Parmenides*—refutes the parody-view of the *Parmenides*, which is that the first part of the dialogue presents fallacious arguments made according to a bad logic by some opponents of Plato, and the second

part refutes them indirectly by showing in an extremely forcible way that their logic will prove anything about anything. We may confirm this by examining two statements of the parody-theory, namely, those of Professor Taylor and Professor Cherniss.

It is difficult to make out how serious Plato thought the objections according to Professor Taylor. Mr. Hardie speaks of "Professor Taylor's view that they are more or less transparent sophistries."¹⁹ This interpretation certainly seems, as we have said, to follow from Professor Taylor's general view of the dialogue. Furthermore, Professor Taylor has said that the second regress-argument is a "manifest subreption";²⁰ and that in it the premises of Parmenides are "an ingenious perversion" of the assertions of Socrates;²¹ while the first regress-argument depends on an ambiguity which it is only reasonable to suppose Plato was aware of, since in the *Sophist* he saw and explained the ambiguity as far as it affected the possibility of significant denial.²²

Yet the opposite view occurs in Professor Taylor's writings also. Whereas in 1916 he held that Plato saw the fallacy in the first regress-argument, in 1934 he wrote that "whether Plato was alive to this confusion is more than we can say,"²³ and spoke of "a series of at least apparently formidable objections."²⁴ And this is not simply a change of view since 1916, for in 1916, too, he quite distinctly implied that Plato meant us to regard them as "grave objections."²⁵ In both years, moreover, Professor Taylor confined his unfavorable critique to the two regress-arguments. He did not even assert, much less argue, that there was any fallacy in Parmenides' first argument—that the many cannot participate in the Idea without dividing it from itself—or in his last—that we cannot know the Ideas. This silence seems to suggest that in his view those two arguments are at least not quite disreputable and were not so regarded by Plato. Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is the fact that in both years Professor Taylor praised Parmenides' "refutation of idealism" in the highest terms, characterizing it as extremely neat and quite fatal. This argument is not an

¹⁹ *A Study in Plato*, p. 97.

²⁰ *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 26.

²¹ *Philosophical Studies*, p. 89.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²³ *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁵ *Philosophical Studies*, p. 90.

objection to any standing part of Socrates' theory; but that does not make it any the less incongruous to insert a first-class argument into the middle of a series the rest of which were going to be shown by indirection to be worthless. What reaction could Plato expect from his readers to such a procedure? If they recognized the perfection of this particular argument, they would have to reject Plato's insinuation of the worthlessness of Parmenides' arguments in general, and so the main purpose of the dialogue, as Professor Taylor expounds it, would be defeated. If, on the contrary, they accepted the implication that Parmenides' arguments were worthless, they would condemn the "refutation of idealism" along with the rest, and so Plato's beautiful argument would be regarded as proved to be fallacious by Plato himself.

These considerations make it very difficult to determine just what Professor Taylor's view is about Plato's estimate of the quality of the objections. That, however, is not our question here; and fortunately these considerations do show quite clearly that, if Professor Taylor were to maintain that Plato reckoned the objections worthless, then he could be refuted out of his own writings. Furthermore, we may dissent from the view that the two fallacies which he has exposed seemed negligible to Plato. The mistake in the first regress-argument is acutely described by Professor Taylor as the assumption that a character can be predicated of itself. The discovery that this assumption is false is by no means a small advance in philosophy. It is taken for true by Socrates and Protagoras in the *Protagoras*.²⁶

Is there such a thing as justice or not? I think there is. What do you think?—I think so too, he said.—What then? If someone asked you and me, "Protagoras and Socrates, tell me, this thing you just mentioned, justice, is it itself just or unjust?", I should answer him that it is just. And how would you vote? The same as I or different?—The same, he said.—Then justice is such as to be just, I should say in reply to the inquirer; and you would too?—Yes, he said.—If he then asked us, "Do you also hold that there is such a thing as holiness?", we should say yes, I think.—Yes, said he.—"And do you say that this too is some thing?" We should say yes, shouldn't we?—He agreed to this too.—"Do you say that this thing itself is such as to be unholy or such as to be holy?" I should be annoyed at the question, I said;

²⁶ 330C.

and I should say "Hush, man; how could anything else be holy if holiness itself is not holy?" What about you? Wouldn't you answer so?—Certainly, he said.

Professor Taylor finds the fallacy in the second regress-argument to be that "Parmenides is . . . allowing himself to substitute the *symmetrical* relation 'is like,' 'resembles,' for the *asymmetrical* relation 'is a likeness of.'"²⁷ Far from being a "manifest subreption," this is surely a confusion into which we are all liable to fall.

The fact is that what Professor Taylor does in his 1916 article is to point out two fallacies with great acuteness and very careful argument, and then to assume without any argument at all that Plato must not merely have seen the fallacies as clearly as Professor Taylor does but also have thought them unlikely to puzzle any decent thinker. We tend to assume that the careful argument has somehow established the second point as well as the existence of the fallacies; but in reality the pains Professor Taylor has to take to reveal the fallacies are a probable argument that Plato thought them serious puzzles.

When we turn to Professor Cherniss' form of the parody-theory, we find the same difficulty in determining whether he thinks that Plato considered the objections serious. Once again there is the general impression that he means that Plato considered them worthless, but once again there are one or two special statements which seem to demand the contrary. Professor Cherniss writes as follows:

Of these objections the first is a quibble made plausible by shifting from Socrates' analogy of "the all-pervading day" to the essentially different analogy of a sail-cloth; and at the bottom of the objection lies the thesis that *Being* is indivisible. This argument is developed abstractly by the tacit predication of material qualities to abstract Ideas (e.g., any *part* of the *Idea* of equality would be *smaller* than the *Idea* itself and yet, by the theory, the object which has this part smaller than equality will thereby be rendered equal to something). The Ideas are, then, said to be open to the objection of an infinite regress, an objection which depends upon debasing the *Idea* to the level of material objects and is due primarily to a juggling of the verb "to be." It amounts to saying that the statement "Smallness is smallness" is equivalent to the judgment "An *Idea* exists which has the predicate small." The same objection of an infinite regress is brought against the device of "imitation of the Ideas by objects," and it is based upon the same fallacious degradation of the Ideas to the level of phenomena. Upon this follows a dis-

²⁷ *Plato's Parmenides*, p. 26.

sertation of the impossibility of any communion between the world of Ideas and that of Phenomena. This difficulty Plato always recognized and the complete solution of it has never been found.²⁸

Here a long passage, seeming to tend to the conclusion that Plato thought all the arguments worthless, is unexpectedly terminated by the statement that he thought the last of them serious and never solved it. So that we can say of Professor Cherniss, as we said of Professor Taylor, that, *if* his theory entails that Plato considered these objections contemptible, then he can be refuted out of his own writings; and we can put to him the same difficulty as before, namely, that, by including a good argument among the bad, Plato would be destroying the force either of his parody or of his good argument. We may also urge—and this is again parallel to something we have urged about Professor Taylor—that the fallacies Professor Cherniss finds in these objections are not, as a matter of fact, contemptible. What he well calls the “degradation of the Ideas to the level of phenomena” is certainly present in these arguments. (It is, in fact, most crudely present in the argument he considers the best, for Parmenides’ last objection reifies the Ideas by equating the Idea of knowledge with God’s knowledge, by equating the relation between the Ideas of relatives with that between the relatives themselves, and by making the Idea of knowledge itself know things.) But such reification, such treatment of the universal as if it were another particular, is not a childish error. While it is easy to say that the universal is not another particular, it is not easy but impossible always to avoid treating it as if it were, always to grasp it in its peculiarity. Fresh modes of the illusion are always arising as logic advances. Nor is it the fact that even now we understand perfectly the ambiguities of the verb “to be,” so that if any argument depends on those ambiguities it must be deliberate “juggling.”²⁹ We are certain that it is ambiguous; but we shall probably never exhaust the account of how it is so, nor neutralize its power to mislead us. The truth is not exactly that the objections set out in the first part of the *Parmenides* are profound, nor that some of them have never been completely solved, but that they are difficulties

²⁸ *American Journal of Philology*, LIII, 135–36. I thank the author, who is also the editor of the *Journal*, for permission to quote from his article.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

which in the nature of language and thought must perpetually be re-erising and reovercome.

Furthermore, surely it is the duty of all holders of the parody-theory to show in some detail what is the logical error exposed in the second part of the dialogue, and how this same error lies at the root of the arguments in the first part. We have ground for complaint against both Professor Taylor and Professor Cherniss in this matter; for the errors they discover in the second part are not the same as those they discover in the first. Professor Taylor tells us³⁰ that in the second part

the apparently single thesis really includes two assumptions, and . . . the two are incompatible. . . . Parmenides says "what is, is one," and in saying this he assumes two things about "what is," (a) that it *is*, or is real, and (b) that it is a *unit*, and these two positions are incompatible.

What is there here that we also find in the first part? Neither is there anything nor does Professor Taylor try to show that there is anything.

Professor Cherniss describes the fallacy in the second part thus: "This result is accomplished by a systematic abuse of *εἶναι*, the meaning being swung from the copulative to the existential and stress being put now on the exclusive and again on the extended meaning of the word."³¹ He explains in a note that the copulative sense is used in Hypotheses 1, 4, 6, 8, and the existential sense in the other four. Now it is true that he tells us that there is a juggling of the verb "to be" in the first part also. But (1) he does not explain what sort of juggling it is, nor show that out of the many ambiguities of this word Plato picks the same one to play with in the second part as he played with in the first. (2) The main fallacy that he finds in the first part has nothing to do with the verb "to be." It is "the degradation of the Ideas to the level of phenomena." This—the main fallacy of the first part—has, as far as he tells us, no counterpart in the second. How, then, can the second expose the logic of the first? There is no need for us to examine whether the holders of the parody-view analyze the fallacies correctly, as long as they themselves do not find the same fallacies in the two parts. For you do not expose one fallacy by giving an example of another.

³⁰ *Plato's Parmenides*, pp. 31–32.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

The conclusion at which we thus arrive is that two important supporters of the parody-theory give us no good ground for abandoning our third proposition, namely, that Plato considered the objections in the first part serious but not fatal.

IV

Our next proposition is that Plato never answered these serious objections in his dialogues. Now there are only two places in which readers have thought they found the answers. One is the *Sophist's* doctrine of the communion of kinds, and the other is the second part of the *Parmenides* itself. The view that they are answered in the *Sophist* is very attractive. Socrates in his original statement of the theory of Ideas seems quite clearly to deny that they communicate with each other;³² and the *Sophist* represents the doctrine of communion as an answer to Parmenides, and Parmenides is the introducer of the objections here. Unfortunately, however, none of these objections really assumes that the Ideas do not communicate or loses its force when we make the opposite assumption. The first argument is that Socrates cannot decide which sets of Manies have a corresponding Idea: how does communion help this? The second argument is that many things cannot participate in one Idea without dividing it from itself: how does communion help this? The fourth argument is that participation cannot be imitation because that would involve an infinity of Ideas corresponding to each set to which any Idea corresponded: how does communion help this? The fifth argument is that we can never know the Ideas because we have our being toward ourselves and they have theirs toward themselves; far from denying, this argument seems to assert some sort of communion among the Ideas.

In the third argument Professor Taylor finds a mistake exposed in the *Sophist*. The argument is that, if there must be a one wherever there is a many, then, by necessary reapplications of the same principle, there will be an infinity of ones wherever there is a many. Professor Taylor points out that this assumes the falsehood that bigness is big, and its generalization that all universals are predicable of themselves. He then suggests that what tempts us to make this false as-

³² Pa. 129E.

sumption is "the linguistic fact that we commonly use the same word 'is' to symbolize both predication and identity"; but Plato saw and explained this ambiguity in the *Sophist*, "so far as it affects the possibility of significant denial."³³ Against this it must be urged that what leads us to the false assumption that universals are predicable of themselves is not the fact that *is* may mean either predication or identity. Socrates does not think that "Justice is just" because he confuses it with the proposition that "Justice is Justice" but because he assumes that it must be either just or unjust, because he is not keeping in mind, or has never realized, that there are predicates and subjects that cannot be synthesized in any way, either affirmatively or negatively.

It appears, then, that the *Sophist's* doctrine that the Ideas communicate with one another, while it does contradict a part of Socrates' original statement of the theory, does not at all invalidate any part of Parmenides' criticism, because on a review of each of his arguments in turn we find that none of them assumes that the Ideas do not communicate. It further appears that, as we find this to be the fact, so we find no reason to believe that Plato himself thought otherwise.

If, instead of asking whether these arguments assume noncommunication, we ask whether the doctrine of communion clears up the difficulties they put, the answer is surely negative again. The doctrine of communion does not help us to know which sets of Ideas have Ideas corresponding to them, or how the Idea can be participated in without being divided, or what participation is, or how men can know the Ideas; nor is there any reason for supposing that Plato thought it did.

The other form of the view that Plato does answer these objections somewhere in the dialogues—the view, namely, that he answers them in the second part of the *Parmenides* itself—cannot be squarely met now. We have already answered one species of it, namely, the parody-theory, to this extent, that two important supporters thereof fail to exhibit the same fallacies as occurring in the two parts of the dialogue, and therefore fail to show that the second part is in fact an answer to the first. Nor do they give reasons for supposing that, although the second part does not answer the first, Plato thought it did. Other species of the view that the second part answers the first will be met later on.

³³ *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 50–51.

Why did Plato never reply to these objections? Not because he could not. That answer is rendered improbable by the arguments for the view that he did not think them fatal; and two passages in particular seem to hint that he thought he could meet them.³⁴ He left them unanswered because, as he tells us,³⁵ the answer to them is a very serious and difficult matter, and the written word, as he tells us in the *Phaedrus*, is not suitable for the most serious and difficult matters. It was his view that written philosophy cannot give insight to those who have it not. If a man already possesses the insight, writings may pleasantly remind him of it; but, if he does not, they will not give it to him. All that writing can do for the untaught is to show him that he has something to learn and make him eager to learn it.

But why set down the objections at all if you are not going to set down their answers? Because it is a useful act to show men that they have something to learn and make them eager to learn it. This answer will appear in a more specialized and more convincing form when we come to say positively what really is Plato's general intention in this dialogue. But even in its present form it surely is, in view of the statement in the *Phaedrus* about committing serious thoughts to writing, quite satisfactory. That Plato never published an answer to these objections, in spite of believing them important, is not one of the mysteries of the *Parmenides*.

V

Far more puzzling is the fact, to which we now turn, that Parmenides, after his objections to the Ideas, gives detailed instructions about method, which he apparently intends quite seriously and regards as important, and that by way of explaining this method he adds an example of it, which example seems to be perfectly absurd. Since the example is absurd, are we to understand that after all he is not serious about the method? Or should we take it the other way round, and say that, since he is serious about the method, he must have somehow intended the example to seem sensible? Or can we in any way combine into a rational whole our two first impressions (1) that he is

³⁴ *Pa.* 135A7-B2 and *Phi.* 15C2; quoted above, pp. 59-60.

³⁵ *Pa.* 135.

really recommending the method and (2) that he thinks the example ridiculous?

Let us bear in mind the following division. An example of reasoning may (1) illustrate how you ought to reason, (2) illustrate how you ought not to reason, (3) serve to prove some doctrine, or (4) serve to disprove some doctrine by showing that it leads to consequences which are not so. Or perhaps it may do more than one of these things, or a fifth.

The second and fourth alternatives are incompatible. A chain of reasoning cannot be both an example of bad reasoning and also a satisfactory reduction to absurdity of some proposition, for if the reasoning is bad the proposition has not been really shown to lead to an absurdity. It is perfectly reasonable to say to a man: "Your own principles lead to absurdities by your own methods of reasoning." And if this is established, we then know that *either* the man's principles are false *or* his methods of reasoning are fallacious. But we do not and cannot know, from such a demonstration, that *both* the man's principles are false *and* his methods of reasoning are fallacious. For, if his principles are false, the absurdity of the conclusions may be due merely to the falsehood of the principles, and the reasoning may be valid; while, if the reasoning is fallacious, the absurdity of the conclusions may be due merely to the invalidity of the reasoning, and the principles may be true. From these facts it follows quite rigorously that, if Plato thought his example proved both that somebody's premises were false and also that his reasoning was fallacious, Plato was mistaken. Burnet said that, "so far as the arguments are sophistical—and one or two of them must certainly have been known by Plato to be so—that is probably quite deliberate."³⁶ He also said: "The Megaric doctrine is refuted. If we postulate a One which is only one (as the Megarics did), we can say nothing whatever about it. Or if (as the Megarics also did) we identify One with Being, we shall have to predicate of it all sorts of incompatible predicates."³⁷ Since these statements together imply that Plato thought he was showing that the Megarics were wrong both in their premises and in their reasoning, they attribute to him a mistake in logic. Professor Taylor seems quite explicitly to attribute such logic to Plato.

³⁶ *Greek Philosophy*, I, 263.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

It should follow that the real purpose of these perplexing "antinomies" is to expose the contradictions in which we are entangled if we commit ourselves to the premisses of certain other philosophers who are the unnamed objects of Plato's criticism, and we are also permitted to suspect that the *methods* of these philosophers as well as their premisses are intended to be satirized; in fact, that the *logic* which leads to the "antinomies" is the logic of the victims rather than of their critic.³⁸

We may begin by eliminating the third alternative. Plato is not directly stating a doctrine in the second part of the *Parmenides*. This follows both from his not being a skeptic and from the symmetry of the eight hypotheses and from their indiscriminateness.

1. If Plato was not a skeptic and if the conclusion of the second part of the *Parmenides* is utterly skeptical and absurd, then Plato is not giving us a positive doctrine in this passage. This argument has been powerfully stated by Professor Taylor;³⁹ and little need be added to his statement here. The premise, that Plato was not a skeptic, is an unargued postulate in this discussion. As to the other premise, that the conclusion of the second part of the *Parmenides* is utterly skeptical and absurd, it hardly needs recommendation because it has rarely if ever been denied. Since Plato makes Parmenides and Aristotle declare that the conclusion of the first hypothesis cannot be true,⁴⁰ it seems very unlikely that he believed the conjunctive statement of all the conclusions with which the whole illustration ends. The reason why he does not repeat this denial at the end of each of the subsequent hypotheses is probably that, since the second hypothesis completely contradicts the first in every particular, he thinks it now quite obvious without comment that the conclusions of these hypotheses cannot be true. This argument by itself seems fatal to every attempt to find a positive doctrine in the second part of the *Parmenides*.

2. The second part of the *Parmenides* has an extremely symmetrical and unified character, which is perfectly obvious and obviously intentional. Not merely does Plato present the whole eight hypotheses as constituting one single example of the method, but he balances them against one another by three different interlacing principles, according as the hypothesis itself is affirmative or negative, as its results are

³⁸ *Plato's Parmenides*, pp. 8-9. His italics.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁰ 142A.

affirmative or negative, and as we consider its results to the One or to the Others. There is only enough disproportion to prevent the symmetry from becoming insipid and dragging. At the end of the fourth hypothesis, though there is some doubt about the text, he appears to sum up the conclusions of all four as if they were to be taken as one. Anyhow it is certain that at the end of the last hypothesis he states all the results together in one compound proposition. In view of this thoroughly unified symmetry Plato cannot have meant us to pick out some of these hypotheses as giving his doctrine and to reject the rest; and no claim to find positive doctrine in this illustration of method has much right to a hearing until it is ready to say how we are to understand *all* the hypotheses. But, if we look at the interpreters who have actually thought they saw a positive doctrine in the second part of the *Parmenides*, we discover, as far as I have read them, that none of them except Professor Cornford finds a positive doctrine in each of the hypotheses. They all either say, or suggest by silence, that only in some of them is Plato giving us his doctrine. For example, Jackson found that Plato gives us his own views in Hypotheses 2 and 3; but in the other hypotheses he develops the consequences of four other views;⁴¹ Mr. Hardie finds a positive doctrine in the first two hypotheses and is silent about the rest. From one point of view these interpreters are wise in their procedure, for it seems impossible to imagine how Plato could have been conveying positive doctrine in all eight hypotheses or even in any three of them. Yet surely the symmetry of these hypotheses, and the equality with which they are all presented, compel us to find a positive doctrine in all of them if we find it in any. This argument also seems to be conclusive by itself.

3. Professor Taylor has pointed to the indiscriminateness of the conclusions drawn from the hypotheses, indiscriminate assertion in four of them and indiscriminate denial in the other four. The hypotheses with affirmative results attribute all possible predicates to their subjects, whether those subjects exist or not; the hypotheses with negative results deny all possible predicates of their subjects. Every one of the eight includes in principle all possible predicates. It is surely inconceivable that Plato meant us to find a positive doctrine here. This argument also seems to be conclusive by itself.

⁴¹ *JP*, Vol. XI, summarized on p. 324.

Let us examine in detail one particular claim to find positive doctrine in this illustration, that of Mr. Hardie. He first tells us⁴² that the original hypothesis is raised in two forms, (1) if it is one (*εἰ ἐν ἑστίν*) and (2) if one *is* (*ἐν εἰ ἔστιν*), the difference between them being made explicit at the beginning of the second statement of the hypothesis.⁴³ A dozen pages later⁴⁴ he states the doctrine thus:

Both the One which is one and the One which exists have a real reference. The former, which is not a whole of parts and is "beyond" all predicates (cf. Proclus in *Rem Pub.* i. 285), refers to the One which is identified (by Plato, as we shall see) with the Good. To it may be applied the words of Bradley when he speaks of his Absolute as being "too rich not too poor for division of its elements." On the other hand, the second hypothesis refers to what is one in a lower or derivative sense; the unity of the object of scientific intelligence, and even of opinion, a one-many which "communicates" with other forms and is participated in by things. This unity is not the unity of the supremely real but of that which, in the language of Neoplatonism, "emanates" from the One. Mind and its objects "proceed" from the One, just as, in Plato's simile, the seeing eye and the seen colour depend upon the transcendent source of all illumination. Thus, for this view, the hypotheses of the *Parmenides* offer a condensed statement of the logical basis of the metaphysics which the *Republic* conveys by the well-known simile of the sun.

What does Mr. Hardie do about the three powerful arguments mentioned above against his type of view? About the argument from the fact that Plato was not a skeptic, taken as a whole, he does nothing at all; and this may give us some confidence in rejecting his view. He does, however, consider one sentence which supports this general argument, namely, that at the end of the first hypothesis when *Parmenides* suggests and Aristotle agrees that these things cannot be so. He writes as follows:

As the answers are throughout dictated by the questions, it can hardly be argued that not "*Parmenides*" but "the youngest present" rejects as "impossible" the conclusions of the first hypothesis. But the passage is not unnatural on the transcendentalist view, if we remember the double purpose which the view attributes to the hypotheses. It is impossible to accept the first hypothesis, without the further qualification supplied by the second, as what is true about "that which is one." To rest in it without attempting to "view the matter otherwise" would be to adopt a position hard to distinguish

⁴² W. F. R. Hardie, *A Study in Plato*, p. 101.

⁴³ 142C.

⁴⁴ Pp. 113-14.

from that of the "beginners and late learners" in the *Sophist* (251^b). It would render all predicates and thought impossible; but predication and thought are facts and these facts require, for their interpretation, the logic of intercommunicating forms. Thus the first hypothesis is not true in general of what is one, but only of one One.⁴⁵

This seems a very weak defense. Surely the plain sense of Plato's statement is that the consequences drawn in the first hypothesis are not and cannot be true. Surely any other reading of the passage is "unnatural" and could be justified only if required by a theory of the *Parmenides* for which there was strong independent evidence. But Mr. Hardie's theory of this part of the *Parmenides* does not possess strong independent evidence, as I hope to show; and, as I hope I have shown, it does possess grave disadvantages.

Mr. Hardie does even less about the symmetry-argument than about the skepticism-argument. He does not notice it at all; and he appears to give us no hint how we are to understand the last six hypotheses. (He does, in the passage quoted above, speak of "the hypotheses of the *Parmenides*" as if he had told us how to understand them all; but he has not. Perhaps the words "first two" have fallen out here.) Nor does he take any notice of the argument from the indiscriminateness of all the hypotheses.

Thus we see that Mr. Hardie by no means meets any one of these three arguments for holding that Plato is not offering us a doctrine in the second part of the *Parmenides*. But, apart from meeting objections, what positive evidence has he for his view? It seems to fall into three groups. First comes the supposed difference in meaning between the hypotheses of the first two movements. Second comes what can be inferred from the passage on method which constitutes an introduction to the eight hypotheses. Third come the superessentiality of the Good in the *Republic* and any other evidence for Neo-Platonic views in Plato.

1. Mr. Hardie finds a confirmation of his view in the fact that, as he says, "the original hypothesis is raised in two forms: (1) if it is one (*ἐἰ ἐν ἑστῶν*) and (2) if one is (*ἐν εἰ ἑστῶν*)."

The difference, he says, is made explicit at the beginning of the second statement of the hypothesis. Parmenides there says that "we are asking now what

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

must follow" from the hypothesis not that the One is one, but that the One *is*.⁴⁶ And "if the One *is*" is explained as meaning "if the One participates in Being" (*οὐσίας μετέχει*).⁴⁷ Mr. Hardie thinks that this implies that the first hypothesis refers to a One beyond being.

Presumably Mr. Hardie does not infer this distinction from the difference of the first two hypotheses in word-order, from the fact that in the statement of the first hypothesis *εἰ* precedes *ἐν*, whereas in the statement of the second *ἐν* precedes *εἰ*. We are prevented from supposing that Plato meant the word-order to signify any difference by the fact that the second hypothesis is stated in both orders, first as *ἐν εἰ ἔστιν*⁴⁸ and then as *εἰ ἐν ἔστιν*.⁴⁹ But, even if we overlooked this point, or supposed Plato to have made a slip here, we should still be much at a loss to give any significance to the word-order; for inspection reveals that (excluding the third statement of the second hypothesis in 142C3) *εἰ* precedes *ἐν* in the first and fifth hypotheses, and *ἐν* precedes *εἰ* in all the others. It would be specially hard to give any meaning to this because, whereas the first hypothesis is negative in its results, the fifth is affirmative.

However, it is not at all likely that Mr. Hardie thinks the word-order significant. Does he perhaps rely to some extent on the accentuation? The word *ἔστι* is in general paroxytone when it is existential in meaning, and oxytone or without accent when it is copulative. But when preceded by *εἰ* or by *μή* it is always paroxytone, whatever its meaning.⁵⁰ Now it is preceded by either *εἰ* or *μή* in every one of the eight hypotheses except the first hypothesis and the third statement of the second hypothesis.⁵¹ A criterion which fails in a quarter of the cases does not seem a good one to rely on; but the really fatal argument against any inference from accents is that Plato did not know of their existence and hence could not use them to convey his meaning. He wrote to be intelligible without them, and they only represent a later reader's interpretation of his meaning.

Since neither the word-order nor the accentuation can be significant, there remains only the context to determine whether Plato made any distinction of meaning in the hypotheses. Mr. Hardie finds

⁴⁶ 142C.

⁴⁹ 142C3.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-2.

⁵⁰ M. W. Chandler, *Greek Accentuation* (2d ed.), p. 267.

⁴⁸ 142B3 and B5.

⁵¹ 142C3.

that Plato explicitly makes such a distinction at the beginning of the second hypothesis. Plato's words are these: *νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν.*⁵² I venture to suggest that Mr. Hardie has misunderstood this passage. Why does he assume that the hypothesis which Plato expresses with the words *εἰ ἐν ἐν* is identical with the hypothesis of the first movement, which Plato called *εἰ ἐν ἔστιν*? Surely this hypothesis, *εἰ ἐν ἐν*, is mentioned only in this passage, being momentarily introduced in order to bring out by contrast something in the hypothesis that *is* being examined. It is not any one of the eight hypotheses from which consequences are inferred in the eight sections. If it were it would have contained, as they all do, the word *ἐστίν*. It follows that Mr. Hardie is mistaken in supposing that Plato is here telling us how the first hypothesis differs from the second. He is not talking about the first hypothesis at all, but elucidating the second by distinguishing it from a third mentioned only for this purpose. Mr. Hardie takes *νῦν* as meaning "in the present hypothesis." That is, in general, a possible meaning; but in this particular context it must mean "actually" or "as things are," in contrast with the imaginary state of affairs suggested in the previous sentence.

Mr. Hardie does not appeal to any other passage as evidence for his view that Plato intends a difference between the first two hypotheses. The only argument that now remains in favor of it is the general impression, if any, that we receive from the two movements. But an inspection of these two movements does not reveal any such difference. Their symmetrical indiscriminateness seems to be crowned by a complete indifference of their hypotheses. Furthermore, the opening sentence of the second movement seems to imply that the hypothesis now to be discussed is the very same as that discussed in the first movement: "Are you willing that we go back again to the hypothesis from the beginning, in case something different appears to us to be the truth when we go back?"⁵³

2. His argument from the passage of transition between the two main parts of the dialogue is that this passage "is calculated to lead us to expect that the second part of the dialogue will throw some real light on the difficulties which have been raised in the first."⁵⁴ It is so

⁵² 142C.⁵³ 142B1.⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

calculated; but stating a positive doctrine is not the only means of throwing light, and the passage itself implies that this is not the means Parmenides is going to adopt. He is going to help Socrates out of these perplexities, not by giving him a doctrine, but by teaching him a method and exercising him therein. When Socrates can handle the method skilfully he will be able to chop his own way out of the tangle. Parmenides is not chopping a path for him, but giving him an ax.

3. Mr. Hardie calls our attention to the facts that Plato identified the One with the Good, and said in the *Republic* that the Good is beyond Being. He points also to some other passages that might be Neo-Platonist. But he admits that they are "inconclusive"⁵⁵ and that the *Republic's* implication that the Good is the supreme object of intelligence is not the Neo-Platonic doctrine that the Good can be known only by an immediate contact which transcends intelligence.⁵⁶ We surely must allow that this evidence gives only a faint degree of probability. Even if the whole of Plotinus were actually to be read in some dialogue of Plato (excepting his professed interpretations of Plato), that still would not be good evidence that Plato's *Parmenides* referred to the One and its first emanation. The few resemblances that we actually have cannot stand against any good argument to the contrary; and that we have good arguments to the contrary has been shown. This completes our examination of Mr. Hardie's view.

We have eliminated the alternative that the second part of the *Parmenides* is a direct statement of doctrine. We may now eliminate more briefly the possibility of its being an indirect statement of doctrine, that is to say, of its proving some proposition by reducing its contradictory to absurdity. This follows from the fact that the illustration takes two contradictory hypotheses, "if the one exists" and "if the one does not exist," and reduces them both to absurdity. If the example had ended with the fourth movement, we might have thought that Plato was establishing indirectly the proposition that the one does not exist. But he disproves that proposition too.

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(To be continued)

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A NOTE ON ἀμβροτος

The connection of Greek βρότος with Sanskrit *mūrta*¹ leads naturally to the assumption that the negative forms of these words are also related. The situation is complicated in Greek, however, by the fact that ἀ-βρότος would not (and does not) survive in that form for long, becoming instead the letter-for-letter equivalent of ἀμβροτος (ἀ-βροτός), 'immortal.' There is, nevertheless, some manuscript evidence to show the existence of ἀβροτος (for ἀ-βρότος) in a most significant passage in the *Iliad*; and a gloss by Hesychius on ἀμβροσίη seems to indicate that in his time the difference between ἀ-βρότος and ἀ-βροτός was not altogether clear. An almost precisely similar development takes place in Sanskrit, where, although kept orthographically apart, the words *amūrta*, 'incorporeal,' (= ἀμβροτος<ἀ-βρότος) and *amṛta*, 'immortal' (= ἀμβροτος<ἀ-βροτός) become both alike epithets of deity; so that by a sort of linguistic as well as natural compulsion the gods (*amṛtā*, ἀμβροτοι) in India as in Greece are at once immortal (*amṛta*, ἀμβροτος) and 'immaterial' (*amūrta*, ἀμβροτος), and man, by the same token, being once made flesh, bears about him, as Augustine says, his mortality.

In *Iliad* v. 339-40, we read (the scene is the wounding of Aphrodite):

ῥέε δ' ἀμβροτον αἷμα θεοῖο
 ἰχώρ οἷός περ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι Θεοῖσιν²

Is it not missing the point entirely to translate ἀμβροτον αἷμα here, as is usual, by 'immortal blood'? Surely ἀμβροτον αἷμα is the exact opposite of that βρότος αἱματώεις which elsewhere in Homer³ disfigures the bodies of wounded and dying men? ἀμβροτος is here, then, not the equivalent of ἀ-βροτός but rather of ἀ-βρότος. The reading of two manuscripts³ (ἀβροτον) appears to support this view. The semantic step, moreover, from βρότος, the gore which on the battlefield was the most patent evidence of man's mortality, to the life itself which ebbed away with the flowing blood is the easiest possible to take. The subsequent confusion would be only worse confounded by the homonym

¹ The relationship, first suggested by Sophus Bugge (*KZ*, XIX, 446), is admitted by Walde-Pokorny. Bugge does not work out the phonological relation completely, but the alternation is clearly between a monosyllabic base *mer-* and a dissyllabic heavy base *merē-*, whence with reduced grade in both syllables we should have *mbrō-*, regularly becoming *mūr-* (*īd*) in Sanskrit.

² *Il.* vii. 425; xiv. 7; xviii. 345; xxiii. 41; *Od.* xxiv. 189.

³ Codex Joannis Mori, Episcopi Eliensis; Codex Baroccianus, No. 202.

βροτός and by the two possible etymologies of ἀμβροτος, a word at best vague and indefinite. To this uncertainty Hesychius bears witness: *ἀμβροσίη* θεία καὶ ἀθάνατος· καὶ ἡ τῶν θεῶν τροφή· βαρυτόνως γὰρ ὁ βρότος τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φῶς οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν· ἡ καθαρά καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀφθαρτος σεμαίνεται.

That this is no mere Greek misunderstanding, however, is shown by the clearest possible evidence from early Indian philosophic prose. In the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, thanks to that word-play which was the diurnal joy of their authors, *amṛta* and *amūrta* are so used that either and both may be translated by the Greek ἀμβροτος. This, for example, is the normal philosophic use of *mūrta* and *amūrta* as it appears in *Praṇa Up.* 1, 5:

Rayirvā elatsarvaṇ yanmūrtaṃ cāmūrtaṃ ca tasmān mūrtir eva rayiḥ.

Everything here below is matter, what is formed [βρότος] and what is not formed [ἀμβροτος]. Form⁵ itself is therefore matter.

With *amūrta* in the sense of 'unformed' may possibly now be compared the ἀβρότη of νύξ ἀβρότη in *Il.* xiv. 78, which would then properly be rendered by Milton's 'uncreated Night'⁶ rather than, on the assumption (which the accent does not warrant) that ἀβρότη = ἀμβροτος (or ἀμβρόσιος?) = *amṛta*, by the usual 'immortal.' Here, moreover, is an excellent example of the ease with which conflation could take place; for as soon as the pleonastic μ occurs in ἀβρότη, the word once again (assuming the usual change of accent) becomes the deceptive equivalent of *amṛta* and, when applied to νύξ or to any other member of the pantheon, can very well be translated as 'immortal.'

The same words *mūrta* and *amūrta* are also used to express the only distinction between the human and the divine, as in *Maitri Up.* 6, 3:

Dve vāva brahmaṇo rupe mūrtaṃ cāmūrtaṃ cūtha yanmūrtaṃ tadasyatyaṃ yadamūrtaṃ tatsatyamtadbrahma.

There are truly two forms of Brahma, the corporeal⁷ [βρότος] and the incorporeal [ἀμβροτος]. That which is corporeal is non-being; that which is incorporeal, that is being, that is Brahma.

⁴ By the emendation (for this suggestion I am indebted to Professor J. Whatmough of Harvard University) of τὸν ἀνθρώπινον to τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, the otherwise rather troublesome second line becomes clear: "For βροτος when it has a barytone accent and is not in the negative (οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν) means human life." Hesychius is elsewhere quite certain of his accent: βροτον· τὸ αἷμα· ὀξύτονος μὲν ἀνθρώπων· παροξύτονος δὲ σεμαίνει τὸν ἐκ φόνου λῆθρον. βροτός· φθαρτός ἢ γηγενής ἀνθρώπος. The *Etymologicum magnum*, one might observe in passing, is even more explicit: ἀμβροτοι. ἀθάνατοι, θεοί, ἄμμοροι βρότον δ' ἐστὶν αἷματος. The scholiast on *Il.* v. 342 [ἀναίμωτος εἶμι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καλεῖνται] likewise is interesting (*Les Scholies genevoises de l'Iliade* [Paris, 1891], I, 86): "ἀναίμωτος" μὲν ἐπεὶ οὐ τρέφονται, "ἀθάνατοι" δὲ ὅτι ἀναίμωτοι.

⁵ The Skt. word here used, *mūrti*, in its later meaning of 'idol' is again the exact equivalent of Gk. βέρας, 'idol' (cited by Bugge, *loc. cit.*).

⁶ *Paradise Lost*, II, 150.

⁷ Hume translates *mūrtaṃ* and *amūrtaṃ* here (as in *Praṇa Up.* 1, 5, *supra*) by 'the formed and the unformed,' Cowell and Max Müller (in his version of the same passage

And once again (*Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 14. 5. 3. 1.) precisely the same comparison is made, but this time with an addition which, if cognate words were to be used, could not be expressed in Greek:

Dve vāva brahmaṇo rupe mūrtam caivāmūrtam ca martyam camrtam ca.

There are truly two forms of Brahma, the corporeal [βρότος] and indeed the incorporeal [ἀμβροτος], the mortal [βροτός] and the immortal [ἀμβροτός].

To the Indians the ἀμβροτοι were at once incorporeal and immortal; so also, one supposes, were they to the more reflective among the Homeric Greeks. That is the ἐρμηνεία of ἀμβροτος.⁸

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NOTES ON HORACE

1. *Maecenas atavis editis regibus*

Horace and other poets copiously extol the ancient Etruscan glories of Maecenas' line, presumably in deference to Maecenas' own pride of ancestry. The connection, apparently on the mother's side, with the great family of the Cilnii seems to be a matter of especial pride. It is surely a legitimate inference that in Roman history, and, on the father's side, there was little or nothing to be proud of.

Epigraphy gives the father's name as L. Maecenas (*CIL*, VI, 21771 = Dessau, 7848). Nothing further is known of him, except that, if Nicolaus reports the name correctly, he was in Campania with Octavian in the autumn of 44 B.C. (Nicolaus *Vita Caesaris* xxxi. 133). There is no record anywhere, to my knowledge, of the grandfather's name or quality. A. Kappelmacher, in Pauly-Wissowa, XIV, 1, "Maecenas" 6. iii. p. 209, speculatively identifies him with C. Maecenas, a Roman knight mentioned by Cicero as one of the opponents of Drusus in 91 B.C. (*Pro Cluentio* 153). There is no ancient evidence for this identification. Velleius (ii. 88. 2) says Maecenas was *equestri sed splendido genere natus*, but this does not necessarily imply more than that his father was of equestrian rank and that, as Horace reports, he could claim descent on both sides from men who once upon a time held command over mighty armies (*Sat.* i. 6. 4).

We know of another Maecenas, mentioned by Sallust as present at the

in *Brh. Up.* 2, 3, 1) both by 'material and immaterial.' The latter seems to me closer to the spirit of the original, although Hume's rendering is literally correct. I use 'corporeal' rather than 'material' in order to avoid any apparent contradiction with *rayih* in the *Pragna* passage.

⁸ Similarly, therefore, it is likely that ἀμβρο[or]ίζειν (quoted by Hesychius as meaning *θεραπεύειν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς*) signifies rather the extinction of personality in mystical communion with God than the extension of personality through 'immortality.'

banquet where Sertorius was murdered: *scriba Maecenas in imo medius inter Tarquitium et dominum Perpernam* (*Hist. frag.* iii. 83 [Maur.]). It is improbable, as Kappelmacher points out, that this is the same man as the C. Maecenas mentioned by Cicero. Syme, who accepts C. Maecenas as the grandfather of Augustus' friend, regards Perperna's scribe, whom, on what evidence I do not know, he also calls C. Maecenas, as "presumably a member of this family" (Syme, *Roman Revolution*, p. 129, n. 4). There is, however, no evidence beyond the common *gentilicium* to show that any of the three was related to either of the others; and the positions in society of the scribe and the presumably older knight hardly suggest a very close connection, though in the conditions of 91-72 B.C. it is not impossible.

Actually, we know hardly any more about Maecenas' background than about Agrippa's. I suspect that the contrast between the rough parvenu and the cultured scion of an ancient house has been overstressed and is in fact largely illusory; that Maecenas' family was socially little if at all above the families of the other upstarts who, as Syme points out in his *Roman Revolution*, formed the bulk of Octavian's supporters. A difference in manners and character between Maecenas and Agrippa there undoubtedly was, but, from the standpoint of Roman society, it may be doubted whether there was much to choose between their origins. Both seem to have been somewhat coy about their immediate origin; but, while Agrippa contented himself with dropping the *Vipsanius* (cf. *CIL*, VI, 896), Maecenas more imaginatively made capital out of the apparent disadvantage of non-Roman ancestry.

The elaborate silence preserved about the immediate antecedents of a man who obviously set great store by distinguished ancestry seems to suggest that, if we are to find Maecenas a known ancestor at all, we should identify Perperna's one-time scribe with L. Maecenas, the father of Augustus' minister and founder of the fortunes of that branch of the family. The entourage of Caesar's heir is no unlikely place to find the son of a man identified with the old Marian party; and in what luster could the vanity of an elegant neurotic better hide the shabby paternal shadow of Perperna's scribe than in the legendary glories of Etruscan royalty?

2. *Ep.* i. 1. 38: *invidus iracundus iners rinosus amator*

This catalogue, taken in conjunction with the mention of ambition and avarice in the verses immediately preceding, is a striking anticipation of the well-known list of the Seven Capital Sins that has figured so prominently in Christian moral teaching: pride, avarice, envy, anger, sloth, gluttony, lust. Nowhere else in Horace do we find exactly this list. There are, of course, plenty of references to these vices, singly or in combination. *Ep.* i. 2. 32-63 and *Ep.* i. 6. 31-66 treat more or less systematically of different portions of this list, but only the most unscrupulous manipulation can extract from either epistle the full seven; nor does the first epistle proceed to a systematic

expansion of the list. This is not surprising, in view of Horace's explicit rejection of systematic teaching, but it does seem strange that he should take the trouble to fabricate a catalogue he had no intention of using. It is much less difficult to suppose that in a series of desultory remarks based on someone else's pamphlet he might reproduce such a list.

The general tone of *Ep.* i. 1, at least from verse 27 to the end, suggests that Horace had a Stoic manual directly in mind, if not immediately before his eyes. This limited list, remarkable for its simplicity, seems to have little in common with the multifarious and hair-splitting classifications of misconduct preserved to us in the remnants of formal Stoic teaching. Yet the personal rather than civic morality it reflects suggests a post-Aristotelian basis, and the condemnation of inertia and the subsequent references to the *rex* (vss. 59-63), to vulgar inconsistency (vss. 82 ff.) and insanity (vs. 101), and to the *sapiens* (vs. 106) are in harmony with Stoic teaching.

The first appearance¹ of a similar list in Western Christian literature is in Cassian, *De coenobiorum institutis* (Migne, XLIX, col. 202). He enumerates eight chief dangers that beset the cenobite, as follows: *gastrimargia, fornicatio, philargyria, ira, tristitia, acedia, cenodoxia, superbia*. It is apparent at once that this list has reference not to ordinary life, as has that of Horace, but to the special conditions of the monastic community Cassian has in mind. A Greek original is suggested by the free use of Greek terms glossed in his text with one or more Latin equivalents. St. Gregory's list in the *Moralia* (Migne, LXXVI, col. 621) resembles that of Horace more closely: "*Radix quippe cuncti mali superbia est. . . . Primae autem ejus suboles, septem nimirum principalia vitia, de hac virulenta radice proferuntur, scilicet inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, ventris ingluvies, luxuria.*" This seems, however, to owe so much more to Cassian than to Horace that any direct influence of Horace seems unlikely. It is more probable that all these lists go back to a common source in the Stoic pamphlet literature, of which Epictetus' manual is our best example; but the very existence of such a pamphlet seems to be now beyond the reach of anything but conjecture.

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¹ It may be questioned whether Cyprian's mention (*De mortalitate* 4) of *avaritia, libido, ambitio, ira, superbia, vinolentia, invidia, zelus*, implies any definite codification.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Roman Citizenship. By A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939. Pp. vi+315.

The reviewer finds this one of the most interesting studies in Roman history which he has read in recent years—interesting, be it said, less from its style than for its subject. It is a truism that Rome owed the stability of her Empire to the fact that she gradually admitted her conquered subjects to full citizenship, instead of keeping them in permanent subjection. The present study traces in detail the evolution of the several stages in this process. It is not always easy reading, for the author often loses himself in the discussion of detailed questions of evidence without stating the thesis he has in mind and the reader has to work hard to discern his conclusions. Why do so many English scholars of the present generation display this fault?

Chapter i discusses the dark subject of the evolution of the Latin League and its relation to Rome. Here, of course, only conjectural results can be extracted from the various considerations involved: the scanty and late tradition, geography, archeology, and comparative sociology. The author makes two interesting suggestions. He thinks that the tradition confuses two stages in the development, the first when Latium was inhabited by small villages and the second when the villages had coagulated into true city-states. The origin of the later conception of mutual rights of *commercium*, *conubium*, and *migratio* is to be found, he thinks, in the mutual relations of the primitive villages. His second suggestion is that the political leagues grew out of religious leagues, i.e., to use the Greek term, out of amphictyonies.

In chapters ii-iv he discusses the various types of states included in the Roman federation after 338. Here his conclusions differ considerably from the views which hitherto have been generally held. The *municipium* or, as it was later called, the *civitas sine suffragio*, possessed all the rights of the Latin colony, from which it was distinguished only by the fact that it had existed prior to its union with Rome, whereas the Latin colony was a new foundation. It not merely possessed the *jus commercii*, the *jus conubii*, and the *jus migrationis* and contributed men to the legions, but (at first, at least) it enjoyed self-government. The *praefecti* sent out by Rome prior to 211 were sent only on occasions when the *municipium* concerned desired Roman assistance in settling some internal difficulty. These early *praefecti* were magistrates elected by the *comitia*. It was only after 211 that Rome began to trench upon the autonomy of the *municipia* by sending out annually *praefecti* appointed by the praetor. The denial of the *jus suffragii* to the *municipia* was due to the fact that they were technically independent states.

Rome's willingness to allow local self-government is illustrated also by her organization within the *ager Romanus* of administrative organs in *oppida civium Romanorum* and even in market towns (*fora*).

In regard to the Latin colonies, the writer thinks that, except in special instances, they were allowed mutual trade, intermarriage, and migration with one another; and he does not believe that there was any formal withdrawal of the right of migration to Rome after 268. In practice, to be sure, the censors discouraged migration of Latins to Rome in the interest of the colonies themselves, which were becoming depopulated.

As to the Roman colonies, the colonies of three hundred citizens sent in early times to guard seaports in Roman territory must, he thinks, have had local officials, if only to summon the colonists to arms in time of danger and to publish the edicts of the Roman senate. The Roman colonies founded after 183 differed from Latin colonies only in this, that the colonists had a dual citizenship. Latins equally with Romans were eligible as colonists.

The other allies of Rome in Italy fell into two classes: those which enjoyed a *foedus aequum* and those which were bound to Rome only by a *foedus iniquum*. In the olden days we used to use the terms *civitates foederatae* and *civitates dediticiae* for these two classes. Even the latter, according to the author, enjoyed a measure of self-government.

Thus all the states comprising the Roman federation were in some measure self-governing. The grievances of the Italian allies which led to the Social War were the various ways in which the senate, but more particularly the Roman magistrates, arbitrarily interfered with the local independence of the states. The real desire of the subject communities was not for the Roman suffrage—a shadowy right at best in an age when even the Roman citizens had but little share in the control of the state—but for release from the galling subservience to which the Romans were subjecting them and from the tyranny of the Roman magistrates. Hence the hope entertained by many Romans that their just grievances would be satisfied for all practical purposes with a grant of a right of *provocatio*.

The ultimate effect of the Social War was to destroy the concept of an *ager Romanus*. Italy became a land of municipalities, in our sense of the term; and the function of the Roman government came to be confined (a) to the municipal government of the *urbs Roma* and (b) to imperial concerns. The municipalization of Italy owed little to Julius Caesar. It had already been accomplished before his time.

In regard to the provinces, Rome's favorite device was the *civitas libera*, which from her point of view was preferable to the *civitas foederata*, in that the grant of freedom was a revocable gift and could be limited and defined as desired.

Under Caesar and Augustus the process, already begun under the Republic, of extending Roman citizenship to provincial communities was greatly ex-

tended. Between the policies of the two men there was by no means so great a difference as has often been represented. As yet, however, citizenship was granted only to communities in which there was a body of Roman settlers or to which settlers were sent out. There was no elevation of wholly non-Roman communities to the status of *municipia* or colonies. The activity of Claudius in the expansion of Roman citizenship has been much exaggerated. He did insist, in the case of the request of the Gallic chiefs for admission to the senate, upon the principle that the senate ought to include the best of the Roman citizen body wherever found, but the number of new senators whom he appointed from the provinces seems to have been small. He also founded new colonies, but mainly as fortresses in the new frontier provinces. Nor were his grants of citizenship to individuals wholesale or indiscriminate. One precedent, however, he did set, though he did not resort to it frequently—that is, the admission to honorary colonial status of provincial *municipia* which were already Romanized.

Under the Flavians and the Antonines the expansion of citizenship became a flood tide. New colonies were founded; communities and provinces (such as Spain) received the Latin right, Latin communities were raised to *municipia*, *municipia* received the status of Roman colonies, Roman colonies were granted the *jus Italicum*. Under the Severi, citizenship was conferred upon non-Romanized Orientals. The *Constitutio Antoniniana* simply recognized what was coming to be the fact. The eagerness of provincials for recognition as Romans was in part, of course, due to vanity. But the literature of the time shows a growing pride in the Roman tradition and a growing sense of membership in the Empire, which the barbarian incursions made all the more keen. The result was, as is well known, that in the end all the inhabitants of the Empire, whatever their race or language, regarded themselves as Romans.

This inadequate sketch of the story which the book tells gives little idea of the wealth of detail which the book provides.

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Storia della lingua di Roma. By GIÀCOMO DEVOTO. Edited by LICINIO CAPPELLI. ("Storia di Roma," published by the Istituto di studi romani, Vol. XXIII.) Bologna, 1940. Pp. 429.

A new book by Professor Devoto, the well-known author of the *Antichi italici* and *Tabulae Iguvinae*, offers every guaranty of being a serious, well-informed, deeply matured, and thoroughgoing work. This is true of the present book as of the preceding works of the same author; I think that I can say this and that I can express my sincere admiration for the author's extensive knowledge and critical capacity, although, this time, I disagree more than I did in the case of his preceding books with some of his basic ideas concerning the history of the Latin language and of the Italian Peninsula in general. But there is one methodological point on which I must express my complete ad-

hesion to the author's way of working. This is the general approach to the problem: How shall a history of a language be prepared? It surely must examine not only the grammar but the whole social, economic, religious, and political life of the people in so far as it is reflected in language; it must be the history of the people, in its development and progressive transformation, written from a linguistic point of view. In this sense, Devoto's book is the best description I know of a language, after Meillet's wonderful *Esquisse d'une histoire de la langue latine*.

It is, of course, impossible for me to examine even the most important—not to say all—problems studied by Professor Devoto. But in order to give the reader some idea both of the riches and of the weaknesses of this book, I will choose a couple of chapters which seem to me, for different reasons, of peculiar interest.

The chapter which contains the most important new element, the result of personal, unpublished investigations by Professor Devoto, is, as it seems to me, chapter i (pp. 1-36), which deals with the "Indo-European Origins of Latin," that is to say, the prehistory of the Latin language and its position among the other Indo-European languages. The demonstration which Devoto (following Meillet, Vendryes, and Bartoli) gives of the antiquity of Latin as compared with the other Indo-European languages and particularly those of the central (Greek, Hittite, Baltic, etc.) and eastern (Armenian, Indo-Iranian) groups and his analysis of the distribution of the Indo-European lexical material among the different Indo-European languages deserve the closest attention.

On the other hand, I find chapter ii (pp. 37-69) very weak. Even the existence of the "Mediterranean," "Alarodian," or "Japhetic" substratum, of which the author makes so much, seems to me to be quite questionable; the unmethodical character of the researches of Marr, Oštir, and Trombetti has been recognized by so many authoritative scholars (I will mention, above all, Meillet) that I need not insist upon it. The role of the Etruscan language is enormously exaggerated by Devoto, as by other Italian scholars, with such obstinacy that it would often seem they are influenced more by national or "racial" than by scientific reasons. Why, for example, should the names in *-ōna* be Etruscan or "Tyrrhenian"? Of all the town names in *-ōna*, which are quite numerous, only one is to be found in Etruria, and that not in the center of the region but near to the eastern boundaries: *Cortōna* (Κρότων in Greek).¹

¹ Moreover, according to the explicit testimony of Herodotus (i. 5. 7), *Cortōna* (Gr. Κρότων) was inhabited not by Etruscans (whom Herodotus always calls "Tyrrhenians," Τυρρηνοί!) but by Pelasgians (Πελασγοί), who spoke a different language (this clearly results from the text!): "What language the Pelasgians spoke I cannot accurately say. But if one may judge by those that still remain of the Pelasgians[!] who dwell above the Tyrrheni[ans] in the city of Croton[!] . . . who were once neighbours of the people now called Dorians, and at that time inhabited the country which now is called Thessaliotis . . . and of the Pelasgians who inhabited Placia and Scylace on the Hellespont, who came to dwell among the Athenians, and by other towns too

One is in Piedmont: *Dertōna* (now *Tortōna*). But we have *Vērōna* and *Cre-mōna* in the territory of the Venetians, an Illyrian stock; *Aluōna* and *Flanōna* in Istria, the land of the Illyrian *Istri*; then *Aenōna*, Ἀπαύζωνα, *Bausiōna*, *Blandōna*, Ἡρώνα, *Narōna*, *Promōna*, *Salōna*, *Scardōna*, *Suberadōna*, *Tariōna* in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula, *Dōdōna* in Epirus, Ἡμῶνα in Pannonia—all regions still peopled in historical times by Illyrians and, furthermore, regions in which no trace can be found either of Devoto's "Etruscans" or of his mythical "Tyrrhenians." We have, it is true, *Ortōna* and *Ancōna* (Greek Ἀγκών, cf. Κρότων) on the Adriatic Sea; but the whole western shore of the Adriatic Sea was once, according to ancient traditions, peopled by folks of Illyrian origin: the *Sallēntīni*, *Calabri*, *Messāpii*, *Peucetii*, *Dauri*, *Apuli* in the south; then the *Frentāni* (from Illyr. *bhrento-, "stag"), the *Paeligni*, "ex Illyrico orti" (Verrius Flaccus, cf. Paulus Festus 222 M., 248 L.); the *Picentēs* (cf. Norden, *Alt-Germanien*, p. 225; Krahe, *Geogr. Namen*, p. 107); then more to the north the *Iapodes*, mentioned as a local folk in the Iguvian Tables, as Devoto knows very well (*Iapuzkum nume*); finally, the *Veneti*.² The presence of Illyrians in the Italian Peninsula from about the year 1000 B.C. is now admitted not only by several most authoritative linguists, such as Kretschmer, Krahe, and others, but also by philologists like Norden and by historians like Schachermeyr (*Etruskische Frühgeschichte*, pp. 28 f., 40 f., 51, 76). Consequently, the manner in which Devoto dismisses the whole question is really surprising. Concerning the names in -ōna, after having asserted that they are Etruscan, he merely remarks: "I nomi in -ona come *Cortona* sono documentati nel settentrione [d'Italia]: *Dertona* (Tortona), *Cremona*, *Verona*; di là dall'Adriatico *Salona*" (p. 46). I must honestly say that this is not the way to give impartial information to the reader.

In the same chapter (p. 51) many words for which an Indo-European etymology can be claimed with plausibility—such as *pariēs*, *plēbs*, *passer*, *piger*, *mulier*, *gemō*, *loquor*, *cupiō*, *ōrō*, *opīnor*, *oportet*, *optō*, and others—are considered as Pre-Indo-European by Devoto; but, of course, here the opinion of other scholars may easily be different from mine, for the subject is quite controversial. The dictionary of Ernout-Meillet, which Devoto obviously follows, is also very skeptical about the Indo-European etymologies of these

which were once Pelasgian and afterwards took a different name: . . . if (I say) one may judge by these, the Pelasgians spoke a language which was not Greek (Ἰάπυγες γλῶσσαν)" (trans. Godley ["Loeb Classical Library"]). The reading Κρότων is now accepted by all scholars, I believe; cf. especially Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen*, I, 25, and DeRuyt, *Antiquité classique*, VII (1938), 281–90, with bibliography; it has, e.g., been introduced in the text by Ph. Legrand, *Belles lettres* (Paris, 1932). Such an old, clear, firsthand statement should not have been neglected by Professor Devoto.

² I may add that *Truentum* in the *Picēnum* was, according to Pliny (*NH* iii. 110), "solum Liburnorum in Italia relicum" (!). The same author records the presence of the Illyrian *Siculi* in the same land (iii. 111). All this, and much more, is neglected by Devoto, whereas quite insignificant and fortuitous "Etruscan" resemblances are emphasized.

words. But even if we should admit that no sure etymology could be given for them, I should still protest strongly on methodological grounds against the assumption that any Latin word which has no kin in other Indo-European languages must, therefore, without any further proof be declared Pre-Indo-European; the analogy of Logudorian and Rumanian, which are the only languages to preserve many old Latin words, and even more the fact that the discovery of Tokharian and Hittite has given us excellent Indo-European etymologies for words which were isolated before should teach us to be more cautious. Devoto himself, who stresses with great reason the archaic character of the Latin language, should consider more seriously the possibility that many old Indo-European words, lost elsewhere, may have been preserved in Latin.

Of other chapters, which unfortunately I cannot examine even cursorily, I would particularly recommend to the reader chapter iv ("L'Età di Plauto"), chapter vi ("Il Latino in Italia"), and chapter x ("L'Età cristiana"). I have some serious objections against chapter ix ("Il Latino nell'impero") and in general against Devoto's ideas on Vulgar Latin and on the origin of Romance languages; but I hope to express my views in another paper and will not stop here any longer.

The second part of the "Appendice" (pp. 383-97) offers an excellent critical exposition of the most important and recent bibliography and will be extremely useful to students and to scholars. Professor Devoto is, of course, quite up to date; I will allow myself only some slight remarks. P. 387: I should have expected to see some mention of the big work of R. S. Conway, J. Whatmough, and S. E. Johnson, *The Prae-Italic Dialects of Italy* (3 vols.; Cambridge, Mass., 1933), which contains a great quantity of precious material and bibliography. Pp. 387 f.: Devoto says: "Per il concetto di illirico e le connesse teorie 'panilliriche' manca un lavoro di insieme." But he does not quote the lengthy article of H. Krahe in the journal *Die Welt als Geschichte*, III (1937), which is precisely the "lavoro di insieme" he wants. P. 392: To the list of lexica of P. Faider should now be added the books I have cited in *Emerita*, IV (1936), 90 n., and some others, most of them published in America.³ P. 394: My work upon the popular elements in Horace's speech was continued and finished in the two following fascicules of *Emerita* (IV [1936],

³ These are: G. Waszink, *Index uerborum et locutionum quae in Tertulliani De anima continentur* (Rome, 1935); J. Paulson, *Index Lucretianus* (Leipzig, 1926); W. A. Oldfather et al., *Index Apuleianus* (Middletown, Conn., 1934); W. H. Schulte, *Index uerborum Valerianus* (Iowa, 1935); G. W. Mooney, *Index to the Pharsalia of Lucan* (London, 1927); A. F. von Katwijk, *Lexicon Commodianum* (Amsterdam, 1934); E. B. Jenkins, *Index uerborum Terentianus* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1932); J. W. Fuchs, *Index uerborum in Ciceronis De inuentione libros* (Hagae, 1937); W. van Oorde, *Lexicon Aetherianum* (Amsterdam, 1930); R. J. Deferrari, M. I. Barry, M. McGuire, *A Concordance to Ovid* (Washington, 1939); W. A. Oldfather, H. V. Canter, K. M. Abbott, *Index uerborum Ciceronis epistularum* (Urbana, 1938); and R. J. Deferrari, M. W. Fanning, A. S. Sullivan, *A Concordance of Lucan* (Washington, 1940). Some of these are cited by Devoto on other pages.

209-47; V [1937], 17-88), which Devoto probably has not seen, for he never quotes them. P. 395: Devoto should have mentioned the Spanish translation of Meyer-Lübke's *Einführung*, revised by A. Castro (Madrid, 1926), which greatly improves the German text. P. 396: To the works dealing with the Latin inscriptions of Africa I would like to add, apart from the articles published in the *Archiv für lat. Lexicogr. u. Gramm.* (a journal never quoted by Devoto, as far as I can see), the pamphlet of Ernst Hoffmann, *De titulis Africae Latinis quaestiones phoneticae* (diss., Breslau, 1907). I also fail to find listed the most important periodicals dealing with the Latin language, such as *Revue des études latines*, *Bulletin de la Société de linguistique de Paris*, etc., and the bibliographical publication *L'Année philologique* of Marouzeau; their inclusion would have been very useful, I think, for many readers.

In conclusion, with the reservations I have made, I think Devoto's book is the best we now can give to advanced students who wish to have a complete idea of the origins and of the development of the Latin language. It will also be of great utility to many scholars, even to specialists.

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Aus altrömischen Priesterbüchern. By EDUARD NORDEN. ("Acta reg. societatis humaniorum litterarum Lundensis," Vol. XXIX.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup; Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1939. Pp. xiv+300.

This remarkable volume gives an interpretation of the augural formula in Varro *LL* vii. 8 and of the Arval Song. For questions of early Latin grammar I must refer the reader to Professor Whatmough's forthcoming review in the *American Journal of Philology*, remarking only that to me as a layman the argument is convincing: on the religious side I can give almost unqualified and wholly ungrudging assent.¹ The documents are in themselves so difficult, and the second has been so often discussed, that it is little short of a miracle that even Norden should have attained so fresh and satisfying a result. A brief summary is not possible: the book must be read.

Here early Rome comes before us, with its narrow boundaries (Norden, pp. 6 and 166, n. 3), with the specific legal definition of the augural formula and with the direct dependence upon its gods shown in the Arval Song; and those deities are by no means as abstract and bloodless as we have sometimes thought them. The Lares and the mysterious Semones can aid: and Mars (perhaps, like Jupiter, by a development²), has not indeed mythology, but personality. We may not minimize, and we must not exaggerate, the dif-

¹ For some criticism in detail cf. St. Weinstock, *J. Rom. Stud.*, XXX (1940), 84 ff. The tentative suggestion (p. 207) that the *semunes* were invoked in separate lines seems to me unlikely: *conctos* suggested *coniunctos*.

² Cf. H. J. Rose, in *Custom Is King, Essays Presented to R. R. Marett* (1936), pp. 51 ff.

ferences between Italy (and Norden's discussion enables us to speak of Italy, not simply of Rome) and Greece.

In fact, Norden, while stressing the Roman character of the importance attached to the threshold and its divine protector (p. 172), maintains that the Arval Song is *carmen Graecanicum*—a composition greatly indebted to Greek religious lyrics—and finds substantial indications of Greek form in the Twelve Tables and in other early Roman and Italian legal documents. For the Twelve Tables the case is convincing, for the archaic Forum-inscription it is very strong: in the other legal documents the likeness to Greek *leges sacrae*³ and the unlikeness to the ponderous style of late republican laws is striking, but we cannot exclude the possibility of convergence. Further, while *iure caesus esto* is undoubtedly comparable with *νηποιεὶ τεθνᾶτω*, there is a difference: the Greek states what is to be done, where the Latin defines the juristic character of what is to be done. It is not an accident that the Roman calendar described the legal quality of each day of the year in a way for which there is no precedent in Greece.

As for the Arval Song, I am puzzled. Norden stresses the five-line structure, with the ephymnion "triumpe triumphe triumphe triumphe triumphe," the combination of prayer for aid and prayer not to be harmed, the juxtaposition of general and special invocation of deities, and the many formal parallels between the Song, on the one hand, and Greek and Horatian religious lyrics, on the other. All this is significant, and *triumpe* proves that the Song belongs, not to the earliest stratum of Roman religion, but to a time when Etruscan influence was strong enough to affect even this essentially native cult. Yet the analogies are not quite conclusive. No extant Greek hymn shows anything comparable with the telegram-like concentration and angularity of the Song: the Elean hymn to Dionysus (pp. 236 f.)⁴ is a simple invocation but admits poetical ornament, as does the Palaikastro hymn (pp. 271 f.). A Greek would almost certainly have made the Arval Song much longer and more ornate. Even from early Rome we have a fragment of a hymn of the Salii⁵ which seems to describe the sky-god's thunder in a manner remotely reminiscent of the Rig Veda; and a native religious lyric at Rome is a

³ I doubt the suggestion (p. 264) of a possible oriental origin for the ban on *morticina*: the *θησιμαία* of Lev. 5:2, 11:8, is not the flesh of dead animals in general but that of particular unclean animals. Pythagorean taboos are very likely to rest on old popular practice (cf. F. J. Dölger, *Antike und Christentum*, V [1936], 105 ff.).

⁴ H. J. Rose, in W. R. Halliday, *Greek Questions of Plutarch*, p. 158, suggests a scan-sion in four lines. As for the number five, reference should be made to its importance at Rome as a typical number (H. J. Rose, *Roman Questions of Plutarch*, p. 170; and *Class. Rev.*, 1923, p. 67; *Mnemos.*, 1924, p. 356; *J. Rom. Stud.*, XII [1922], 130, where a Sabine origin is suggested).

⁵ Ap. Terent. Scaur. (Keil, *Gram. Lat.*, VII, 28); Maurenbrecher, *Fleck. Jahrb. Supp.*, XXI [1894], 337 f.).

possibility. Neither Cato's remark (*ap. Gell. xi. 2. 5*), "poeticae artis honos non erat," nor Cic. *Tusc. disp. i. 3* proves anything to the contrary.

If a Greek form was borrowed, it was adapted⁶ and simplified—as was, much later, the Eucharistic rite. Borrowing is not impossible—Greek artists are known to have worked in Etruria and at the court of the Tarquins;⁷ and native Romans might copy their technique, just as Manius produced a fibula which would pass as Etruscan.⁸ In art that is a much easier thing than is the transference or adaptation of stylistic features from one language to another. Still, even this may have taken place in the hands of some precursor of Livius Andronicus or of one of the wandering prophets of the sixth century or of some Roman who had a Greek tutor. At this time Rome was not insulated from the religious forces of the Hellenic world: Nilsson has drawn a parallel between the reception of the Sibylline Books at Rome and the collection of prophecies by the Pisistratids.⁹ The borrowing, if borrowing it be, need not be purely literary; "neue lue rue Marmar sins incurrere in pleores" may be akin to the religious actions to end pestilence known from sixth-century Greece. Some of these possibilities may be true.

Whether they are or not, the interest and value of Norden's book is great and goes far beyond what either its title or these remarks would suggest. Norden gives a wealth of brilliant incidental observations (e.g., p. 25, on a fragment of Cato; p. 90, on *mens*; pp. 150, 240, against the description of the Arval Hymn as magical; pp. 105, 216, on *nomen Latinum*; pp. 94 ff., on the development of prose style; pp. 115, 260, on the use of written texts in religious ceremonies;¹⁰ p. 163, n. 1, on *dea Dia*; pp. 188 ff., on *lusus Troiae*; pp. 223 f., on oaths and *fides*) and throws much light on familiar authors, especially Horace,¹¹ Aeschylus, and Sophocles. Any student of antiquity who ignores this book will do so to his loss—and to his loss not only in knowledge but in pure pleasure.

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⁶ Pasquali's theory of the derivation of the Saturnian meter from Greek constituents is not beyond question (cf. J. Whatmough, *AJP*, LVIII [1937], 483 ff.).

⁷ A. Blakeway, *J. Rom. Stud.*, XXV (1955), 129 ff.; *Br. Sch. Ath.*, XXXIII (1932-33; pub. 1935), 192.

⁸ F. N. Pryce, *J. Rom. Stud.*, XXVII (1937), 260.

⁹ *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1935, pp. 489 f.

¹⁰ Cf. L. Deubner, *Attische Feste*, p. 53.

¹¹ Is it thinkable that in *Carm. i. 2. 37 satiate* is in a measure due to "satur fu fere Mars"? Most of the poem was, no doubt, incomprehensible to Horace and to his contemporaries: but *satur* was clear; and, in view of the interest of Augustus in the revival of the Arval College, Horace might have seen a copy of the text. This is, however, a bare possibility, and the *satis* motif, with which the poem opens, was natural (cf. Verg. *Georg. i. 501*).

Scribes and Correctors of the Codex Sinaiticus. By H. J. M. MILNE and T. C. SKEAT. Published by the Trustees of the British Museum, 1938.

The Codex Sinaiticus was acquired from the Monastery of Mount Sinai by the Czar, through his representative, Constantine Tischendorf, under conditions which have never been fully cleared up. It was published by Tischendorf and, more recently, in photographic facsimile by myself; and it remained safely in the great public library in Leningrad until 1933, when, after rather prolonged negotiations, it was sold by the government of the U.S.S.R.

The reason for the sale has not always been quite understood. The Russian government needed money, of course, but it was willing to let go this great Codex because it is trying to concentrate its powers on the collection of manuscripts belonging to peoples more closely associated with its past history. Thus, for example, Leningrad and Moscow have become primarily collectors of Slavonic manuscripts, while their Georgian codices have been sent to Tiflis and their Armenian to Etchmiadzin. Greek manuscripts, being non-Russian, were regarded as suitable for trading purposes, to obtain money which was badly needed for the renovation of libraries and museums.

Thus the Codex Sinaiticus came on the market. It was offered to at least one American library, but the price asked was too high. Ultimately, the highest bidder was the British Museum. The Codex reached London on December 27, 1933, and the present volume by Milne and Skeat, prepared on the basis of a study of the manuscript in its new home, is a magnificent example of exact scholarship and lucid exposition.

The most permanent contribution of Milne and Skeat to paleography will probably be the new light they have thrown on the importance of the ornamentation which goes with the subscriptions of the individual books. Their contention is that the *coronis* is so fixed an element in the method of each scribe that it amounts to a signature. This section of their works seems to me to be most convincing and provides a clue for the identification of scribal schools which will be enormously valuable.

But more spectacular is a discovery by the use of the ultraviolet lamp. Tischendorf always thought that the last verse of John looked unnatural and believed that it was written by a different scribe, inferring that it was missing in the original text. The opinion of other scholars who had seen the Codex was, on the whole, adverse to Tischendorf's view, though they agreed that there was something queer in the appearance of that verse. Milne and Skeat, plus the ultraviolet lamp, have solved the problem. It is now absolutely certain that the last verse of the Gospel was omitted and a *coronis* added to show the end had been reached—but the original scribe noted the omission, washed out what he had drawn, and put in the missing verse. There can be no further doubt on the subject. Tischendorf's insight has been remarkably confirmed; but, of course, the omission of the verse has now no critical importance. It was merely a scribal error, corrected immediately.

On two points the treatment given the Codex by the British Museum seems to me to be open to criticism. It reached London in the same condition as it was in when Tischendorf saw it on Mount Sinai and I saw it in Leningrad—unbound. The editors say: "Since the process of binding would present such an opportunity for examining the book, both from the technical and palaeographical standpoint, as would never occur again, it was decided that the entire description given in Tischendorf's great edition should be compared afresh with the original." The new comparison has not been reprinted, but the main results are given in this book. The complete comparison has merely been handed over to the editors of the Cambridge Septuagint and the Oxford "New Tischendorf."

This seems to me to be unfortunate. The two editors, Dr. Milne and Dr. Skeat, are among the most competent in the world, but they are human. Questions will surely arise which, as they admit, can be investigated only when the leaves are loose. Why, after enjoying this opportunity themselves, have they acquiesced in the policy of rebinding the Codex and so prevented all others from seeing it under the same advantageous conditions? To me, at least, it seems certain that a codex such as the Sinaiticus ought not to be bound but kept in a box. This was the policy of the librarian at Leningrad, and the result was that I was able to photograph it under favorable conditions.

It is also a pity that the British Museum made no effort, so far as is known, to complete this publication by a study of the leaves which are in Leipzig. These are in some ways the most important of all, because they have been so thoroughly corrected and because of their close connection with the Codex Pamphili. When I published the photographic facsimile of the Codex Sinaiticus I included the Leipzig leaves, and surely the editors of the present volume could have gone to Leipzig for a week to complete their study. German scholars, before the war, were always hospitable, and there could have been no difficulty.

Moreover, in merely handing over their corrections to the editors of the Septuagint at Cambridge and of the "New Tischendorf" at Oxford, Milne and Skeat (or more probably the trustees of the British Museum) have missed a chance of really benefiting students of the Septuagint and the New Testament. The paleographical commentary on the Codex which Tischendorf published was one of the most perfect examples that have ever been published of what such a commentary should be. But it is now almost unattainable and very expensive. To have republished it with Milne's and Skeat's corrections and notations would have given us a great book, and it ought not to have been terribly expensive. To pass these corrections over to be incorporated in the Cambridge Septuagint or in the "New Tischendorf" merely means that in future we must take the opinion of the editors of these books, instead of being given the evidence.

The problems concerning the Codex—apart from its textual value—are in the main three: (1) Where was it written? (2) How many scribes wrote it? (3) How often was it corrected?

I. THE PROVENANCE OF THE CODEX

The provenance of the Codex has recently been dealt with by Rendel Harris, Lagrange, and myself. Lagrange discussed the point in an article in the *Revue biblique* for 1926 (pp. 91 ff.), but his argument is merely that, since the manuscript was in Caesarea in the sixth century, it probably was written there.

Rendel Harris first discussed the matter in a paper, never published in full, which he read to the University Philological Association in Baltimore in 1884, but he elaborated the theme in a lecture given in Oxford in 1893 and published his argument in an appendix to his very valuable book on stichometry. Some of his points cannot be appreciated without a full discussion of Euthalius, which, in turn, cannot be undertaken until we have a proper critical edition of Euthalius. But his main contention is that Euthalius was connected with Caesarea and that the Codex Vaticanus was connected both with Euthalius and with the Codex Sinaiticus. Therefore, \aleph and B and Euthalius all came from Caesarea. Moreover, he argued that a mistake in Matt. 13:54 indicates that the Codex Sinaiticus comes from Caesarea.

In my *Codex Sinaiticus* I took a different view. Accepting the fact that B came from the same scriptorium as \aleph , I argued that this suggested that both of them came from Egypt, probably from Alexandria, because the text of the Psalms in the Codex Sinaiticus is the same as that in the Coptic text of the Pistis Sophia and also because the chapter numeration in the Pauline epistles shows that the Codex Vaticanus had originally accepted a strange order found in the Coptic version but had corrected it in accordance with the advice given by Athanasius.

The treatment of this question by Milne and Skeat seems to me inadequate and even misleading. They do not give the arguments which have been presented either for Caesarea or for Alexandria but dismiss them by saying that the discussion of these points lies outside the scope of their work and that they are, in any case, very indecisive. But they then go on to quote the mistake in Matt. 13:54 and apparently regard that as having great weight in favor of Caesarea. Surely, however, this point has very little importance for the solution of the problem of where the scribe was writing. The Empire was largely a unit, and scribes were not bound to remain in the place where they were born and brought up. A notable illustration of this is the Codex Amiatinus, written by an Italian scribe, but in Northumbria. Similarly, the scribe of the Codex Sinaiticus may have been born or have, at some time, lived in or near Antipatris and have been thinking of it as he worked, but this proves nothing as to the place where he was writing.

Although, however, Milne and Skeat have thrown no new light on the location of the scriptorium where \aleph and B were written, they have immensely strengthened the proof that both came from the same scriptorium, by pointing out an accident which ought to go into the annals of literary curiosities. Tischendorf said that the scribe of the New Testament in B was identical with scribe D of the Codex Sinaiticus. I killed that illusion by printing a facsimile of each, side by side, but I have always wondered how Tischendorf could conceivably have made such a blunder. It now appears that, having no photographs, he merely suffered from a confusion of memory.

There really is a similarity between scribe D of the Codex Sinaiticus and one of the scribes of the Codex Vaticanus—not, however, as Tischendorf thought, the scribe of the New Testament but one of the scribes of the Old Testament. This similarity is so close as to prove that both codices belong to the same scribal school, a conclusion which I had reached on other, much less convincing grounds. Now, if \aleph and B come from the same scriptorium and B is bound up with Egyptian traditions, it is probable that the scriptorium was in Alexandria.

Moreover, I fail to see why Milne and Skeat think that textual evidence should be ignored in an article on the provenance of a manuscript, for such evidence is often much the best. At the same time, I would be far from wishing to claim that the matter is settled. The arguments for Alexandria are not decisive, any more than those for Caesarea. I merely regret that Milne and Skeat have not discussed the matter more fully.

II. THE SCRIBES

Milne and Skeat have had an opportunity such as no one else has had since Tischendorf, for they have been able to sit down, day by day, and compare one page with another. Tischendorf had this opportunity. I did not, except in one curious way—the process of developing the plates gave me a clearer impression of variation than anything else, because the difference between scribes is represented and even magnified by the difference in the way that the image “comes up.” I found that Tischendorf was marvelously correct, and Milne and Skeat agree, with one serious exception. They distinguish three scribes (A, B, and D), as did Tischendorf, but they do not think that there was also a fourth (C), who wrote the poetical books of the Old Testament. They maintain that these were written partly by D (Pss. 1:1—92:3) and partly by A, who wrote the rest. When I was in Leningrad I found it difficult to recognize C, but in the end thought that Tischendorf was probably right. I quite failed to note the change of script after Ps. 92:3 but do not doubt that Milne and Skeat are right on this point, though I still have some slight qualms about their rejection of C.

Milne and Skeat give an interesting discussion of another doubtful point—as to whether the scribes of the Codex wrote from dictation. They think that orthographic mistakes are often due to this practice. They seem

to overlook the mental procedure of copyists. Some copy letter by letter, others word by word, still others phrase by phrase. In effect, the two latter types are dictating to themselves, and they spell according to their own fashion. Milne and Skeat refer to this on page 57, but only to pass it over. Thus, perhaps, the writers are hardly justified in stating that the Sinaiticus was undoubtedly written from dictation. Moreover, in the preceding paragraph they suggest that dictation dropped out of use with the rise of monasticism. When do they think that monasticism began? Personally, I think that the use of dictation in scriptoria is very doubtful. I accept most of Ohly's reasoning and am inclined to hold that the argument from orthography is nearly worthless. Some people can copy correctly, others cannot. In the Codex Sinaiticus, scribe B spelled differently from A, and worse. Surely that does not prove that B was listening to dictation and A was not, but merely that B spelled badly. Probably Milne and Skeat have very good secretaries in the British Museum; but there are other kinds, and their mistakes are not made only when they are listening to dictation.

III. THE CORRECTORS

Tischendorf correctly laid the true foundation for the discrimination of the correctors by showing that there were two groups (A and B), contemporary with the Codex, and a third (C), possibly as much as three centuries later. I argued that these can be subdivided still further.

Milne and Skeat, on the contrary, think that the differences of script in correctors A and B do not point to multiplicity of scribes. They believe that all the corrections grouped as A and B were made by scribes A and D of the original manuscript, who merely made the corrections less carefully and varied their handwriting from time to time.

I would not flatly deny their conclusion, because I have great respect for their judgment, but I hesitate to accept it. Their argument is that certain slight peculiarities of the original scribes are reproduced in the corrections of group A. This had been noted already, so far as the correctors A1 and A2 are concerned. But are the corrections in the A group also by the same hand? No one denies that they are in a different script, but Milne and Skeat argue that this merely shows that the original scribe used a variety of forms. "Hard to believe, but not impossible"—to my mind—and I think that Milne and Skeat are too much influenced by their belief that the Codex was the work of professional scribes, not of monks.

Why? There were plenty of monks by 360, and there was surely a scriptorium in connection with the library of Caesarea and another in the Catechetical School at Alexandria. Both Eusebius and Athanasius busied themselves with the mass production of manuscripts, and I see no reason to suppose that this production was not in the hands of ecclesiastical scribes. Of course, there may have been no inclosed convents, such as at Sinai or S. Saba, until later—

but there were monks; and monks, not the buildings they lived in, are the important thing. Altogether the treatment of the A corrections seems to me to lack the certainty which Milne and Skeat assert for it, and I still incline to the belief that the variation in script points to a variety of scribes.

The case of B corrections is similar. Milne and Skeat think that all the B corrections are by the same hand and that this can be identified with that of scribe A of the manuscript. I am much more inclined to accept this than the identification of all the A corrections with the hand of scribe D of the manuscript.

The corrections called C are a different matter. Here Milne and Skeat do not differ greatly from the views entertained by Tischendorf and somewhat further elaborated by myself. Especially important is the fact that they are inclined to agree that the scribe who used the manuscript of Pamphilus to correct the text or a part of the Old Testament is not identical with any of the other C scribes. I think that this is right, and it is, of course, of great importance for the textual value of this part of the Codex.

It would be improper to finish this review without again expressing the gratitude which all scholars will feel to Milne and Skeat for the extremely valuable book which they have given us. They have dealt with a series of difficult and delicate problems in an extremely lucid manner; and, if I have ventured to differ from some of their views, it is not because I am certain that they are wrong but because I think that there is still room for doubt.

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A Greek-English Lexicon. By LIDDELL and SCOTT. New edition revised and augmented throughout by HENRY STUART JONES with the assistance of RODERICK MCKENZIE. Part 10: *τραγῆιν-ψῶδης*. With preliminary matter and Addenda and Corrigenda to the complete work. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. Pp. i-xlvi+1809-2042+ (Addenda et Corrigenda) 2043-2111.

Only a ghoul is undeterred by the rule *de mortuis*, and, though there are philological ghouls in the world, to have read a requiem pronounced by way of review by even one of these were warning enough to a reviewer, if warning were needed, against emulating such a fogleman's scantling, now that the reviewer comes to the last part of the new Liddell and Scott—planned in 1911, work on it suspended for a time during the Four Years' War, its publication begun in 1925 and completed in the first year of this war, nearly a century after the appearance, in 1843, of the original Liddell and Scott—with a final part that ominously defines *τραγικός* on its first page and then hastens to *τυμβωρυχείν*. McKenzie's tragic death came in 1937, but he "saw the main body of the work to its end," and Stuart Jones "up to within a fortnight of his

death" in 1939 "was at work on the Addenda and Corrigenda, . . . and had almost put them into shape": *bene quiescant*.

The revised Liddell and Scott is a monument to both men, as well as a noble example of that devotion to Greek scholarship—on the part not only of the editors and their many collaborators but also of the publisher, the Oxford University Press—which in England was still alive as late as 1939, whatever the future may hold. Even the latest generation of young scholars, who will never have had to use the edition of 1897—an edition that did not pretend to take full account of the new sources available even then and on the etymological side still depended on Curtius' work of 1858—will at a glance see the shining merits of this, merits which reveal themselves without need of comparison with its predecessor. Those who occupy themselves with the great mass of texts on stone or papyri hitherto published have in their hands a tool of the highest quality that will make their work many degrees lighter, quicker, and surer.

The few notes that follow are intended to be a modest contribution to the ends which this great Greek-English lexicon subserves.

τράγημα is, or used to be, familiar to Greekless small boys with a threepennybit or sixpence to spend, thanks to the French loan word *dragées* which, unless it has gone out of use in English in the last fifteen years, or in this last year, might have been retained in the explanation of this word. The *NED* definition of *dragées* is quite different from that of my native usage.

τρίβολος, IIIc. Cf. Thuc. ii. 76. 4.

τριβώλετερ. If this "obscure word found only in Alc. 38" means *εἶδος ἀκάνθης* (Choerob. *Epim.* i. 272, according to Bergk), then the point at Alc. 38 escapes us, or at least is not what Bergk pretends. Alc. 38 is known from Hephaestion xi. 3, and what Choeroboscus has comes from Hephaestion too. If for the corrupt and meaningless *τριβώλετερ* (v.l., *τριβόλετερ*) we read *ὀλβέττερα*, i.e., *ὀλφέττερα*, "basket" (cf. *HSCP*, XXXIX [1928], 4), we have a word of the necessary metrical shape (— — —), adequately defined by emending the pointless *εἶδος ἀκάνθης* in Choeroboscus to *εἶδος τι κανοῦ*. It was the well-filled basket that still contained, for some folks, their portable wealth, for *πλοῦτος* meant originally wealth in grain, see Hesych., s.v. *εὐπλοῦτον κανοῦν*.¹ And so Alcaeus continues *οὐ γὰρ Ἀρκάδεσσι λώβα*.²

τρυγέρανος (Philem. 47) is no "burlesque name of an animal" but the perfectly good Keltic *trigaranus*, i.e., "*τρυγέρανος*," an epithet of *Tarvos* in the famous Kelto-Latin inscription of Paris, discovered in 1710 beneath the choir of Notre-Dame-de-Paris (Dottin, *La Langue gauloise*, p. 168; *CIL*, XIII,

¹ Quoted *HSCP*, XXXIX, 4, where see also the items from *Etym. magn.*, Suidas, as well as other items from Hesych. Cf. Kaibel, *Com. Gr. Fr.*, I (1899), 151. For the basket as a symbol of wealth, if not of wealth, cf. Deut. 28:17.

² The accent *ὀλφέττερα* (not *-τέρα*) in Alc. 38 we learn from Choerob. If objection is taken to the hiatus, perhaps read *ὀλφέττερας*, cf. the v.l. *τριβώλετες*.

3026). That Philemon of Cilicia knew an odd Keltic word or two need occasion no surprise.

Τυνδάρεις cet. Also spelled Τυν-, see my review of Part 9.

τυφλός is not "metaph." of other senses than sight. It means properly "impercipient" of any of the senses, "dull"; the English cognate is "deaf," and τυφλός τὰ τ' ὤτα κτλ. is anything but "metaph."

ὑδατώλαιοι (νύμφαι) is surely not "dub. sens." If νύμφαι, like the Oscan *diumpai* or *anafriss* (i.e., "imbribus") are not up to their elbows in water, who would be? Cf. Guarducci, *Stud. e mat. di storia delle religioni*, XII (1936), 30; Arias in *Atti acc. Lincei, sc. mor., rendiconti*, Ser. 6, 11 (1935), p. 606, n. 2; AJA, XLI (1937), 131. In CIL, V, 3932, we have *man(n)isnavius* the epithet of a *flamen*, which has been interpreted to mean "having wet hands" and thus seems to be comparable to ὑδατώλαινός.

ὑπερφίαλος must be connected with ὑπερφύνης and *superbus*. Why should this "modern explanation" be "unconvincing," even if—or merely because—it leaves something to be added?

ὑποκρατήριον. Not "Ion. ὑποκρητ—" but Ion. ὑποκρητ—(so the inscription itself).

φάτνη. For the etymology see further Giles, *Proc. Cambridge Philol. Soc.*, XXV–XXVII (1890), 14 f. (not mentioned by Boisacq or Walde-Pokorny). φίλος, I c. "in Hom. and early Poets, *one's own*" should have been Ia. Kretschmer (*IF*, XLV, 267) derives the word from Lyd. *bilis*, "suus." One counts dear that which is one's own.

χέρος. For the etymology cf. *herna*, "stone" (Serv. A. vii. 684); but F. Specht in KZ, LXVI (1939), 201–3, has yet another suggestion (ξερός).

χόριον. I'll wager that no shepherd could ever be "uncertain to which of the senses" of χόριον the proverb in Theoc. x. 11 "is to be referred" (cf. CQ, XV [1921], 108).

χρεών. If χρή was "prob. orig. a neut. Subst." (I agree), then χρεών is prob. orig. nom. acc. (χρή δν) with metathesis of quantity, or in Ion. (χρεόν) with shortening of η before ο. For χρεώ is "ἦ, less freq. neut."

χρήμα. From "that which is needed" and "thing" to "money," like Osc. *egmō*, cognate with *egeo*.

ῶς. The comparison with Umb. *esoc*, "ita," is dubious, for that stands for **essoc* from **eksoc*, Osc. *eksuk*—unless the latter is to be analyzed as *ek-* plus **sōd-ke*, which is far from certain (cf. Osc. *ekss*, "ita").

In the Addenda: πεντέλιτρον is not from Tomi but from Perinthus, as is clear enough in the place cited (*Dacia*, III–IV [1927–32], i, 611). It, moreover, "n'avait d'italique que l'appellation; en fait, elle continuait les anciens poids grecs de la ville" (Cantacuzène, *loc. cit.*). The λίτρα, both word and thing, remains Sicel. And that is no "assumption" (AJP, LXI [1940], 312) either.

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La Vie quotidienne à Rome à l'apogée de l'empire. By JÉRÔME CARCOPINO.
Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1939. Pp. 348. Fr. 25.

This is the most important book that has appeared on the subject for many years. Professor Carcopino is especially well qualified to write it, for in addition to his familiarity with Latin literature he has, through his experience as director of the Ecole française de Rome, a detailed knowledge of the monuments of ancient Rome, upon which the reconstruction of its life so largely depends. Moreover, the author's style is characteristically French in its lucidity, its immediate appeal to the reader's interest, and its literary charm. The book will find a place beside the works of Marquardt, Friedländer, Blümmner, and Dill on the shelves of all those who have turned their attention to the field of private antiquities.

In successive chapters Professor Carcopino deals with "Splendeur, étendue, population de l'urbs" (pp. 16-36); "Les Maisons et les rues" (pp. 37-70); "La Société" (pp. 72-96); "Le Mariage, la femme, et la famille" (pp. 97-124); "L'Education" (pp. 125-67); "Les Divisions de la journée, le lever, et la toilette" (pp. 171-202); "Les Occupations" (pp. 204-34); "Les Spectacles" (pp. 235-86); and "La Promenade, le bain, et le dîner" (pp. 287-318). A too brief bibliography (one page) is followed by twenty-six pages of notes. There is no index, nor are there any illustrations.

And yet in spite of the excellent qualities of the book, a good many of the author's conclusions and explanations are open to question. One of these is his interpretation (pp. 19, 20) of the words *sit egestus* at the end of the inscription on the base of Trajan's column. He says that the meaning is clear "puisque en le verbe *egerere* possède les deux acceptions contradictoires de 'vider' et d' 'élever.' " But where is the evidence that *egerere* ever means 'élever'? This has never been established, nor is it necessary for the interpretation of this inscription.

On page 67 the author must have in mind Martial's description of street scenes in Rome (*Ep.* i. 41. 3): "Transtiberinus ambulator, qui pallentia sulphurata fractis permutat vitreis," but the phrase "fractis vitreis" does not mean "verroteries," as he renders it, but "broken glass."

Moreover, in his account (p. 101) of the three forms of marriage (*confarreatio*, *coemptio*, and *usus*) Carcopino says: "De ces trois formes aucune n'a duré, assurément, jusqu'au II^e siècle de notre ère." But Gaius speaks as if *coemptio* were still practiced in his time, nor is there anything in his discussion to show that he was thinking of it only as an institution of the past. Again, on page 103, in his description of the bride's dress, he falls into the old error of regarding *palla* and *flammeum* as separate parts of the costume. Apparently in this he is following Rossbach (*Die röm. Ehe*, pp. 282 ff.), but Miss Wilson (*The Clothing of the Ancient Romans*, p. 141, n. 11) has shown that Rossbach has misinterpreted the representation in art to which he refers. The drapery (*flammeum*) was all in one piece, covering head and face and falling as low as



the knee. It was a sort of *palla* but differed from it in being so thin as to be transparent. It may be added that in other references to the costume of the Romans, Professor Carcopino has not been particularly felicitous. Indeed, his contribution to this vexed question is negligible. In some cases, as has just been pointed out, it is even incorrect. Another example of this occurs on page 183 where he speaks of the tunic of the senatorial class as "bordée d'une large bande de pourpre: le laticlave." Apparently he still holds to the old theory that the distinguishing mark of the senatorial tunic was a single broad stripe of purple. But again we are indebted to Miss Wilson, who has pointed out (*op. cit.*, p. 64) that "there is no foundation in literature, sculpture, or painting for the theory that the *latus clavus* was a panel down the front of the tunic." The evidence indicates that the senatorial tunic had two vertical stripes on both front and back, and these differed from those on the equestrian tunic (*angustus clavus*) only in being wider. On page 185 he speaks of the *pallium* as one of the substitutes for the toga in the second century. It was, but this was nothing new. It was known and often used in republican times. Even Cato the Elder sometimes wore one. Further, his description of the *lacerna* on the same page as "un *pallium* de couleur" and the *paenula* as "une lacerna complétée par un capuchon" will surely give a wrong impression of these garments. The *lacerna* was entirely different from the voluminous *pallium*, and the *paenula* with its hood was used long before the *lacerna* came in.

In another field—namely, that of religion—the author's statements sometimes diverge from strict accuracy. On page 154 he says that it was not till the second century that "Rome a commencé d'avoir une vie religieuse, au sens ou nous l'entendons aujourd'hui." He is discussing here the progress of the oriental mystery cults. It is true that religious ideas similar to our own became more pronounced in the second century, but they had commenced long before. One of the most influential of the oriental cults—the worship of Isis, with its ideas of penance, absolution, and personal immortality—had attained great popularity in the first century. And there were other eastern cults of still earlier introduction. Moreover, it is not true that "nulle de ces religions orientales n'a abordé en terre italienne sans un long séjour préalable en pays grec ou grécisé" (p. 155). The cult of Mithra, which became so strong in Italy, made only a small appeal to the Greeks. Here may be mentioned also the discussion of *salus* on page 161. Professor Carcopino says: "Dans la langue du II^e siècle, le mot latin *salus*, auquel ne s'attachait jadis qu'une acception terre à terre de santé physique, prend, de surcroît, une signification morale et eschatologique où sont impliquées la libération de l'âme ici-bas et sa béatitude dans l'éternité céleste." This is merely wishful thinking. The cult of *Salus* goes far back in Roman religion, but it did not signify physical health. It meant national safety, as is shown quite clearly by the vow of a temple to her made by the Dictator Junius Bubulcus in 302 B.C. during a crisis in the war with the Samnites. Toward the end of the second century before Christ, it is true, she was identified with the Greek Hygeia and from



that time closely associated with Aesculapius. But even this association did not put an end to her old cult of goddess of national safety, and it was in this capacity that she frequently appeared in vows for the safety of the emperor. His safety and that of the country, in the minds of the people, were bound up together. There is, accordingly, no reason for reading the idea of "salvation" into the word in connection with the brotherhoods and funeral colleges of the second century, like the *Collegium salutare* at Lanuvium. It was only at a later date that *salus* and *salutaris* developed the idea of "salvation." Our author has indulged too hopefully in proleptic theology.

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Daily Life in Ancient Rome: The People and the City at the Height of the Empire. By JÉRÔME CARCOPINO. Edited with Bibliography and Notes by HENRY T. ROWELL. Translated from the French by E. O. LORIMER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xv+342. \$4.00.

This is not merely a translation of Carcopino's work. It is a second edition; and Professor Rowell by substantial contributions to the Bibliography and notes of the original, the addition of an index, and the insertion of a score of illustrations has distinctly increased the usefulness of the volume.

Mr. Lorimer's translation for the most part is excellent. It runs as smoothly as a piece of original English by a practiced hand. In a few passages, however, he fails to render the French correctly. On page 81, for instance, he translates Carcopino's "tunique sans ourlets" (*tunica recta*) as "a tunic without hem," instead of "a tunic without seam," which Carcopino must have meant. Moreover, in the same passage "collier" would be more appropriately rendered by "necklace" rather than by "collar," with distinct advantage to the aesthetic appeal of the bride's general appearance. On page 130 and elsewhere he uses the form "Dea Syra" instead of the more frequent "Dea Syria," which Carcopino himself prefers. "Castanet-players" is not a correct translation of "joueurs ... d'accordéon," which in turn is not right for *scabellarii*, the designation of those who gave the time to the dancers by bearing down on the *scabellum*, a sounding device worn on the foot like a shoe (cf. the Greek κρούπεζαι).

There are some misprints: word for sword (p. 9), Graecicised for Graecised (p. 129), Eurysaces for Eurysaces (pp. 179, 326), vestarii for vestarii (p. 179), drovers for drivers, i.e., of the two-wheeled gig, *cisium* (p. 180), Corpis for Corpus (p. 181), emporer for emperor (p. 189), Marquandt for Marquardt (p. 282), Preussichen for Preussischen (p. 299), Carenae for Carinae (p. 303, n. 67), bibliothèques for bibliothèques (p. 307, n. 95), and Macrobius for Macrobius (p. 311, n. 102).

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Papyri societatis archaeologicae Atheniensis (P.S.A. Athen.). Edidit GEORGIOS A. PETROPOULOS. ("Mémoires de l'académie d'Athènes," Vol. X.) Athens: Academia scientiarum Atheniensis, 1939. Pp. i-xxii + 1 + 468 + 25 pls.

In the last two generations modern Greek scholarship has won a place of distinction in archeological investigation and in other branches of research touching upon the people of ancient Greece and their culture. Notably in the late A. M. Andr  ad  s it has produced the best exponent of the public finances of the ancient Greek city-states since the death of August Boeckh in 1855. Only recently their interest has spread to papyrology. This interest now expresses itself in the publication of the collection of papyri owned by the Academy of Athens, by Georgios A. Petropoulos, professor of Greek law at the University of Athens.

Of the total of seventy numbers contained in this volume about one-half is made up of complete pieces or of large fragments which have been restored, with commendable restraint, by the editor. In several instances Professor Petropoulos has re-edited papyri which he had already published or discussed elsewhere. These documents show improvement in accuracy of reading and a mind open to suggestion. Examples of this deepened understanding and greater precision may be seen by a comparison of No. 46 of the new volume with the editor's earlier statement of its contents in the *Actes du V^e Congr  s internationale de papyrologie* (1938), p. 342, or in the interesting nursing contract, No. 20, with its primary edition in *Aegyptus*, XIII (1933), 563-68.

In No. 46, correctly depicted by Petropoulos in his earlier description as a house-to-house census, the reading $\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha$ proposed by Zucker has been corrected to the month name $\Pi\alpha\chi(\acute{\omega}\nu)$, and the mistaken transcription $\kappa\acute{\omicron}\lambda(\lambda\eta\mu\alpha)$ to the date $\kappa\theta$. In No. 20, 3-4, he has replaced his original restoration of $\tau\acute{\omega}[\nu \iota\epsilon\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omega]\nu$, etc., in the double dating by year of the emperor and by a second method, with $\tau\acute{\omega}[\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \kappa\omicron\upsilon\nu]\acute{\omega}\nu \tau\acute{\omega}\nu \theta\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \text{'A}[\lambda\epsilon\acute{\xi}\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha]$. Despite the fact that this formula was practically obsolete in the Roman period the new reading is fully confirmed by *BGU*, VII, 1641, of A.D 127.

The time is past when each additional volume of Greek papyri could be counted upon to add something new and greatly surprising to our knowledge of Egypt under Ptolemaic and Roman rule. Now it is, in considerable degree, a matter of confirmatory or corrective evidence. P.S.A. Athen. 46, to select one of several examples, is a unique and welcome addition to our knowledge of the institution of slavery in Roman Egypt. It presents thirty-one broken lines of payments against the poll tax made by slaves and freedmen in an unknown year of the second century, Christian era. Unfortunately, the name of the town from which it derives is lost. In my judgment it is a list of delinquent poll-tax payers among the slave and ex-slave classes, made up for the purpose of collecting, in the following year, the unpaid remainders due from these subjects. Both slaves and freedmen were treated, for fiscal purposes, according to the corresponding classification of their owners. Probably this list was

taken off the house-to-house census rolls of the town from which it came, apparently in the last month of the year. In some cases the slaves belonged to the owners of the houses recorded on the list, in other cases not. This observation confirms a similar one based upon Papyrus London 261 and Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer + Papyrus London 260 of the year A.D. 72-73, which were correctly combined by Carl Wessely and published in 1905 in *Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde*, IV. The Rainer section shows that in one house in the town of Arsinoë there lived six slaves belonging to four different persons. The register—P.S.A. Athen. 46 now published by Petropoulos—shows one house in which two slaves belonging to the houseowner were listed as residents, a second in which three slaves lived who belonged to a person other than the owner of the property. It is therefore clear that in the towns of Egypt the slaves did not necessarily reside with their owners. "Slave quarters" were unknown. Like the slaves at Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. who were designated as "those living apart," that is, apart from their masters, and were predominantly employed in handicraft industrial production, in the towns and cities of the Nile Valley a part of the servile population found residence, along with freedmen, in family houses owned or rented by free persons.

Professor Petropoulos has brought to his task of editing the papyri of the Academy at Athens an unquestioned knowledge of the ancient Greek, the advantage of a thorough knowledge of ancient law, and great zeal in the search for analogous readings and in the citation of differing solutions of disputed problems. One might regard him as overconscientious in this last respect. But, if this is a fault, it certainly lies upon the better side of scholarship.

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Anecdota Atheniensia et alia, Tome II: *Textes grecs relatifs à l'histoire des sciences*. By A. DELATTE. ("Bibliothèque de la faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège," Fasc. LXXXVIII.) Liège, 1939. Pp. viii + 504.

The editor of these texts is the author of the admirable *Etudes sur la littérature pythagoricienne* (Paris: Champion, 1915) and of several other studies, and the editor of the tenth volume of the *Catalogus codicum astrologicorum Graecorum* (the Athenian MSS). The first volume of his *Anecdota Atheniensia*, with texts relating to the history of religion, appeared in 1927 (Paris: Champion), but since that time Delatte's systematic searches of libraries at Paris, Rome, and other European cities, and at Mount Athos with the help of his son Louis, have brought to light so many more MSS of the texts in which he was interested that the original title had to be changed.

His work has been to edit carefully, and with reference to a surprisingly large number of manuscripts in some instances, nineteen late Greek treatises, mostly Byzantine, in the fields of physics (in the ancient sense of the word), arithmetic, astronomy, botany, and dietetics. None is a major work, but, as Delatte properly remarks, even though these brief treatises are of Byzantine origin they may contribute to our knowledge of the doctrines, language, and instruments of science. In spite of their value for these purposes, however, there must inevitably be a flavor of pedantic futility in the writings of an age which could do little better than recombine and repeat, with an added dash of pious teleology, the dicta of scholars who had lived 500, or 1,500, years before.

The first two treatises in the collection are the *Σύνοψις τῶν φυσικῶν* and the *Περὶ χρείας τῶν οὐρανίων σωμάτων* of Symeon Seth (eleventh century), the former dealing with miscellaneous physical questions and the latter with astronomical matters. Aristotelian influence is predominant, but a dozen other authors are cited. It was rather surprising to find that M. Delatte did not identify the quotation from Philolaus, probably taken from Nicomachus, *Introd. arith.* ii. 19. 1, which occurs in *De utilitate corporum caelestium* 9; he must have recognized it, as it is found later in the *Comm. in Nicom.* ii. 18. 3 at page 162, lines 18-19, where it is referred to "the Pythagoreans."

The recension of the commentary on Nicomachus, Book ii, which occupies pages 129-87, has never been printed before. Hoche published entire the version which bears the name of Philoponus and Book i of the present text, found in Vaticanus 1411 (fifteenth century), where it is also attributed to Philoponus. Delatte discovered the same version, but attributed to the philosopher Proclus, in MS 1238 of the National Library at Athens (eighteenth century), thereby confirming an observation of Tannery that Suidas was mistaken in saying that Proclus Procleius wrote the commentary on Nicomachus. Delatte uses both the Athenian and the Vatican MSS in establishing his text and presents the commentary on Book ii under the joint name Proclus-Philoponus.

The remainder of the volume contains five treatises on the construction and use of the astrolabe (the first two, by Nicephoros Gregoras, and the third, by Isaac Argyros, are accompanied by diagrams; the others are anonymous and are not illustrated), five lists of botanical terms, and four short works on articles of diet. The first two of the latter group have been published in other forms and from other MSS. The treatises on the astrolabe are the more useful because the only Greek work dealing with the construction of this instrument hitherto accessible has been that of Philoponus.

M. Delatte's work as editor has been thoroughly and capably done, and the typography of the book makes it pleasant and easy to handle. I have noted misprints at page 53, line 15, and page 77, line 21, and a few other places where the printer has been careless in the alignment of letters.

FRANK E. ROBBINS

University of Michigan

Tibullus Ambarvalgedicht (II, i). By PAUL PÖSTGENS. Würzburg: Konrad Triltsch Verlag, 1940. Pp. vi+91. Rm. 3.

Pöstgens has now published an enlarged and revised form of the dissertation which he wrote in 1934, dealing exhaustively with the first poem of the second book of Tibullus.

Elter, in 1906, had described the gliding from picture to picture by Tibullus "wie ein Wellenschlag." A thorough understanding of this called for a careful study of the transitions from theme to theme within the poems. Such a study, says Pöstgens, remained largely to be done until he sought, through an interpretation of Tibullus ii. 1, to give the detailed analysis demanded.

Pöstgens gives a line-by-line interpretation of the poem in the first thirty-six pages. He shows how cleverly Tibullus accomplishes the transitions and discusses also word order, rhythm, and felicitous choice of words. An example of how smoothly the mood is carried along is the transition to *Cupido* in verse 67. This is so managed that a continuous development of the festival mood is portrayed and that the *Eroslied* fits into the composition of the poem.

After proving errors in analyses of the composition of the poem by several others—notably Karsten and Jacoby—Pöstgens gives his own analysis (p. 41). It was a disappointment that, after having done a beautiful job of showing how the poem glided along from thought to thought, Pöstgens felt it necessary to offer his own formal analysis of the structure. Any such division could be, in its turn, attacked.

Pöstgens takes up the question of what festival is here described. He adduces reasons for believing that this festival occurs in the spring and states that he had already formulated his views that the Ambarvalia was meant before he read an article to that effect by Fowler.

With the treatment of the Ambarvalia by Tibullus he compares that by Vergil in *Georgics* i. 338-50. In a chapter on "Das Kultlied," Pöstgens seeks to place in proper historical connection the view of the poet on the development of mankind. Here again he compares Tibullus and Vergil. Before discussing Vergil he turns, first, to Lucretius, since behind Vergil's *Georgics* is "als anregende geistige Kraft die epikureische Entwicklungslehre der Menschheit." Comparing Lucretius, Vergil, and Tibullus, he finds that Lucretius, with definite exclusion of divine aid, emphasizes the free spirit of man; Vergil shows man attaining his ends through labor; Tibullus sings the grace of the gods, most clearly shown in the countryside.

Pöstgens contrasts the artistic form of Tibullus ii. 1 with forms used by Callimachus, Bion, Catullus, and Horace. Both Callimachus and Tibullus are dramatic, but they differ in effect: in Callimachus we are listeners, in Tibullus we feel ourselves actually taking part. In Tibullus, furthermore, the whole poem is tied together by the theme of life on the land. The inner clarity and fusing-together of many Hellenistic features into a unified whole is a happy achievement of Augustan art.

Discussing the place in the work of Tibullus of the poem here studied, Pöstgens points out that in this poem Tibullus concerns himself with the views current at the time, which saw in country life the source of strength for what was genuinely Roman. This emphasis on the soil and the importance of the peasant must sound strangely familiar to one writing today in the Third Reich.

Tibullus ii. 1 is important not by reason of originality but because Tibullus gives the important place of introductory poem over to praise of a religious *Wertordnung* and the peasant life. This life Vergil and Horace believed to be the only road leading the Roman people back to the strength of their ancestors. The poem of Tibullus, then, in spite of many formal ties with Hellenistic art, is truly a Roman work of the Augustan age.

ALICE CATHERINE FERGUSON

Ashland College

The Elizabeth Day McCormick Apocalypse, Vol. I: *A Greek Corpus of Revelation Iconography*, by HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY; Vol. II: *History and Text*, by ERNEST C. COLWELL. Introduction by JULIETTE RENAUD. Pp. xxxviii + 602; xiii + 170 + 77 pls. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. \$25.

The illustrated text made available in this handsome publication dates early in the seventeenth century and once belonged to Parthenios of Larissa, an ecclesiastic who was also a book-collector. Professor Colwell's treatment of the text and the history of the manuscript points to identification of the author with the translator of the New Testament into modern Greek—Maximos of Gallipoli. This vernacular version of the final book of the New Testament is accompanied by a commentary mainly derived from that of Andrew of Caesarea, of the sixth century. The late appearance of a Greek commentary on Revelation accords with the suspicion with which the Apocalypse was regarded by the Greek church; it was not admitted into the Orthodox canon until the fourteenth century. Of the Greek texts of the Apocalypse, nearly one-half date after the fall of Constantinople, and the popularity of the book at this time was doubtless in some measure due to this calamity and the nationalism it inspired. Just as German illustrators of Revelation, at the time of the siege of Vienna in 1529, made the "Siege of the Holy City" into a representation of that event, so the miniaturist of the Rockefeller-McCormick Apocalypse turns the Holy City into a rendering of Constantinople and clothes the hosts of Gog and Magog with Turkish costumes.

The miniatures so illuminatingly discussed by Willoughby are not without Latin intrusions: the "Queen of Heaven" is a German Madonna, and the cross-inscribed banner is, according to our author, a purely Latin type. The Western influence on Greek apocalyptic illustration is further illustrated by

Juliette Renaud's Introduction to the first volume, in which she shows the dependence of the apocalyptic frescoes in monasteries of Mount Athos on Cranach's woodcuts for Luther's Bible of 1522-23.

Professor Willoughby's comprehensive treatment extends to the binding of the book, which he identifies as a Turkish-Venetian variant of Persian type and locates with probability in the Douskos monastery in Thessaly. The principal effort of the author of the first volume is directed to elucidating the iconography of the sixty-nine miniatures of the codex, which he does with astonishing competence and in a fascinating style. The charm of his treatment is derived partly from the extensive erudition of an enthusiastic iconographer and partly from the diversity of tradition that marks this late iconographic cycle. Much of this is oriental, such as the Persian details in the rendering of horses and the two-bladed sword inherited from Islamic imagery as the weapon of Mohammed and Ali. Out of this welter of flotsam from various streams of medieval iconography the author has constructed an ensemble that pictures vividly the character of Greek religious thought in popular guise during the opening years of the seventeenth century.

C. R. MOREY

Princeton University

Greek Tragedy. By H. D. F. KITTO. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1939. Pp. x+410. 15s.

At a time when many works on Greek tragedy are being published, the present volume comes with a most refreshing approach to the subject. It is a work of criticism and especially of that kind of criticism which seeks to explain the form in which a particular piece of literature is written. The book, therefore, is in no sense a history of Greek tragedy, nor is it concerned with origins or with the moral teachings of the dramatists. It is rather an attempt to discover the dramatic conception on which each play is built and which explains the form of that play. Kitto admits that there were limits fixed by the conditions of performance, but these limits were wide, and within them the form of a play was determined by its own vital idea. Each of the three Greek tragedians was an artist, and each one had a different fashion of tragic thought which explains his plays. I select more or less at random some of the interesting points of view which the author develops on the basis of this thesis. On page 25 he warns that we should not make too certain that the dramatic position of the chorus in the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus is a sign of date only. Rather, the special degree of dramatization is not necessarily in the tradition at all but was probably a direct consequence of the layout of this particular myth. Old tragedy, i.e., the tragedy with two actors and a chorus (p. 32), may be a primitive form if regarded historically or biologically, but regarded

aesthetically it is perfectly adapted to the purpose for which it was designed and is not primitive. The tragic idea of Aeschylus rendered impossible the Sophoclean plot as well as the Sophoclean characterization (p. 107). Sophocles used a third actor because he wanted to illuminate his chief character from several points of view—a thing which Aeschylus never does (p. 148). The structure of Euripidean tragedy differs radically from the Sophoclean because the Euripidean tragic theme—social suffering which follows social wrongdoing—is the direct antithesis of the Sophoclean—an individual fault which leads to individual suffering (p. 252). The radical changes made by Euripides were due to his personal genius rather than to anything that we can regard as an inevitable development (p. 290). These are but a few of the answers which Kitto makes to the questions which he himself propounds. As he remarks (p. v), the answers may be wrong, but the questions which he asks are right. Not everyone, for example, will agree that the *Antigone* is primarily the tragedy of Creon or that in the *Orestes* we are nearer to tragedy than in the *Electra* or that Evadne and Iphis are introduced into the *Suppliques* of Euripides so that we may see a more intense expression of grief in a single person, but at least everyone will find the discussions of the individual plays stimulating. As a particularly fine illustration of Kitto's interpretation, I should like to cite his treatment of the chorus in Sophocles' *Electra* (pp. 166 ff.). Another excellent passage is that in which Kitto deals with the relation of Aristotle's theory of tragedy to the dramatic art of Aeschylus (pp. 110 ff.).

The book is written in a most interesting and provocative style and is an indispensable volume for the student of Greek drama.

GERTRUDE SMITH

University of Chicago

METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART. *Handbook of the Etruscan Collection*. By GISELA M. A. RICHTER. New York: Metropolitan Museum, 1940. Pp. xxiv+86+173 figs. + 1 map. \$2.00.

The Etruscans and Their Art. By GEORGE M. A. HANFMANN. (Reprint of *Bulletin of the Museum of Art, Rhode Island School of Design*, July, 1940.) Providence, 1940. Pp. 35. \$0.75.

Most of the outstanding objects in the rich Etruscan collection of the Metropolitan have been published previously, so Miss Richter's book brings relatively little that is new, but it is a thoroughly satisfactory guide for either the visitor or the distant student. With its Bibliography in eighteen pages and its succinct but fully documented discussion of the origin of the Etruscans, it may at first appear to be a handbook not only of one collection but of Etruscan archeology; but one finds that Dennis, Poulsen's *Etruscan Tomb Paintings*, and other standard works are absent from the Bibliography and that branches of archeology not represented in the Metropolitan collection are almost com-

pletely omitted. Nevertheless, the clear historical arrangement of the material and the conservative but up-to-date scholarship of the author will make the book widely useful.

Eleven Etruscan pieces in Providence are illustrated by Mr. Hanfmann. This is not an impressive number, nor are any of the pieces unique in type; but at least three of them are notable, none had been well published before, and all are now excellently illustrated. However, Mr. Hanfmann's well-rounded essay is little dependent on these objects. It is occasionally evident that English is not his native tongue, but he writes well, and his discussion has interest and individual color as well as authority. Some of his statements may be open to question: for instance, that the true vault and arch were introduced from the Hellenistic east and that the elongated proportions of an Etruscan bronze were "ultimately derived from early classical athletes." At the end of his historical sketch the writer endeavors to isolate and formulate the fundamental traits of Etruscan and of Italic art. There is a good, short bibliography, consisting chiefly of standard books.

F. P. JOHNSON

University of Chicago

The Fish-tailed Monster in Greek and Etruscan Art. By KATHARINE SHEPARD. 520 West 114th Street, New York: The Author, 1940. Pp. xii+125+16 pls. \$2.00.

According to a typed slip which came with this book, it is a Ph.D. dissertation written at Bryn Mawr under the direction of Dr. Mary H. Swindler. The book itself contains no mention of this and no acknowledgment to anybody at Bryn Mawr. Some little drama here? Anyhow, no one will doubt the authenticity of the typed slip after reading the third sentence of the Introduction.

The author has occasion to mention a very large number of objects, many of them very briefly. She is concerned with most of them in only one aspect and apparently has not taken great care in matters which are unimportant for her subject. Thus Kolchos is a vase-painter, and the familiar akroteria from Locri are dated 493 B.C. There are more than five hundred footnotes, consisting almost entirely of citations, and that would seem to be enough; but the works chosen for citation are frequently not the latest, the most accessible, or the most authoritative. One gains the impression that the author lacks a general acquaintance with the literature of archeology. However, she has been diligent in her search for fish-tailed monsters and has found some that could easily be missed. Her general historical conclusions are well stated in a final chapter. The ninety-nine illustrations are small, but nearly all show what they are intended to show. Printing and proofreading are satisfactory.

The book will be consulted by all who have occasion to deal with material of the kind discussed in it.

F. P. JOHNSON

University of Chicago

The Clausulae in the Confessions of St. Augustine. By SISTER M. BORROME CARROLL, O.P., M.A. ("Catholic University of America Patristic Studies," Vol. LXII.) Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1940. Pp. xv+89. Price \$2.00.

This is another of those painstaking studies of prose rhythm in late Latin of which so many have issued from Professor Deferrari's workshop. Augustine's *Confessions* proves to be less formal in style than the *City of God*, only 65 per cent of its clausulae being metrical as contrasted with 80 per cent in the latter work. The author provides careful tabulations of both metrical and accentual forms in the sentence endings; it is obvious that accent has not yet routed quantity, as it had in Augustine's contemporary Ammianus; yet it is curious that in each of these authors spondee cretic and double spondee make up about one-third of the clausulae, though in different proportions. We still lack a satisfactory study of this whole movement from quantity to accent; many years ago A. C. Clark and I called attention to accentual rhythm in Petronius, but no one seems to have followed it up. I am not convinced by the author's treatment of elision; it seems unlikely to me that Augustine elided as much as she thinks possible. And apparently she did not realize that *i* and *u* may be consonantal as well as vocalic, e.g., she counts *rapiébat* as four syllables, whereas it may just as well be *ra-pyé-bat*, as so often in Ammianus. This vitiates some of her conclusions about accentual rhythm. But her dissertation is, nevertheless, a careful piece of work, another useful contribution to the series. There are a good index and bibliography.

CHARLES UPSON CLARK

North Hatley, Quebec

Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der giessener Universitätsbibliothek, V: Alexandrinische Geronten vor Kaiser Gaius: Ein neues Bruchstück der sogenannten alexandrinischen Märtyrer-Akten. P. bibl. Univ. Giss. 46. By ANTON VON PREMIERSTEIN. "Schriften der Ludwigs-Universität zu Giessen" [1936]. Giessen, 1939.

Karl Kalbfleisch published this study of a third-century papyrus left unfinished at the time of Premierstein's death. The publication includes a description by Hermann Eberhart, a transcription by Eberhart, which was checked by Kalbfleisch, a highly conjectural restoration of the text, a fully documented commentary of fifty pages by Premierstein, and three plates. The document is an account of the appeal to Rome of a dispute between the leaders of a newly established *gerousia* in Alexandria and several opposition leaders. The items of major importance in this papyrus are the indications that the Alexandrian elders arrived in Rome at the time of the suicide of Tiberius Gemellus (i.e., A.D. 37), that they were representatives of a council of 173 representing 180,000 citizens, that they were "Greeks," and that there

had been a Greek settlement in Alexandria for 630 years. The author's argument that the Tiberius Caesar whose death is alluded to was not the emperor but Tiberius Gemellus is somewhat unconvincing in that it requires the author of this third-century romantic account to be accurately informed on many details of the emperor's career. Moreover, one feels that it was the emperor's death that would be relevant to this narrative.

ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

University of Chicago

The Romans in Spain, 217 B.C.—A.D. 117. By C. H. V. SUTHERLAND. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1939. Pp. xi+264+12 pls.+3 maps.

This volume, admittedly a "short and, for the most part, general survey," has the virtues and the shortcomings of any similar account of any Roman province. It possesses a degree of objectivity which the more extended treatments of provincial specialists so frequently lack. At the same time the author's numismatic competence is skilfully applied to the evidence from Spain. Also admirable are the emphasis upon the experimental, tentative, and flexible character of Roman administration from 205 to 165 B.C. and the sanely conservative treatment of "the already threadbare controversy about romanization." Condensation is no doubt responsible for the unsatisfactory presentation of certain disputed points. The original accounts of Hannibal's oath, for example, should not be translated as a pledge of "perpetual hatred." Discussion of precedents for the division of the peninsula into three provinces does not include reference to the three *legati* used by Pompey to administer the territory. Errors and omissions of this sort, however, do not seriously affect the value of this straightforward, informative exposition of Rome's work in Spain.

J. J. VAN NOSTRAND

University of California

BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Books submitted are not returnable.]

- CARPENTER, RHYS. *Observations on Familiar Statuary in Rome*. ("Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome," Vol. XVIII.) New York: American Academy in Rome, 1941. Pp. vi+112+34 pls.
- CHASE, ALSTON HURD, and PHILLIPS, HENRY, JR. *A New Introduction to Greek*. Ann Arbor: Edwards Bros., 1941. Pp. vi+112. \$2.25. Lithoprinted. For sale by the authors, whose address is Peabody Hall, Exeter, N.H.
- EFRON, ANDREW. *The Sacred Tree Script: The Esoteric Foundation of Plato's Wisdom*. New Haven, Conn.: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Co., 1941. Pp. xxiv+372.
- FERN, SISTER MARY EDMOND. *The Latin Consolatio as a Literary Type*. (Diss., St. Louis University.) St. Louis, Mo., 1941. Pp. x+230. Paper, \$2.00; cloth, \$2.75. For sale by the author, whose address is Webster College, Webster Groves, Mo.
- GINSBURG, MICHAEL. *Hunting Scenes on Roman Glass in the Rhineland*. ("University of Nebraska Studies," Vol. XLI, No. 2 ["Studies in the Humanities," No. 1], August, 1941.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1941. Pp. 31. \$0.75.
- PEASE, ARTHUR STANLEY. *Caeli enarrant*. (Reprinted from the *Harvard Theological Review*, XXXIV, No. 3 [July, 1941], 163-200.)
- PRITCHETT, WILLIAM KENDRICK, and MERITT, BENJAMIN DEAN. *The Chronology of Hellenistic Athens*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. xxxv+158. \$5.00.
- RAMSAY, SIR WILLIAM M. *The Social Basis of Roman Power in Asia Minor*. Prepared for the press by J. G. C. ANDERSON. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1941. Pp. xii+305.
- ROBINSON, DAVID M. *Excavations at Olynthus, Part X: Metal and Minor Miscellaneous Finds: An Original Contribution to Greek Life (with a New Up-to-Date Map of Olynthus)*. ("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology," No. 31.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. xxviii+593+171 pls. +1 map. \$20.00.
- STARR, CHESTER G., JR. *The Roman Imperial Navy, 31 B.C.-A.D. 324*. ("Cornell Studies in Classical Philology," Vol. XXVI.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1941. Pp. xviii+228. \$2.50.
- STRÖMBERG, REINHOLD. *Griechische Pflanzennamen*. ("Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift" Vol. XLVI [1940:1].) Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag. Pp. 190. Kr. 10.
- Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. LXXI (1940). Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press, Inc.; Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, Ltd. Pp. viii+659+cix.

